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Abstract
Do causes always precede their effects? Can we affect the past? Or is the unidi-
rectionality of time a consequence of the causal fabric that makes up our universe?
The relationship between causality and temporality is an intriguing subject for
physicists, philosophers and fans of science fiction. In psychology, causal and
temporal perception have been usually studied independently.
Recent research, however, has demonstrated the key role of temporal order
cues in causal attribution, showing, for example, that children from a very young
age expect causes to precede their effects. Here, we follow the opposite route:
building on recent findings that the elapsed time between two events appears to
contract when the events are assumed to be causally linked, we examined whether
beliefs or perceptions of causal structure can affect the perceived temporal order.
Our results point to a novel perceptual illusion that we call the “causal reordering
effect”: in the presence of strong causal beliefs, causal order defines temporal
order; the presumed cause is seen to precede its associated effect even if, in reality,
it occurs after it. We present experiments illustrating the reordering effect not
only when causal relationships are recently learned but also when causality is
directly perceived. In addition, we show the effect to persist despite extended
exposure to the stimuli and to lead participants not only to reorder the events
but also to misremember the stimuli.
The perception of causality in dynamic sequences with such extreme viola-
tions of Newtonian principles conflicts with the predictions of current theories of
causal perception. This observation led us to conduct a set of studies that re-
evaluate the findings upon which those theories are based. Our results indicate
that causal impressions are far more ubiquitous than currently thought and that
previous interpretations of experimental findings conflate judgements of causality
with judgements of collision faithfulness.
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CHAPTER 1
Causality and Temporality in the Mind
Imagine watching a long queue of dominoes falling one after the other. As each
domino falls, it knocks the next one in the queue which falls and knocks the
next one and so on. While you are observing the 1/1 domino knocking the 2/2,
something rather unexpected happens: Just as the 2/2 starts falling, the 3/3
domino which is next in the queue is already going down, knocking the domino
that follows it (Fig. 1.1). So, as a matter of fact the 3/3 domino fell before its
time, before being touched by the previous domino. This thesis is concerned with
the following, apparently straightforward question: Will you see the early domino
fall?
Figure 1.1: The temporal order (the 3/3 domino falls before the 2/2 touches it) does
not match the assumed causal order (the 2/2 domino causes the fall of the 3/3). How
do we resolve this incongruence?
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Intuitively, the answer seems obvious: Surely, as long as the events don’t
happen too fast and provided the observer is actually attending to the events in
question, then it’s hard to imagine how one can fail to notice the domino’s early
fall. Consider another scenario, though: your friend is holding a glass of water
that suddenly slips through his hand and starts falling to the floor. While you are
following the glass with your gaze and half a second before it reaches the ground,
it shatters to pieces. Do you think you would perceive the early break?
Figure 1.2: If a glass shatters half a second before it hits the floor, when would you
perceive the shattering?
If there is a reason to doubt one’s accuracy in perceiving the objective order
of these events - the domino falls before it is knocked, the glass shatters before
it hits the ground - that is due to one’s causal beliefs. Causality comes in an
immense variety of flavours but all causal events obey the temporal precedence
rule: effects may be simultaneous or may follow their causes, but, at least from an
epistemic point of view, they never precede their causes. Although, the theoretical
possibility of backwards causation is a common subject in science fiction and
philosophical discourse (Black, 1956; Dummett, 1964; Poidevin, 1988), in everyday
life the possibility of affecting the past is normally considered absurd.
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Since in our understanding of the world, the causal relata are temporally or-
dered, our causal beliefs carry information about the order in which related events
take place. Thus, what is interesting in the above examples is that the causal in-
formation is in conflict with the order in which events actually take place. If we
attribute the fall of the domino to the previous domino knocking it or if we at-
tribute the shattering of the glass to its collision with the ground, then our beliefs
are incongruent with what our senses deliver. The different causal models that we
hold for each situation is also what might make us relatively more reserved when
predicting our impression in the glass case compared to the domino one. While
we can imagine a number of alternative causal explanations for the domino’s fall
(e.g. someone knocked the table, there was a sudden gust of wind), it is harder
to imagine a different cause for the glass shattering, especially since the obvious
cause is only half a second away.
So, regarding the question that we asked earlier, a closer reflection reveals
that when there is a mismatch between causation and temporal order, one is
forced to disregard one piece of evidence in favour of the other. Is the perception
of temporal order a hard constraint or can there be conditions in which causal
attributions override the perceived order of events? Thus posed, the question
taps into a number of unresolved issues in the philosophical and the psychological
study of causal attribution, the perception of time and the relationship between
the two. Is it the case, as our intuition tells us, that the temporal order of
events is perceived directly? Specifically, is the order of event representation in
the mind mirroring the order in which events happen in the outside world? Is
time represented by time? Moreover, are causal beliefs, at least in some cases,
the product of direct perception? Even more generally, is there such a thing as
direct encapsulated perception or is the percept always modulated by experience,
memory and expectation?
Of course, the work presented here has no ambition to settle any of these
questions, some of which have been fiercely debated for at least the last 100
years. Based on experimental data, we will principally attempt to answer the
question we set at the beginning regarding the role of causality in the perception
of temporal order. However, in doing so, the hope is to illuminate aspects of the
above controversies and ideally offer a novel perspective.
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1.1 Time as a Guide to Cause
According to the traditional view on causal judgement, causal relationships are
not perceived directly but are inferred from cues such as spatiotemporal contigu-
ity and constant conjunction. For David Hume, a cause is “an object precedent
and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are
plac’d in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resem-
ble the latter” (Hume, 1739, p.170). So, we call “cause”, according to Hume, an
event that occurs just before another event, provided that we have experienced
enough sequences with the same types of events occurring in the same temporal
order. Kant (1781) disagrees with Hume on whether causation is a construction
of the mind and argues that given the repeated experience of temporally ordered
of events, causation can be perceived in the environment. Aside from their fa-
mous disagreement, both philosophers assume the accurate detection of the order
of events based on which causal impressions are formed through perception or
inference.
In the psychology of causation, a similar pattern emerges. Although there is
a heated debate about whether constant conjunction is the main determinant of
causal learning and judgement (Ahn & Kalish, 2000; Cheng, 1997; Danks, 2005;
Newsome, 2003; White, 1989), all parties seem to agree on the importance of
temporal contiguity and precedence. Regarding contiguity, it has been shown
experimentally that when the temporal distance between two events exceeds ap-
proximately 2 seconds causal impressions are destroyed (Michotte, 1963; Shanks,
Pearson, & Dickinson, 1989).
For others, it is not the time that elapses between the cause and the effect per
se that matters but rather the probability of occurrence of alternative causes: the
longer the gap the higher the chance that other events will intervene (Lagnado
& Speekenbrink, 2010). Even in the absence of intervening events, longer delays
can be tolerated if such delays are expected. In a series of studies Buehner and
May (2002, 2003, 2004) have shown that greater delays do not necessarily destroy
causal impressions if the mechanism connecting the cause and the effect is assumed
to require some time to operate. Short delays can even be detrimental to causal
attributions if longer temporal gaps are expected (Buehner & McGregor, 2006).
The role of mechanism in influencing the accepted delay between the cause and
the effect has also been studied from a developmental perspective: Schlottmann
(1999) has shown that adults and children over 10 years old prefer contiguous
relationships unless a mechanism that requires a certain amount of time is known
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to be in place. However, despite appreciating the role of intervening mechanisms
(Shultz, 1982) and even if they are shown that some particular mechanism re-
quires time to bring about the effect, younger children still show a preference for
temporal contiguity (Schlottmann, 1999). Thus, it seems that an initial bias for
contiguous causal events can be overruled in certain circumstances and provided
some experience in causal reasoning.
The issue of temporal precedence, on the other hand, has received less atten-
tion, perhaps due to our strong intuitions about its necessity. Existing empirical
findings point to the conclusion that people not only make causal attributions
based on temporal order but that, furthermore, order information may override
other cues to causation such as contingency data. Lagnado and Sloman (2006),
for example, presented participants with a scenario in which four computers were
infected with a virus. According to the instructions, the virus was always trans-
mitted from a connected computer and, most critically, the virus on each computer
might have been activated with a variable delay irrespective of when the computer
was actually infected. Despite the fact that in this scenario temporal order in-
formation should have been discarded in favour of the covariation information
that was also provided, the majority of participants preferred causal structures
consistent with the order in which the virus appeared on each computer.
In a similar vein, White (2006a) asked participants to infer the causal relation-
ships in a situation where 5 species cohabited a natural reserve. Given information
about the population fluctuation of each species, the goal was to determine the
preys and the predators in the reserve. Participants performed very poorly in
four experiments in which no temporal information was given. In fact, accord-
ing to the author, their mistakes were consistent with the hypothesis that they
interpreted the order in which statements were presented as the order in which
events actually took place. This effect persisted even if participants were specif-
ically instructed not to attribute temporal meaning to the order of statements.
Their performance was significantly improved only when explicit temporal order
information was given.
Similar results have been observed in studies with very young children. By
the age of 5-7, the majority of children use precedence information to determine
causes and effects (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Burns & McCormack, 2009; Rankin
& McCormack, 2013; Shultz & Mendelson, 1975). For younger children although
there has been evidence for ignoring or violating precedence in causal judgements,
i.e. allowing for causes to follow their effects (Shultz & Mendelson, 1975), later
studies provided evidence for the opposite (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Rankin &
McCormack, 2013). Bullock and Gelman (1979) argued that at the age of 3 chil-
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dren’s nonverbal reports show that they behave as if relations are unidirectional
but only older children can articulate this belief.
In addition, Lagnado and Sloman (2004) have stressed the role of temporal
order information in causal induction through intervention. Apart from the ability
to disrupt the normal operation of a causal network and examine its downstream
behaviour (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 1993) the authors argue
that the “advantage for intervention derives from the fact that the temporal cue
is a more stable indicator of actual temporal order when one is intervening on a
system rather than when one is passively observing it” (Lagnado & Sloman, 2004,
p.875). When we intervene on a system we gain dependable information about the
order of events and order information can greatly facilitate causal attributions.
1.2 Evidence for a Bidirectional Relationship
According to the above discussion, there does not seem to be a reason to doubt the
priority of temporal order information when assigning causal roles. The reviewed
experimental evidence shows that both adults and children from a very young
age rely heavily on the order in which events take place. Referring to our earlier
example, it follows that when we see the glass breaking before contacting the floor
we will certainly not consider it as a case of backwards causation; rather, we will
revise our causal beliefs, search for an alternative explanation and, in the worst
case, remain puzzled by the seemingly uncaused shattering.
It is important to notice, however, that all the available experimental evidence
for the criticality of temporal order cues is drawn from causal learning contexts.
In the experiments we have described, adults and children are asked to make
judgements in situations where beliefs about the causal structure and/or the di-
rectionality of relationships are absent or very weak. In these primarily inductive
tasks, people are searching the environment for cues that will allow them to form
general causal rules. It is undeniable that in the absence of prior knowledge
and especially in observation-only tasks, temporal order is the only cue to causal
structure.
In the glass and the domino examples, however, strong causal assumptions are
already present. Most people probably have a very solid idea about what caused
a domino to drop in a long queue of dominoes or what explains the shattering of
a glass that was heading to the ground. As discussed, such causal beliefs carry
temporal order information. Thus, it might be the case that observing a well-
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known causal relationship and observing the cues that lead to the apprehension
of a new one, are quite distinct processes. In the words of Norwood Hanson, the
difference might be like “the difference between having a visual impression of a
lunaroid patch and observing the moon” (Hanson, 1958, p.65). If, nevertheless,
the perception of temporal order is a process encapsulated from other cognitive
processes and if its product mirrors the temporal structure of the external world,
then causal beliefs or other sources of temporal expectations would be irrelevant.
In the rest of this section we will discuss theoretical reasons for doubting the
primacy of temporal order cues and the potential evidence for a more bidirectional
relationship between causal and temporal order.
1.2.1 Causal theory of time
Perhaps, one reason for doubting the primacy of temporal order is that from
a metaphysical perspective it remains an open question. Although, as we saw
earlier, Hume (1739) reduced the causal direction to the temporal order, other
philosophers found this reduction unsatisfactory (Price & Weslake, 2009). There
have been, for example, a number of theories according to which the causal rela-
tionship is more primitive than the temporal one and, thus, it is the time arrow
that is reducible to the causal arrow (Grunbaum, 1968; Reichenbach, 1956; Van
Fraassen, 1970).
According to causal theories of time, an event A occurs before an event B in
case A can cause B but not the converse. Even if such theories had enjoyed more
support in the philosophical circles (Earman, 1972; Lacey, 1968), such ontological
views have limited use from a psychological perspective. Even if the temporal
order of events was in fact reducible to their causal relationships at some meta-
physical level, there would be no adequate reason to assume that the human
experience reflects that. The mere fact that we can make order judgements even
for non-causally related events shows that, in our experience, causation and tem-
poral order might be related but are certainly independent notions. For example,
we can reliably report the order in which athletes finish the 200 meters dash, even
if we rarely assume that the finishing of the winner caused the finishing of the
runner-up.
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1.2.2 Is temporal order directly perceived?
A more interesting avenue to re-examining the relationship between causal and
temporal order is centred on the way we perceive and represent temporal order.
Both the Humean approach and the experimental evidence reviewed earlier pre-
sume the veridical perception of temporal order. The assumption, although not
directly discussed, is that the experience of temporal order is a purely perceptual
phenomenon: a low-level encapsulated process that depends only on the input
that the senses deliver.
In the philosophy of time this is known as mirroring or inheritance and states
that the experience of time duration and/or that of temporal order mirror or
inherit the temporal structure of the environment. Its proponents endorse at a
greater or lesser degree the view that there is a match between the properties of the
content of temporal experience and the properties of the vehicle the carries that
experience (Hoerl, 2013; Mellor, 1985; Phillips, 2014; Soteriou, 2010)1. “When
I see e precede e*, the only sensations I need have are those that reveal to me
the two events themselves. What makes me see them to be in that order is not
another sensation, but simply that I see them in that order” (Mellor, 1985, p.144).
So, even if there is nothing red and nothing square in our mind when we perceive
a red square, there is some form of succession when we perceive events that follow
each other, such as a red square turning blue.
From an experimental perspective, it has been argued that the existence of
the “prior entry” effect constitutes evidence for Mellor’s (1985) position that the
perception of temporal order is defined by the order in which events arrive in
consciousness (Vibell, Klinge, Zampini, Spence, & Nobre, 2007). In prior entry,
we perceive as happening first the event that we attend to (Spence & Parise,
2010). In a typical study, subjects are asked to focus on to the left or the right of
a fixation point and report which of the two stimuli - one shown on the left and
on on the right - appears first. Although it has been noted that response bias may
also affect the reported order of events (Schneider & Bavelier, 2003; Shore, Spence,
& Klein, 2001) proponents of the validity of the phenomenon insist that even if
confounds are controlled for, attention is still modulating the perceived order
(Shore et al., 2001; Spence & Parise, 2010). In explaining prior entry, Spence and
Parise have claimed that attention speeds up the processing of the stimuli so that
“attended stimuli typically reach awareness earlier than relatively less attended
1Although there are various versions of the mirroring theory, here we will be concerned only
with what Lee (2014) calls ’Topological Mirroring’ in which perception inherits only the order
in which events take place and not necessarily the duration of those events.
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stimuli” (Spence & Parise, 2010, p.375). In that respect, the perceived temporal
order of events depends on the arrival of those events in consciousness, and factors
such as attention may speed up certain input signals over others.
Other philosophers have criticized the mirroring theory exactly for confusing
the content with the vehicle (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Lee, 2014). According
to a well-known quote “a succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of
succession” (James, 1890, p.629). Such criticisms are usually based on the exis-
tence of phenomena in which the temporal characteristics of perceptions diverge
from the properties of the events that triggered those perceptions.
For example, Hirsh and Sherrick (1961) presented participants with 2 succes-
sive auditory, visual or tactile stimuli separated by 10-60 ms. At around 20 ms
participants could more or less, depending on the modality, reliably report whether
the cues were simultaneous or successive. However, irrespective of modality, par-
ticipants’ performance was close to chance when asked to report the order in which
the same events took place. The authors hypothesized the existence in the brain
of a separate module that computes the order of events and is common to all
sensory modalities. Similar results were obtained more recently with visual-only
stimuli at slightly higher intervals (30-50 ms) by Mitrani and colleagues (Mitrani,
Shekerdjiiski, & Yakimoff, 1986); they have also concluded that simultaneity and
order are computed by two quasi-independent mechanisms having different tem-
poral resolution. Irrespective of its realization at the physical level (Marr, 1982),
it appears rather hard for the mirroring theorist to explain how it is possible to
perceive the lack of simultaneity without being able to report the order of events
(Lee, 2014).
Another set of behavioural results that cast doubt on the mirroring view are
collectively known as postdiction phenomena (see Shimojo, 2014, for a review).
Postdiction refers to cases in which the perception of some event is influenced by
an event that temporally follows it. For example, in the colour phi phenomenon
(Kolers & von Grunau, 1975) a red circular spot is shown on the left of the screen,
followed by a green spot of the same size and shape shown on the right. Observers
of this sequence report the presence of a single spot that moves from left to right,
like the phi effect and, furthermore, that the spot abruptly changes colour from
red to green, approximately at the midpoint of its trajectory. Similar to other
postdiction effects, like the “cutaneous rabbit” (Geldard & Sherrick, 1972), what
is most interesting is that in order for observers to see the colour changing to
green at the midway point they must have already seen the green spot. Thus,
the perceived order of events (red at left - green at middle - green at right) is in
this case the result of inference that occurs after all objects have been displayed,
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unlike what mirroring theory would predict.
In order to explain postdiction, several theorists (Dainton, 2010; Eagleman &
Sejnowski, 2000; Grush, 2005, 2007, 2008) have put forward the idea that temporal
experience, rather than purely bottom-up, it is, especially in short time-scales, a
more constructed process. According to Grush “the details of what is experienced
within [a temporal interval] is not a mere passive reflection of the world’s tem-
porality, but is the result of active interpretation” (Grush, 2007, p.2). Although
there are differences between the various accounts that argue for an “active” view
on temporal perception - mainly about the time in which this interpretation takes
place - what is interesting from our perspective is the idea that, especially in short
time intervals, we don’t passively perceive the temporal order of events. Rather,
as shown on the right panel of figure 1.3, we take into account both the immediate
past and the immediate future, either by slightly delaying our verdict (Dainton,
2010; Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000) or by relying on predictions (Grush, 2005,
2007).
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Figure 1.3: According to the mirroring view (left) the perceived temporal order (top
line) copies the temporal order of the environment (bottom line). For Grush (2007), at
every instant, the perceived temporal order is the product of an integration that takes
into account preceding events as well as events that are predicted to follow.
1.2.3 Evidence from multisensory integration
Although, according to the above discussion, it might be argued that the experi-
enced time does not necessarily match the temporal features of the environment,
it remains unclear why and under which conditions people reinterpret the order of
events. One important cognitive process where such reinterpretation takes place
and that has also been quoted as evidence against the mirroring view (Dennett &
Kinsbourne, 1992) is known as multisensory integration. The fact that light trav-
els much faster than sound and that the transduction of sound by the ear requires
less time compared to the transduction of light by the retina means that audio-
visual signals coming from distances shorter or longer than 10 metres (i.e. the
horizon of simultaneity) should be perceived as asynchronous. However, when the
Causality and Temporality in the Mind 29
visual and the auditory signals are thought to belong to the same source the brain
shifts the perceived time of arrival of the signals in order to reinstate simultaneity
(King, 2005; Spence & Squire, 2003).
Furthermore, it has been shown (Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashino, & Nishida, 2004;
Vroomen, Keetels, de Gelder, & Bertelson, 2004) that adaptation to some fixed
time lag leads to recalibration of the subjective point of simultaneity. In other
words, a lengthy (e.g. 3 min) exposure to a delay between two signals can cause
people to change what they perceive as simultaneous in a way that compensates
for the delay they were adapted to.
By adopting the same principles and methodology found in recalibration liter-
ature, Stetson and colleagues (Stetson, Cui, Montague, & Eagleman, 2006) have
shown that multisensory recalibration can change not only the perceived simul-
taneity but also the perceived order of events. In their experiment, participants
were adapted to a 135 ms delay between a keypress and a subsequent flash. In
some trials, however, the flash was displayed at a variable delay either after or
before the keypress. What was found was that following adaptation to the 135 ms
delay, when the flash appeared in less than 44 ms after the keypress, participants
reported that the flash actually came before the keypress. Similar results were
reported by Heron, Hanson, and Whitaker (2009).
These studies are especially interesting from our perspective, not only as ex-
amples of misperception of the temporal order of events but, furthermore, for
suggesting that causal beliefs (keypress - flash) are overridden by sensory recali-
bration. This can be seen as the opposite effect of what we have been discussing
so far. Instead of causal beliefs influencing the perception of temporal order, it
appears that other, more fundamental mechanisms (King & Palmer, 1985) take
precedence over causal expectations.
However, as noted elsewhere (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009) it is unclear
whether in those experiments (Heron et al., 2009; Stetson et al., 2006) causal
beliefs were indeed present. Although the intention was for the subjects to form
the belief that their keypress is causing the appearance of a flash on the screen,
in 40% of the trials (Stetson et al., 2006) the flash actually appeared from -150
ms before to 150 ms after the keypress. Thus, it is certainly possible that seeing
the flash before their press in approximately 20% of the trials and, moreover, be-
ing repeatedly asked about the order of events might have dissolved participants’
belief in the causal efficacy of their keypress.
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1.2.4 Causal influences on perception
While multisensory integration provides evidence against the mirroring view of
order perception, the mechanisms involved in the temporal displacement of expe-
rienced events are typically thought to be rather low level (King & Palmer, 1985).
Causal perception, on the other hand, at least according to the Humean tradition
depends on higher level cognitive processes, such as memory. Although there have
been arguments for a lower level direct causal perception (Michotte, 1963; Scholl
& Tremoulet, 2000) which will be discussed at a later stage, it would be more in-
formative, at this point, to review the evidence for the role of causal impressions in
visual perception, without insisting on the particular nature of those impressions.
In that respect, Scholl and Nakayama (2004) have conducted an experiment
showing that the spatial location of objects can be influenced by causal impres-
sions. In particular, they have presented participants with a movie clip in which
a disc A approaches another disc B and overlaps with it before B starts moving.
Subjects were asked to indicate the percentage of overlap. According to the re-
sults, when the context of the clip implied a collision, i.e. a causal event, there
was a significant underestimation of the amount of overlap. In other words, when
the first disc was seen as bumping the second one, the resting location of the first
disc was misperceived to be more compatible with a causal interpretation of the
sequence of events.
More recently, Kim and colleagues (Kim, Feldman, & Singh, 2013) showed
that causal impressions can also influence the apparent trajectory of motion. In
their experiments participants were asked to report the motion of a rectangular
target object which was seen alternating between two locations. Although this
apparent motion was identical between conditions, participants’ responses were
strongly influenced by the presence and behaviour of a pair of green rectangular
objects: When the green objects moved horizontally participants reported an
horizontal trajectory of the target object. Conversely, when the green objects
moved vertically, the red rectangle appeared to subjects to be moving in a circular
trajectory through a tube (that was present in all conditions). According to
the authors (Kim et al., 2013), this can be explained by a causal interpretation
(perceived collision) that was imposed in the relationship between the red object
and the green one and that causal impression subsequently defined the reported
trajectory of the red object.
Causal impressions were also shown to affect the perceived size of objects
(Buehner & Humphreys, 2010). In the first experiment of that study, participants
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viewed a circle (launcher) moving to the right towards a rectangular bar and
stopping next to it, at which point another circle (launchee) that was initially
located at the right end of the rectangle started moving also to the right. In the
second condition of the same experiment the launchee moved with a 600 ms delay.
Participants judged the delayed launching as significantly less causal compared
to the immediate launching. Most importantly, after each viewing participants
were asked to estimate the length of the intervening rectangle which was varied
between trials. The results indicated that in “causal” trials, i.e. when there was
no delay between the movement of the circles, participants underestimated the
size of the rectangle and, conversely, they overestimated it in “non-causal” trials2.
The authors concluded that “the human perceptual system apparently resolves
low-level ambiguities by drawing on higher-level cognitive concepts (causality in
this case), which are themselves derived from low-level percepts” (Buehner &
Humphreys, 2010, p.48).
1.2.5 Causal binding of causes to effects
Even more relevant to our current purposes, Buehner and colleagues (Buehner,
2012; Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Humphreys & Buehner, 2010) have conducted
a number of experiments that show how causal beliefs can affect the perceived
time that elapses between causes and effects. More specifically, in Buehner and
Humphreys (2009), subjects went through 3 phases in 2 conditions (Fig. 1.4). In
the first phase they were either exposed to two tones, T1 and T2 separated by
a fixed delay of 500, 900 or 1300 ms, preceded by two preparatory tones P1 and
P2 (baseline condition) or they were asked to press a key following which tone
T2 was heard (causal condition). The aim of the two different conditions was to
induce a causal belief in the relationship between the keypress and tone T2 in the
causal condition but not in the baseline condition, in which the target tone T2
was heard without the participants’ intervention.
2In chapter 5 we will evaluate this causal vs. non-causal distinction
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Figure 1.4: The three experimental phases in the two conditions of the first experiment
in Buehner and Humphreys (2009)
Following training, subjects in both conditions had to synchronize a keypress
with a tone T1 that was preceded by tones P1 and P2 and was followed (with a
fixed delay) by T2. In the final phase, again common to both conditions, partici-
pants were asked to synchronize their keypress with both T1 and T2. By trying
to synchronize two key presses against two tones, participants were essentially ex-
pressing in a behavioural way their estimation for the time that elapses between
the tones T1 and T2. According to the results, participants underestimated this
delay significantly more in the causal condition compared to the baseline condi-
tion. Thus, when participants assumed a causal link between the keypress and
the tone, they consistently expected a shorter delay between the cause and the
effect. Similar results were observed when the delay between the two events was
randomized, thus non-predictable, and subjects simply reported their estimation
about the temporal distance (Humphreys & Buehner, 2010).
In explaining the temporal binding effect, a Bayesian account has been pro-
posed (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; Eagleman & Holcombe, 2002; Griffiths &
Tenenbaum, 2011). Since from a Humean perspective, temporal contiguity is one
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of the fundamental cues to causality, then, conversely, causal expectations should
influence judgements of temporal duration. In other words, in the presence of
a strong prior for causes and effects to occur in close temporal proximity, then
the cognitive system will be biased towards underestimating the time that elapses
between the two related events3.
The temporal binding effect provides evidence that causal beliefs can affect the
perception of time. According to the Bayesian interpretation, causality imposes
constraints that direct the way time is experienced. In the next chapter we will
start investigating the extent to which strong causal priors can influence not only
the time that elapses between the cause and the effect but also the temporal order
in which events are experienced.
1.3 Roadmap
In what follows we will investigate the relationship between causal perception
and temporal order judgements. The aim of the research that will be presented is
twofold: One the one hand, we want to evaluate the philosophical claims regarding
the nature of temporal order perception and representation. Is the order that we
perceive a mirror image of the temporal structure of our environment or is it
open to interpretation? At the same time, we wish to assess whether causal
assumptions can produce qualitative distortions in perception. Since the effect
we are investigating is novel, we will approach it using different experimental
paradigms and attempt to address some of the most obvious confounds.
Most of the experiments in this thesis have the following format: Participants
are presented with a video animation in which what is assumed to be the cause
occurs after its associated effect. Following the presentation of such a clip, par-
ticipants are asked to report the order in which events took place. Thus, the
main dependent variable in the majority of our experiments is whether causes
are reported to occur before their effects according to causal interpretations or
after them according to direct perceptual input. The potential inadequacies of
the measure will be discussed and, in some cases, alternative measures will be
employed.
Specifically, in the next chapter, we will present 4 experiments in which partici-
3According to an alternative forwards model (Haggard & Clark, 2003), temporal binding is
explained by the preparation for an action that generates a prediction of the effects of that action
to allow for more precise control. However, this account applies only to cases where agency is
involved, whereas here we are concerned with observation-only conditions.
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pants are introduced to a computer-based animated world, featuring novel objects
connected through novel causal relationships. After learning these relationships,
participants are presented with a clip in which the temporal order is incongruent
to the causal order, in which the effect takes place before its presumed cause. In
the first two experiments of that chapter we found strong evidence for the reorder-
ing effect, with the majority of participants ignoring the objective temporal order
of events and being very confident in the causal order that they report.
However, the next 2 experiments did not corroborate these results, casting
some doubt on the validity or, at least the robustness of the effect. In particular,
these results raise the possibility that the effect occurs only in the presence of
perceptually noisy stimuli. We discuss the concern that participants report the
causal rather than the objective temporal order of events not because causality
drives their perception or interpretation of the scene but rather because causality
provides the most plausible explanation in the absence of direct sensory input. In
other words, if the presented sequences are too complex and/or attention is driven
away from the critical events, then the observed effect might be due to some form
of response bias: Participants report the order on which they were trained, the
order that they presume to be correct.
The two chapters that follow describe two very different approaches to disam-
biguating the determinants of the reordering effect and evaluating its robustness.
In chapter 3, we present two experiments in which rather than training partici-
pants in novel causal relationships we use sequences featuring prototypical causal
relationships, object collisions. According to the Michottean tradition (Michotte,
1963), the causal impressions resulting from such sequences are not due to infer-
ences based on past experiences (Hume, 1739) but rather are the product of direct
causal perception. Irrespective of the actual route to causal perception, the use of
prototypical causal relationships allowed us to address the possibility of response
bias driving the reordering effect. In both studies of that chapter, there was no
training, the sequences, compared to earlier experiments, were relatively simple
and the speed of the objects relatively slow, thus significantly reducing perceptual
load. Furthermore, in the second experiment of that chapter, rather than par-
ticipants reporting the order of events, they were asked to identify the sequence
they saw against a normal collision, i.e a sequence in which temporal and causal
order match. Our results showed a strong reordering effect with the majority of
participants reporting the causal order and selecting the sequence that featured
the causal order of events rather than the order they have actually witnessed.
In chapter 4, we continue the investigation of attentional confounds to the
reordering effect by presenting two experiments featuring repeated presentation
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of the critical sequences. Here, participants not only have the chance to observe
the animated clips multiple times but, moreover, they are implicitly or explicitly
instructed to observe particularly the order in which events take place. Accord-
ing to our results, participants who observe the critical sequence more than once,
are less likely to reorder the events. Nevertheless, the majority still prefers the
causal rather than the objective temporal order. On the other hand, if the atten-
tion is drawn explicitly to the order of the events, the causal reordering effect is
nearly eliminated. However, we note an additional confound related to the latter
paradigm: drawing attention to the order of events can potentially weaken causal
beliefs which, as discussed throughout this thesis, is thought to be the main factor
in distorting the temporal order.
The last empirical chapter is a slight detour, by revisiting the causal perception
debate and evaluating the evidence upon which this debate is based. Although,
it is generally agreed that causal impressions in dynamic sequences require events
to obey quasi-Newtonian rules, our observations indicated that participants have
strong causal impressions even in the presence of extreme spatiotemporal devia-
tions from Newton’s laws. We, thus, conducted three experiments that directly
assess the role of spatial gaps and temporal delays in causal perception. We find
that participants report strong impressions of causality even when spatial and
temporal deviations are more extreme than those usually employed in the litera-
ture. We put forward an explanation according to which past research conflates
impressions of causality with reports of collision faithfulness.
In the last chapter, we summarize our findings and attempt an explanation of
the causal reordering based on the accumulated evidence. We, finally, discuss the
theoretical and practical implications of our research and explore possibilities for
extending the work and the ideas presented here.

CHAPTER 2
Cause as a Guide to Time
According to our review of the literature, although temporal order is one of the
most critical and dependable cues in causal learning, i.e. when causal beliefs
are weak or absent (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; White, 2006a), there might be
reasons to expect a more bidirectional relationship between temporal and causal
order in the presence of stable causal beliefs. From a theoretical perspective, a
number of philosophers have argued against a purely perceptual and towards a
more constructed, interpreted view of time and temporal order (Dainton, 2010;
Grush, 2007). These arguments are mainly based on postdiction phenomena that
show some degree of flexibility in the way time is perceived. Similar conclusions
can be drawn from the rich research in multisensory integration and recalibration
(Fujisaki et al., 2004; Spence & Squire, 2003).
If the perception of time is indeed malleable, it is quite possible that order
judgements are affected by the presence of strong causal beliefs. Besides, causa-
tion, like time, is unidirectional, at least in the ordinary human experience if not
metaphysically (Black, 1956; Dummett, 1964). Furthermore, causation has been
shown to affect perception in spatial (Scholl & Nakayama, 2004), size (Buehner
& Humphreys, 2010), trajectory (Kim et al., 2013) and, even more relevantly,
judgements of temporal duration (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Humphreys &
Buehner, 2010).
In order to directly test the hypothesis that causal order influences or even de-
fines temporal order in certain conditions, we developed a software-based abstract
physics world. Participants in the experiments to be presented played a puzzle
game, the successful completion of which depended on learning novel causal rela-
tionships. This was followed by the target sequence and the respective temporal
order judgement, identical for all participants.
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The use of novel causal relationships was crucial in allowing us to directly
determine participants’ causal beliefs without the interference of prior knowledge.
In the absence of prior beliefs, we could administer different training regimes to
different groups of participants, thus controlling their causal beliefs. Subsequently,
we could present participants with identical or near-identical stimuli and study
whether the perception of those stimuli would be affected by the recently acquired
causal beliefs.
However, the danger of using novel causal relationships lies in failing to induce
stable causal beliefs. Remember that according to our hypothesis it is strong
causal expectations that influence the way temporal order is perceived. As dis-
cussed earlier, in the absence of causal knowledge, the direction of influence is
reversed, with temporal order information becoming the main cue to causal struc-
ture (Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; White, 2006a).
In order to counteract this potential problem we staged the learning session
as a puzzle game, that required participants’ active involvement. It has been
shown that causal learning is greatly facilitated by intervention, due to the rich-
ness of information embedded in interventions (Lagnado, Hagmayer, Sloman, &
Waldmann, 2006; Lagnado & Sloman, 2004; Sloman & Lagnado, 2005; Steyvers,
Tenenbaumb, Wagenmakers, & Blum, 2003). Although previous research focused
mainly on the advantages in speed and complexity reduction associated with in-
terventions (Bramley, Lagnado, & Speekenbrink, in press; Steyvers et al., 2003),
we hypothesized that explicitly describing the causal relationships to participants
or having them simply observe the causal links would result in poorer and more
fragile beliefs compared to beliefs generated as the result of active learning.
2.1 The abstract physics world
The computerized “physics world” is shown in figure 2.1. It consists of various
abstract objects, each with its own properties. The objects are stationary at the
start of each trial, but some of them can be moved by the participant (a yellow
hand appears over movable objects). When the “play” icon is clicked, the objects
are activated and display a variety of predefined behaviours. Some objects move
in a predefined direction as if affected by gravitational pull, whereas others re-
main static unless disturbed by another object. Objects can also interact through
collisions and repulsions (at a distance), and some of these interactions lead to
transformations of the objects themselves (e.g., changes in shape). Participants
must learn the rules of the physics world through trial and error. The way the
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objects behave is governed by a physics engine, which makes the environment rich
but predictable.
The training part of the experiment is presented as a puzzle game, in which
the goal is to place a red rectangle inside a purple square by transforming it into a
star. To achieve this, participants move objects around while the world is paused
(Fig. 2.1b) and then click the “play” button to activate it. If unsuccessful, they
have to reset the stage to its initial configuration (Fig. 2.1a) and try again; if
successful, they see a congratulations message (Fig. 2.1c), and they progress to
the next stage.
The various stages differ in terms of the objects present, their initial positions,
and which objects participants are allowed to move. Crucially, objects retain their
properties from stage to stage (e.g., blue circles always repel other objects). This
stability allows the subjects to learn the properties of the objects and the relation-
ships among them. Given that they lacked any specific prior knowledge, we were
able to assess and manipulate their acquired causal beliefs and, at a subsequent
stage, evaluate the influence of these beliefs on the perception of temporal order.
2.2 Experiment 1
In the first experiment (thereafter “Puzzle1”)1, we used the physics world in a
between-groups design. The experimental group played seven stages of the puzzle
game (e.g. Fig. 2.1). The aim was to position the objects in a configuration such
that when “play” was clicked, the red rectangle drifted into the purple square.
However, the purple square only “admitted” stars, with other objects bouncing
off its exterior. To transform the red rectangle into a star, a separate object, the
green square, had to collide with the black platform. The collision between the
green square and the black platform effectively acted as a switch, transforming
the red rectangle into a star and thus enabling it to enter the purple square.
By completing all seven stages, participants gradually learned the two critical
causal relations (Fig. 2.2, top row): First, the green square colliding with the
black platform caused the red rectangle to transform into a star, and, second, this
transformation caused (or enabled) the star to enter the purple box.
1All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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Figure 2.1: Sample frames from a stage in the physics world. The objects initially
appear in a stationary configuration (a), but when the “play” icon (right-facing triangle
inside the green circle at the top) is clicked, the objects are activated: The red rectangle
will move left, the blue circle will repel nearby small objects, and the red rectangle will
transform into a star if the green square contacts the black platform. The goal is to
position the objects such that the red rectangle will transform into a star and enter the
purple square. To successfully solve this puzzle (b), participants must move the blue
circle and the green square so that when “play” is clicked, the blue circle will repel the
red rectangle towards the purple square and the green square toward the black platform.
When the green square collides with the black platform, the red rectangle will become
a star and thus be “admitted” into the purple box, prompting a “Congratulations!”
message (c).
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Figure 2.2: Design of the training and test phases of Experiment Puzzle1. In the causal
model underlying the training phase (top row), the green square colliding with the black
platform causes the red rectangle to transform into a star, and this transformation causes
(or enables) the star to enter the purple box. The temporal order of events during the
test phase (bottom row) contradicted the causal model: The entrance of the star into
the purple box preceded the red rectangle’s transformation into a star, and the green
square collided with the black platform at the end of the sequence.
The seven stages of the training phase were followed by the test phase, in
which participants were asked to watch a video clip. The clip featured the familiar
objects in motion, but, crucially, it violated the expected causal order of events:
The red rectangle entered the purple box before being transformed into a star,
and this transformation occurred before the green square collided with the black
platform (Fig. 2.2, bottom row). Thus, the temporal order of two sets of events
(entrance-tranformation and collision-transformation) was reversed compared to
the causal expectations established during training.
The control group saw exactly the same clip without receiving any training.
After viewing the clip, subjects in both groups were asked the same set of ques-
tions regarding the temporal order of events and their causal beliefs. The control
group’s responses served as a baseline and also verified that the presented tem-
poral order of events was discriminable. Our prediction was that the responses of
the control group would tend toward the objective temporal order, whereas those
of the experimental group would tend toward the causal order of events.
2.2.1 Participants
Sixty-six participants (42 male, 24 female) aged 18 to 48 years (M = 26.59, SD
= 7.5) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. They were randomly
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assigned to one of two conditions resulting in 31 participants in the experimen-
tal group and 35 in the control group. Participants in the experimental group
were paid $1, and those in the control group were paid $0.30; the difference in
compensation was due to the short time taken to complete the latter condition.
2.2.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flex 4.5 and the physics engine
Box2DFlashAS3.
Participants in the control group were simply asked to click the “play” icon and
carefully observe the events that took place. The clip lasted for approximately2
2.5 sec and was presented only once.
As shown in Figure 2.3, the scene features a black elongated rectangle of size
20x200px and a purple square of size 80x80px located 10 pixels to the right of the
black rectangle. A red smaller rectangle (60x20px) is located 750px to the right
of the purple square. A green square sized 35x35px is 655 pixels to the right and
330 pixels below the black rectangle. Finally, a blue circle with 40 pixels diameter
is located 48 pixels to the right and 9 pixels below the green square.
When participants click the “play” icon, the red rectangle starts moving hor-
izontally to the left at a speed of approximately 430 px/sec3. Similarly, the green
square moves diagonally upwards and to the left at a speed of approximately 330
px/sec4.
The red rectangle enters the purple box, and approximately 160 ms later (M
= 162.76 ms, SD = 8.014), it transforms into a star. Approximately 200 ms (M
= 204.47 ms, SD = 8.567) after that, the green square collides with the black
platform. Finally, a “Congratulations!” message is shown.
2Because of the online nature of the experiment, there were slight deviations among partici-
pants regarding the temporal distances between the various events, but these were not significant.
Events were logged with millisecond accuracy immediately after they occurred. Thus, the logged
time corresponded to the event onset time plus the time required for the generation of a time
stamp. The time-stamp generation was tested on a variety of computer systems and did not
exceed 0.065 ms.
3In fact, the red rectangle moves with a constant acceleration, since a gravity-like force is
exerted on it.
4In fact the green square’s velocity is due to a force which is inversely related to the distance
between the green square and the blue circle - as was the case in training sequences, the blue
circle is a repeller.
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Figure 2.3: Sample panels from the test video clip shown to participants in both con-
ditions in Experiment Puzzle1. Panel (a) shows the initial configuration of the objects
(the labels were only visible after the clip was finished, when participants were asked to
recall the temporal order of the events). When the clip began, the red target rectangle
and the green square both moved toward the purple box; the midpoint of movement
is shown in (b). The target entered the purple box (c) and then transformed into a
star 160 ms later (d). The transformation occurred 200 ms before the green square
collided with the black platform (the arrows show the direction of movement and were
not present in the actual experiment).
Participants in the experimental group completed seven stages of training be-
fore watching exactly the same clip. In each training stage, they had to position
the various objects so that when “play” was pressed, the green square had to col-
lide with the black platform in order for the red rectangle to transform into a star
and be allowed to enter the purple box. However, to guard against the possible
confounding factor of the visual system being habituated to a certain sequence,
the transformation of the red rectangle always took place 100 ms before the col-
lision of the green square with the black platform5. We return to this important
experimental detail in this experiment’s discussion section.
After watching the test clip, both groups were shown the clip’s starting config-
uration with labels next to each object (Fig. 2.4); they were given four prompts
5To ensure that the red rectangle transformed 100 ms before the green square collided with
the black platform, we surrounded the black platform by an invisible object. The collision with
that invisible object actually caused the transformation of the rectangle into a star.
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and asked to place the prompts in the same temporal order in which the various
events had occurred. The prompts in the temporally correct order were as fol-
lows: “The target object entered the purple box”, “The target object became a
star”, “The green square collided with the black platform”, “A ‘Congratulations’
message appeared”. Next, participants were asked to explain their answer by se-
lecting one or more of the following: “That’s what I saw,” “That’s what makes
sense,” “That’s what I remember from previous rounds” (available only for the
experimental group), and “Other.” Finally, a question directly assessed partici-
pants’ causal beliefs by asking what made the red rectangle become a star in the
test clip; the response options were as follows: “The green square collided with
the black platform,” “The target object entered the purple box,” and “Other.”
Figure 2.4: Screenshot of the main measure in Experiment Puzzle1. Subjects had to
click and drag prompts from the top panel to the bottom one to designate the order
in which they saw the various events happening (the initial order of the prompts was
randomized for each participant)
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2.2.3 Results
Table 2.1 displays a summary of the selected order of events for each condition in
the experiment. There was a significant difference in the selected order of events
between the two groups, χ2(7, N = 66) = 23.48, p < .01. Most striking, 38.7%
of the participants in the experimental group provided the exact causal order of
events, and only 19.3% gave the objective temporal order. For the control group,
these percentages were 2.9% and 42.9%, respectively. (The chance level for each
separate ordering was 4% or 16% if we ignore the “Congratulations message”
event.)
Condition
Training No Training Total
R
ep
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d
O
rd
er
Causal Order 12 (38.71%) 1 (2.86%) 13 (19.70%)
Temporal Order 6 (19.35%) 15 (42.86%) 21 (31.82%)
Other 13 (41.94%) 19 (54.29%) 32 (48.48%)
Total 31 35 66
Table 2.1: Number of participants in each condition that reported the causal, the tem-
poral or any other order of events
Figure 2.5 shows that only 32.3% of the trained participants reported correctly
that the red rectangle transformed into a star before the green square collided
with the black platform. So, as predicted, the event that was recognized as the
cause was seen to temporally precede its associated effect, even though it actually
followed it by 200 ms. The percentage of participants from the control group that
gave this answer was significantly higher (62.9%), χ2(1, N = 66) = 6.16, p < .05.
Similarly, 48.4% of participants in the experimental group correctly reported
the rectangle entering the purple square before transforming into a star. This
contrasts with the majority of participants (88.6%) in the control group who
reported the correct ordering, χ2(1, N = 66) = 12.60, p < .001.
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of participants in each group who reported the correct temporal
order for the two critical sets of events, in Experiment Puzzle1.
The causal basis of the explanation for the observed reordering effect is also
apparent in that 48.4% of the participants in the experimental group, when asked
directly, pointed to the collision of the green square with the black platform as
the cause of the transformation of the red rectangle, and that number correlated
significantly with those participants who placed the collision prior to the transfor-
mation, r(64) = .470, p < .01. Finally, there was no difference between the groups
when asked to explain their answer: 85.7% from the experimental condition and
80.6% from the control condition responded that the order they provided was the
one they saw.
2.2.4 Discussion
Experiment Puzzle1 showed that participants had a definite bias toward the causal
order of events: The majority of participants in the experimental group (80.6%)
perceived at least one of the critical events in the wrong temporal order, congruent
with the causal beliefs that were induced during the training rounds.
One potential concern stems from the fact that, by the end of the experiment,
the two groups differed not only in their causal beliefs but also in the number
of times they experienced the temporal order of events. It might be argued,
therefore, that habituation to the repeated temporal order led participants to
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reorder the events in the test phase. However, as mentioned in the Design and
Procedure section, for one of the manipulated relationships (collision of the green
square and the black platform - transformation of the red rectangle into a star),
the order of events was inverted not only in the test clip but also throughout the
training phase. Participants never witnessed the causally potent event (collision)
occurring before its presumed effect (transformation). Thus, at least in respect to
this relationship, the 67.7% of participants who responded with the causal order
of events were not driven by habituation to a repeated temporal order but by
causal beliefs that were established through a combination of direct instructions
and the strong causal impression generated by the collision-like events.
It is interesting that the responses of the control group showed higher-than-
expected levels of reordering. It can be argued that although we intended that this
group hold no causal beliefs about the sequence of events, this was pragmatically
unavoidable. Evidence supporting this suggestion comes from this group’s answers
to the direct causal question, with 82.8% providing a direct cause, the entrance
of the rectangle into the box. Thus, even these untrained participants probably
imposed some causal interpretation onto the sequence, which could potentially
affect their perception.
However, the observation that about 6 out of 10 participants in the control
group failed to report the correct order of events raises some concerns regarding
how discriminable that order was, irrespective of held causal beliefs. Thus, it may
be the case that causal beliefs influence the way events are perceived or, alterna-
tively, that in the absence of clear sensory input, people use causal knowledge to
augment impoverished signals. In the latter case, one would expect the effect to
occur only when the perceptual signal is ambiguous (e.g. high speed events) or
when perceptual load is high (e.g. complicated event sequences). Although this
experiment provides evidence that causation is affecting the way temporal order
is perceived, neither the necessary conditions nor the precise mechanism are clear.
In the experiments that follow we will be returning to this question in order
to re-evaluate it in light of the accumulated evidence. The next experiment uses
the same material as Experiment Puzzle1 but attempts to more carefully control
the causal beliefs of participants before presenting the critical sequence.
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2.3 Experiment 2
In the second experiment (thereafter “Puzzle2”)6, we replicated and extended the
findings of Experiment Puzzle1 by more carefully controlling participants’ causal
beliefs. We used the same environment but introduced two separate training
phases, each featuring different causal relations. Training Phase A consisted of
seven stages suggesting, as before, that the collision of the green square causes
the transformation of the red rectangle into a star. Training Phase B consisted
of seven different stages suggesting that the entrance of the red rectangle into
the purple square causes the transformation, similar to what participants in the
control group of Experiment Puzzle1 seemed to infer.
Regardless of condition, all participants completed a training phase and then
a test phase with a single clip. In the test clip, the temporal order of events was
either congruent or incongruent with the causal relations presented in the training
phase. We hypothesized that the perceived order in the test clip would be strongly
influenced by the causal beliefs developed in the training phase.
Unlike Experiment Puzzle1, both groups went through a training session, thus,
by the time they view the critical sequence, we had concrete predictions regarding
the causal beliefs of all participants. Although the issue of noise as a prerequi-
site for the effect, discussed earlier, is not tackled by this experimental design,
we reduced the influence of prior causal assumptions. Thus, the reported tem-
poral order for all participants would, in this case, result from the integration of
perceptual input and recently acquired causal knowledge. In addition, as will be
described shortly, with this experimental design it became possible to compare
the percepts of participants with different causal assumptions against the same or
very similar sequences of events.
2.3.1 Participants
163 participants (68 male, 95 female) aged 18 to 67 years (M = 31.33, SD = 10.6)
were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid $0.50 for partici-
pating. They were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 conditions resulting approximately
in 40 participants per condition.
6All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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2.3.2 Design and procedure
The design was 2 x 2 full factorial, with type of training (A or B) and congruency
of test clip (either congruent or incongruent with training type) as factors. In all
conditions, participants completed seven stages of training and then viewed a test
clip in which the order of events was either congruent or incongruent with the
causal order implied during training. Table 2.2 summarizes the four experimental
conditions.
Condition
Causal relation implied
in training
Temporal Order of events in
test sequence
1. Training A -
Congruent
Collision → Transformation Collision-Transformation-Entrance
2. Training A -
Incongruent
Collision → Transformation Transformation-Collision-Entrance
3. Training B -
Congruent
Entrance → Transformation Entrance-Transformation-Collision
4. Training B -
Incongruent
Entrance → Transformation Transformation-Entrance-Collision
Table 2.2: The four experimental conditions in Experiment Puzzle2 differed in the main
causal relationship and on whether that relationship was congruent or incongruent with
the temporal order of events in the test clip.
Training Phase A was very similar to Experiment Puzzle1, as presented in
Figure 2.1. The only exception was that the black platform was removed, and the
green square had to collide with the purple square to transform the red rectangle
into a star. The removal of the black platform was necessary to allow the same
event (collision) to play different causal roles in the two training types as will be
discussed shortly.
The stages in Training Phase B looked similar to Training Phase A, but,
as shown in Figure 2.6a, there were two key differences. First, the red rectangle
became a star after entering the purple square, thus implying that it is the entrance
that causes the transformation (Fig. 2.6c), and second, the green square was seen
as competing with the red rectangle to enter the purple square: If the purple
square was already occupied by one of the shapes, the other shape would be
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Figure 2.6: Sample panels from a stage in Training Phase B of Experiment Puzzle2.
Panel (a) shows the initial configuration of the objects. The red rectangle entered the
purple box without becoming a star (b). The red rectangle became a star and the green
square bounced off the purple box’s exterior (c). This led participants to believe that
the green square was “rejected” because the box was already occupied by the star (the
arrows show the direction of movement and were not present during the experiment).
rejected and bounce off the purple square’s exterior (Fig. 2.6c).
Following the training session, participants viewed one of four very similar
test clips, depending on condition, and were asked to carefully observe the events
that took place. The test sequence was presented once and was very similar to
the test sequence in Experiment Puzzle1, as shown in Figure 2.3 (except for the
absence of the black platform). In all conditions, the critical manipulation was the
temporal position of the transformation event. In congruent conditions it occurred
directly after the event that was causally responsible during training (collision for
Training Type A and entrance in Training Type B) while in incongruent conditions
it occurred approximately 165ms7 before the event that was assumed to cause it
during training.
Immediately after watching the test clip, participants were given the same
questions as in Experiment Puzzle1, namely, to order the events in time, to state
whether they saw the ordering or remembered it from previous rounds, and, finally,
to state the cause of the transformation of the red rectangle.
This experimental design allowed us to present very similar sequences of events
to participants in all groups and then study the perceived temporal order under
different causal assumptions. Although we were primarily interested in compar-
ing the congruent against the incongruent conditions for each training type (i.e.
Condition 1 vs Condition 2 and Condition 3 vs Condition 4 in table 2.2), the
design allowed for further comparisons between training types. Thus, while in
Training Phase A the collision of the green square with the purple square was a
7for Training A the mean delay 166.15 ms (SD = 10.05) and for Training B it was 167.32 ms
(SD = 4.56).
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critical event, causing the transformation of the target object, in Training phase
B it was just a side effect, a result of the purple square being occupied by the
star. However, in the test clip the transformation-collision order was the same in
Conditions 2 and 3 (Table 2.2), thus a potential divergence in the reported order
would be another test for the reordering effect.
Similarly, the two training types convey a different causal role for the entrance
event (i.e. the entrance of the target object into the purple square): for training
type B it is the entrance that causes the transformation, while for training type
A it is simply a side-effect of the fact that transformation has already occurred.
Again, it would be interesting to compare Conditions 1 and 4, since for one group
the temporal order of the collision and transformation events was incongruent
with the learned causal relationship (Training B) while for the other training type
that particular event order was inconsequential.
2.3.3 Results
Table 2.3 displays a summary of the selected order of events for each condition
in the experiment. In the incongruent conditions, almost none of the participants
gave the correct temporal order of events (0% for Training Type A and 4.9% for
Training Type B). The vast majority of participants in Training Type A (95.0%)
responded with the causal order of events. This percentage was lower for partic-
ipants in Training Phase B (51.2%), but even then it was much higher than for
those preferring the objective temporal order.
For congruent conditions, i.e. when the temporal order matched causal ex-
pectations, the reported order was veridical for the majority of participants in
Training Type A (87.8%). This was not the case for Training Type B, with only
41.5% reporting the correct order.
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Condition
Training A Training B
Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
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Causal Order 36 (87.80%) 38 (95.00%) 17 (41.46%) 21 (51.22%)
Temporal Order 36 (87.80%) 0 (0.00%) 17 (41.46%) 2 (4.88%)
Other 5 (12.20%) 2 (5.00%) 24 (58.54%) 18 (43.90%)
Table 2.3: Number of participants in each condition that reported the causal, the tem-
poral or any other order of events (for congruent conditions the temporal order is the
causal order of events)
The results are more clear when focusing on the specific events that were re-
ordered in the incongruent conditions. As a reminder, in both the incongruent
condition of Training Phase A and the congruent condition of Training Phase B,
the transformation of the red rectangle took place 165 ms before the collision of
the green square with the purple box. For the former condition the transforma-
tion should not have happened before the collision, since during training it was
the collision that caused the transformation. As shown in Figure 2.7-top none of
the participants reported the objective temporal order of events. On the other
hand, for participants in Training-B Congruent no direct relation between collision
and transformation was present in training, since it is the entrance that causes
the transformation8. A significantly higher proportion of participants (46.3%)
reported the correct order in this case, χ2(1, N = 62) = 24.22, p < .01. Addition-
ally, the number of participants in the incongruent condition of Training Phase
A who placed the collision before the transformation was almost the same as the
number of participants in the congruent condition of Training Phase A for whom
the collision indeed occurred before the transformation.
There was an even stronger effect of prior training when participants responded
whether the transformation of the rectangle into a star occurred before or after the
star’s entrance into the purple square (Fig. 2.7-bottom). When the training sug-
gested that the entrance into the square caused the transformation (incongruent
8in this condition, the collision is only indirectly connected to transformation as a result of
the purple box being occupied by the target object which should have already been transformed
into a star
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condition of Training Phase B), only 7.3% of participants reported the objective
order of events in the test sequence, namely, that the entrance happened after the
transformation. This percentage rose to 92.7% when the training was congruent
with the order of the presentation in the test sequence (congruent condition of
Training Phase A) and is comparable to the percentage of participants in the
congruent condition of Training Phase B for whom the transformation indeed
happened after the entrance. In this case, participants’ responses were highly
determined by their causal beliefs and, for the incongruent condition of Training
Phase B, the objective order was ignored.
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Figure 2.7: Proportion of participants in the four conditions in Experiment Puzzle2
that detected the transformation of the red rectangle before the collision of the green
square with the purple square (top) or before the entrance of the red rectangle into the
purple square (bottom). For the conditions in the first two columns in each graph, the
transformation actually happened about 165 ms earlier than the causally potent event,
and, for the last column in each graph, it happened later than the causally potent event.
As in Experiment Puzzle1, participants’ reported order was guided by their
causal beliefs: Those in Training Phase A responded that it was the collision of
the green square that caused the transformation of the red rectangle in the test
clip (82.9% for the congruent condition and 97.5% for the incongruent condition),
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whereas participants in Training Phase B responded that it was the entrance of
the red rectangle into the purple square that caused its transformation (92.7% for
the congruent condition and 95.1% for the incongruent condition).
Finally, 79.7% of participants across conditions showed confidence in their
response by claiming that they saw that specific order of events: 52.8% also said
that they remembered the order from previous rounds, 43.6% said that it was the
order that made sense, and 3.7% gave other explanations.
2.3.4 Discussion
Experiment Puzzle2 replicated and extended the findings from Experiment Puz-
zle1. The majority of participants perceived the key events in the order that
matched their causal beliefs irrespective of the temporal order of the presenta-
tion. Taken together with findings from Experiment Puzzle1, there is evidence
that the perception of temporal order is a process of active interpretation that
can be heavily influenced by learned causal relationships.
However, it is not the case that perceptual input is ignored altogether. We
believe that the features of the presented sequences in some cases assisted and in
others hindered the conjectures that participants made. For example, a relatively
high proportion of the untrained participants in Experiment Puzzle1 (i.e., those
in the control group) wrongly perceived the green square colliding with the black
platform before the red rectangle transformed into the star. This might have
been due to either spontaneously formed causal judgements, as argued earlier, or
features such as the color and size of the objects or the direction of movement that
attracted participants’ attention, thus influencing the perceived order of events
(Stelmach & Herdman, 1991).
Despite these possible attentional issues, the temporal-reordering effect per-
sisted under a number of manipulations. We used several different sequences and
varied the implied causal relations while keeping constant the spatial proximity
of the crucial events (within 2-7 cm of each other) and the long temporal inter-
vals (150-200 ms), which were at least twice the length of detectable intervals
in visual order-judgement tasks (Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961; Kanabus, Szelag, Ro-
jek, & Po¨ppel, 2002). Additionally, we presented identical sequences of events to
groups of participants with diverging causal beliefs and observed that those beliefs
significantly influenced the reported order of the events.
Of course, one could disagree with our claim that intervals greater than 70-
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80ms should be sufficient to make the order of two events perceivable, for any two
events. The tasks and the displays commonly used in temporal order judgement
experiments are far simpler than the stimuli we have presented, usually consisting
of two successive visual flashes. Therefore, it could be claimed that the tasks are
not comparable and the delay necessary for the clear perceivability of events is
in our case debatable. Experiment Puzzle1 attempted to verify that the order is
perceivable by presenting the events to naive participants. However, as we saw
that manipulation was only partially successful with a relatively large proportion
of untrained participants still reordering the events. As discussed, this can be
explained by the ubiquity of causal interpretations that affect the perceived tem-
poral order or it could be the case that due to the complexity of our sequences
the order was in fact indiscriminable. In the latter case, participants are using
causal beliefs to “fill-in the gaps” rather than re-interpret perceived stimuli. The
next two experiments and especially the experiments in Chapter 3 return to this
question by attempting to examine the causal reordering effect while at the same
time evaluating the discriminability of event order in the absence of causal inter-
pretations.
Another interesting reading of this pair of experiments is that since the causal
relationships were particularly novel and we did not provide explicit instructions,
participants were driven, at least partially, by Humean cues in order to figure out
how this virtual world operated. This means that as shown in other experiments
(Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; White, 2006a, see also section 1.1) participants used
the order of events, among others, to detect causal links. Subsequently, during
the testing phase, these causal beliefs were used to re-interpret the order in which
events took place. In the next experiment we will try to provide further evidence
for this bidirectionality.
2.4 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 (thereafter “TwoWay1”)9 aimed at illustrating the bidirectional
relationship between causal and temporal order. In the first phase participants
were introduced to a novel causal relationship and subsequently were asked to
report the causal direction between two events relying on the perceived temporal
order alone. Subsequently, the order of events was reversed in order to assess
the extent to which the learned causal relationship would affect temporal order
judgements as shown in Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2.
9All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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Concretely, this experiment featured a puzzle game, one that was rather dif-
ferent, though, to the puzzle game used in the previous two experiments. In this
case subjects were shown a number of black diamond shapes and a single black
triangle and were told that their task is to make all shapes become red (see Fig.
2.8). As before, through trial and error, participants had to learn that when the
world is activated (after the “play” button is pressed) the triangle spontaneously
becomes red and turns red all nearby objects. Thus, to achieve their goal, par-
ticipants had to move the triangle close to the diamonds and press “play”. The
aim of this section was to introduce the causal relationship in which a change of
colour is transmitted to nearby objects.
Figure 2.8: A stage in the puzzle game of Experiment TwoWay1. The initial configura-
tion of the shapes is shown in panel (a). Participants must move the triangle between
the diamonds (b) so that when the triangle becomes red (c) it will transmit its new
colour to the diamonds (d).
Following the training session participants observed a set of clips featuring
different shapes sequentially turning red. We hypothesized that they would use
the temporal order of events to infer the causal roles and, thus, we asked them to
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report their causal beliefs. Finally we showed a clip in which the order of events
did not match that causal relationship and we asked participants to report the
temporal order.
The aim of this experiment was twofold: On the one hand we wanted to verify
whether given only temporal order information people reliably deduce the causal
direction of a relationship. Provided this first test was successful, the question
was whether subsequent inferences would follow the opposite path: from known
causal relationships to temporal order judgements. At the same time, we aimed at
re-evaluating the causal reordering effect using much simpler non-moving stimuli,
thus reducing the perceptual load. The presence or absence of the reordering effect
in such simpler conditions would provide a first indication as to whether the effect
requires perceptual ambiguity, whether causation is used to deduce information
that was not perceived in the first place.
2.4.1 Participants
We recruited 15 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. One participant
was not included in the analysis for providing a nonsensical answer in the ordering
question (see next section). Of the remaining participants 5 were male. Their
mean age was 43.93 (SD:12.28) and they were paid $0.50 for their participation.
2.4.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was developed using Adobe Flex 4.5. All participants went
through the same procedure (Fig. 2.9): After providing some demographic data,
they were informed that they will play a simple puzzle game in which they had to
make all shapes become red. To achieve that they could move some of the objects
- in fact only a triangle could be moved. After they set the position of the objects
they had to press the “play” button to see whether they met their goal. If not
they could press the “reset” button and try again. Finally, they were told that
the instructions were intentionally rather vague to give them the opportunity to
find out the details of the game for themselves.
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Figure 2.9: Experimental procedure in Experiment TwoWay1: (a) Puzzle game where
participants use the triangle to make the diamonds red, (b) 6 clips in which a circle turns
red before a square (in the last clip positions are predetermined), (c) Causal question (d)
2 clips in which a circle turns red before a square, (e) 5 clips in which a square turns red
before a circle (in the last clip positions are predetermined) (f) temporal order question.
Following the instructions, subjects played 4 stages of the puzzle game (the
final stage is shown in Fig. 2.8). Each stage featured a triangle and a variable
number of diamonds. Participants could move the triangle anywhere in the screen.
When the “play” button was pressed, a countdown timer was shown for 3 seconds,
following which the triangle changed colour to red (Fig. 2.8c). If the diamonds
were within a radius of 120 pixels from the triangle’s center they became red after
50 ms (Fig. 2.8d) and a “Well Done” message was shown. To proceed to the
next stage subjects had to position the triangle in the correct location so that
its colour was “transmitted” to all diamonds. If they failed they could press the
“reset” button which caused the triangle to be returned to its initial location.
There was no limit to the number of attempts participants were allowed.
After successful completion of all training stages, subjects were informed that
for the clips that followed they just had to press the “play” button and observe
what happens. The 5 clips that followed all featured one black circle and one
black square positioned randomly in the screen. When “play” was pressed the
countdown was shown, following which the circle turned red and 50 ms later the
square also became red. Finally, the “Well Done” message was shown. After
viewing all 5 clips participants watched another clip of the same type with the
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positions of the circle and the square being predetermined for all participants
rather than randomized. Then they were shown the initial configuration of this
last clip and were asked to indicate their causal belief by choosing one of the
following: “The circle made the square become red”, “The square made the circle
become red”, “Both shapes became red independent of each other”.
Next, another two clips of the same type were shown. Then, without any
indication, the temporal order of events was reversed for the 4 clips that followed:
after the 3 sec countdown, the square became red and 50 ms later the circle became
red. In the 5th clip of that series the positions of the objects was the same for
all participants. Finally, participants were shown the initial configuration of this
last clip and asked to order the events that took place by dragging 4 prompts to a
box. The 4 prompts in the temporally correct order were: “A 3...2...1 countdown
appeared”, “The square became red”, “The circle became red”, “A ‘Well Done’
message appeared”. The initial ordering of these prompts was randomized for
each participant. Participants (1) who did not place the countdown prompt at
the first position in the ordering question were not included in the analysis.
2.4.3 Results
The main results are shown in figure 2.10. The majority of participants (71.43%)
did use the temporal order of events to assign causal roles and, thus, concluded
that the event that happened first (circle became red) caused the event that
followed (square became red). However, after watching 5 clips in which that tem-
poral order was reversed, almost all participants (92.86%) reported the objective
temporal order (square became red before the circle) rather the order implied by
the causal belief they had expressed in the previous stage.
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Figure 2.10: Proportion of participants per answer in the causal question (left) and the
temporal order question (right) in Experiment TwoWay1.
2.4.4 Discussion
The results reinforce the role of temporal order as a cue to causal attribution
(Lagnado & Sloman, 2006; White, 2006a). Very few participants (2) chose not
to impose a causal interpretation to the scene and for the majority a 50 ms
precedence of one event over the other, was sufficient for assigning causal roles.
On the other hand, this causal interpretation was not used, as in Experiments
Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, to guide temporal order judgements.
An obvious explanation is the extended exposure to the reversed order. As
a reminder, after answering the causal question participants saw 2 clips where
the temporal order matched the causal order that was reported by the majority
and then 5 clips in which the temporal order was reversed. Thus, it may be the
case that after repeatedly watching a different order participants revised their
causal beliefs and assumed the reversal of causal roles. The experiment that will
be presented next is designed to assess this hypothesis by reducing participants’
exposure to the reversed order.
2.5 Experiment 4
This experiment (thereafter “TwoWay2”)10 was in most respects identical to Ex-
periment TwoWay1. However, we used different shapes in the training and the
10All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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testing sessions to verify our assumption that the particular shapes used in Ex-
periment TwoWay1 did not imply any particular causal roles. The most crucial
change, however, was the fact that the reordered clip was shown a single time
rather than 5 times as in Experiment TwoWay1.
2.5.1 Participants
We recruited 10 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. One participant
was not included in the analysis for providing a nonsensical answer to the temporal
ordering question (see next section). The remaining 9 participants had mean age
of 33.67 (SD=7.51) and of them, 5 were female and 4 were male. As before, they
were paid $0.50 for participating.
2.5.2 Design and procedure
The procedure was the same for all subjects and in the most part identical to
Experiment TwoWay1 (Fig. 2.11). In the training session there were 4 stages
and the causal shape was a triangle as before but the effect shapes were squares.
Training stages were modified to accommodate the different shape types.
In the test session we initially showed 6 clips where a diamond turned red 50
ms before a circle. This was followed by the causal question. Then participants
saw another 3 clips with the same temporal order, followed by a single clip in
which the order was reversed, i.e. the circle became red 50 ms before the dia-
mond. Participants were then asked to provide the temporal order for the last
clip. As before, if the countdown prompt was not positioned first, subjects (1)
were excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 2.11: Experimental procedure in Experiment TwoWay2: (a) Puzzle game where
participants use the triangle to make the squares red, (b) 6 clips in which a diamond
turns red before a circle (in the last clip positions are predetermined), (c) Causal ques-
tion (d) 3 clips in which a diamond turns red before a circle, (e) 1 clip in which a circle
turns red before a diamond (f) temporal order question.
2.5.3 Results
The results, shown in figure 2.12, are less extreme than in Experiment TwoWay1
but in the same direction, nevertheless. Approximately half of the participants
(55.56%) inferred the causal relationship between the diamond and the circle based
on the temporal order in which events happened. Again though, this causal link
did not guide the temporal order: 66.67% of participants reported the objective
and not the causal order of events in the critical clip that followed.
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Figure 2.12: Proportion of participants per answer in the causal question (left) and the
temporal order question (right) in Experiment TwoWay2
The relatively higher proportion of participants that reported a temporal order
matching the causal order compared to Experiment TwoWay1 (33% vs. 7%),
could be interpreted as the result of the briefer exposure to the reordered clip (1
vs. 5 times). However, further analysis showed that of those participants (5) who
reported a causal relationship based on the original temporal order, none reported
a temporal order congruent to that belief after watching the reordered clip. The
increased level of reordering observed in this case was most probably random and
not attributable to any of our manipulations.
2.5.4 Discussion
As in Experiment TwoWay1 the majority of participants were able to deduce the
causal direction of events given only temporal order information. However, the
newly acquired causal knowledge was not used at a later stage to interpret tem-
poral order, with the majority reporting the veridical order of events. As will be
discussed extensively in the following section, the absence of the causal reordering
effect in this context can be given two competing explanations: either causal be-
liefs were not stable enough by the time a different temporal order was presented
or, alternatively, the simpler, relative to Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, stim-
uli and the lack of motion reduced perceptual load making it easier to distinguish
the order of events and, thus, re-evaluate the recently acquired causal beliefs.
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2.6 General Discussion
The 4 experiments presented in this section resulted in contrasting findings. While
in the first two, there was a strong influence of causal beliefs on the reported
temporal order, that was not the case in the last two experiments, where tempo-
ral order reports were veridical for the majority of the subjects. Since the two
paradigms used were very different, in order to explain the contrasting results we
must evaluate the differences in respect to the implied causal relationships.
One obvious difference between the paradigms is that the first two experiments
feature moving objects while in the other two the objects are static. It might be
the case that the presence of motion adds noise to the scene making it more
difficult to track the order in which events happen. As already discussed, then, it
could be argued that in Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2 it is not causal beliefs
that drive the reordering effect but rather the noisy perceptual input. Participants
essentially fail to see the order in which events happen and in the absence of any
direct evidence they provide the most reasonable answer which is based on the
recently learned causal relationships. Despite participants reporting a high level
of confidence in those experiments one may still argue that the cognitive system
fills in missing information based on prior knowledge and, furthermore this process
is not consciously accessible. Nevertheless, noisy perceptual input can at best be
only part of the answer, since as we saw, the majority of subjects in the control
condition of Experiment Puzzle1 who skipped the causal training section, were
capable of discerning the objective order of events and were as confident in their
reports as was the experimental group.
Another difference between the two sets of experiments lies in the particu-
lar nature of the causal relationships. It is quite possible that despite all causal
relationships being relatively novel, some are more similar to real-world experi-
ences and some are less so. Although the critical conditions in all experiments
featured a training session, it might be the case that the reordering effect, when
present, is equally due to training-induced causal beliefs as well as consistent prior
knowledge. For example, in Experiment Puzzle1, more participants reordered the
collision-transformation relationship compared to the transformation-entrance re-
lationship. Perhaps a collision is seen as a more causally potent event and the
transformation cannot be easily explained without it, whereas participants found
it more acceptable to have a rectangle entering a container without having the re-
quired shape. White (2006b), among others, has argued that only events matching
some causal schema, i.e. an abstraction of a previously encountered causal rela-
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tionship, will be judged as causal. If this argument stands, it might be reasonable
to assume that the colour change in Experiments TwoWay1 and TwoWay2 is seen
as less causally efficacious (Schlottmann & Shanks, 1992). Thus, even if partici-
pants endorsed its causal role, it was a more reluctant endorsement in the absence
of an alternative explanation, not adequate to influence the perceived temporal
order. The strength and stability of causal beliefs might also have been influenced
by the number of training trials in each experiment. Due to the different na-
ture of the tasks, participants spend less time solving the puzzles in Experiments
TwoWay1 and TwoWay1 compared to Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2 and it
can be argued that the level of exposure in the former case was inadequate.
Another potentially critical difference is that in Experiments Puzzle1 and Puz-
zle2 each object has unique causal properties not shared with other objects. In
Experiments TwoWay1 and TwoWay2, on the other hand, the same causal roles
are shared by different objects during the experiment: the cause of colour change
is the triangle during training but, during testing, this role is taken by the circle
(Exp. TwoWay1) or the diamond (Exp. TwoWay2). This sharing of causal roles
perhaps made it easier for subjects to assume a reversal of roles between the cause
and the effect in the critical clip and, thus, perceive the objective order of events.
Finally, the differential presence of spontaneous, uncaused events might be
crucial in the resulting strength of causal beliefs required to induce the reorder-
ing. In Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, as soon as “play” is pressed the objects
act based on gravitation-like forces and the influence of other objects, whereas in
the latter two experiments, objects appear to change colour spontaneously, with-
out a known cause. This difference might make the world more consistent and
predictable in the first two experiments and relatively more random in the other
two. Thus, participants are more actively seeking and expecting explanations for
the various events in Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2. As a result, an inconsis-
tent temporal order fits more easily in the context of Experiments TwoWay1 and
TwoWay2, while within the largely consistent and predictable environment of Ex-
periments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, an inconsistent order and, thus, the spontaneous
activation of events might be more surprising.
In summary, results from Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2 seem to concur
that in order to misperceive the temporal order of events, stable causal beliefs
are required. One possible explanation for the veridical reports in Experiments
TwoWay1 and TwoWay2 is the absence of stable causal beliefs resulting from the
lack of prior familiarity with the featured relationships or the inconsistency of
environments, as discussed. A second option is the different level of complexity
and associated perceptual noise in the two pairs of experiments. Thus, although
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strong causal beliefs seem to be a determinant of the effect, it remains an open
question whether an ambiguous perceptual signal is also required. The latter, of
course, is a matter of degree: we can safely assume that if the presumed cause
occurs sufficiently long after the effect, participants will notice the inconsistency
and probably re-assess their causal beliefs. Therefore, we can better qualify the
ambiguity requirement by asking whether the reordering effect requires a generally
indistinguishable order of events or whether causal beliefs influence an otherwise
perceivable event order. The chapters that follow investigate among others the
ambiguity requirement, through experiments that present visually simpler stimuli
featuring familiar rather than recently learned causal relationships.
CHAPTER 3
Michotte Reordered
One issue we have touched upon but not thoroughly examined is the way this re-
ordering takes place, the representational level explanation in Marr’s (1982) terms.
Is reordering a perceptual or an inferential phenomenon? Although the bound-
aries between perception and inference are certainly not clearly defined (Gibson,
1966; Gregory, 1970), there is still an informative way to distinguish between
the two processes: We can view perception as a universal, automatic process
and, most critically, a process encapsulated from previously acquired information
(Rips, 2011). Examples are the perception of colour or depth and the detection of
motion. On the other end of the spectrum, we can see inference as a process that
even if it depends on perceptual data, its output is strongly determined by exist-
ing knowledge. Referring to figure 3.1, for example, one needs some knowledge
of basic arithmetic to infer the correctness of the calculation but no additional
information is required to perceive the colour of the digits that compose it.
Figure 3.1: We perceive the colour of the digits but we infer the error in the calculation.
In the case of Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, it is clearly the case that
any causal impression depends on the recently learned causal rules. Indeed, it
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makes no sense to assume that the causal relationship between a collision of a
rectangle on a platform and the transformation of an object into a star is directly
perceived by the participants. On the other hand, perhaps certain features of
these relationships fall within the domain of direct perception. For example, it
may be the case that a collision is perceived as a causal factor (Exp. Puzzle1 &
Puzzle2) that triggers a search for causal links, even without any prior knowledge.
This issue taps on a long debate regarding the perceptual or inferential char-
acter of causation. Probably the most influential contribution on the matter was
made by Hume (1739) who argued, as we have already seen, that causation arises
in the mind as a result of processing certain perceptual cues, such as spatiotem-
poral contiguity and contingency. We don’t see causation, says Hume, we infer
it is there, in an effort to explain and predict our environment. Albert Michotte
(1963) disagreed with Hume. In his seminal book provocatively titled “The Per-
ception of Causality” (1963), he presented about 100 experiments that aimed to
show that, at least some forms of causality are perceived and, moreover, that any
amount of existing knowledge cannot influence that perception. Although not
directly championed by Michotte, the direct perception of causality is explained
by the presence of an independent module in the brain that detects causal events
and is fairly independent from other cognitive processes (Rips, 2011).
The most well-known illustration of a sequence in which, according to Mi-
chotte, causality is directly perceived, was dubbed the “launching effect” (Mi-
chotte, 1963). The launching effect is the generation of a causal impression from
a two-object collision as shown in figure 3.2. In Michotte’s experiments a square
A approaches from the left a stationary square B and stops next to it. Immedi-
ately after that, B starts moving to the right in the same or lower speed than A.
Participants viewing the above sequence or one of its many variations report a
clear impression: “it is the blow given by A which makes B go, which produces
B’s movement” (Michotte, 1963, p.20). Regarding the encapsulated nature of the
phenomenon, in Michotte’s experiment 28 (Michotte, 1963, p.84), object A is a
wooden sphere and object B is the projection of a circle on the screen. This se-
quence generates yet again a causal impression, even “in the presence of observers
who knew perfectly well that ‘in reality’ no causal influence was operating” (Mi-
chotte, 1963, p.86).
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Figure 3.2: The launching sequence as described by Michotte (1963, Exp. 1, p.20). (a)
Initial configuration, (b) Object B moves at 30 cm/sec to the right towards object B
(c) A stops directly next to B and immediately after that, B starts moving at the same
or lower speed (d) B stops 2 cm to the right of A, or closer depending on its speed.
The launching effect is, according to Michotte, a perceptual illusion similar to
apparent motion and defines the foundation of our notion of cause (Schlottmann
& Surian, 1999). It is explained by the “ampliation of movement”: while the
perceptual system is tracking object A’s motion, it generates predictions as to A’s
next location; when A stops that prediction is falsified and perception resolves this
tension between its prediction and the actual data by postulating the occurrence of
a causal event, the transference of momentum from A to B. So, causal detection in
a launching sequence is, according to this view, an integral part of the perception
of motion.
Michotte’s methods have been heavily criticized (Joynson, 1971) and there
have been a number of studies arguing against the universality of his findings
(Beasley, 1968; Gemelli & Cappellini, 1958). Although it is true that most ex-
periments described by Michotte (1963) are anything but carefully controlled by
today’s standards, his main findings have been replicated in studies spanning more
than 60 years (Rips, 2011; Sanborn, Mansinghka, & Griffiths, 2013; Yela, 1952).
It is rather the interpretation of those findings that is at the centre of the debate.
Many researchers are sympathetic to the idea of direct causal perception (Butter-
fill, 2009; Scholl & Gao, 2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Wagemans, van Lier, &
Scholl, 2006; Yela, 1952), whereas others insist that the causal impressions result
from the interpretation of perceptual data, given prior knowledge.
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In contrast to Michotte’s ideas, White (1999, 2006b, 2009, 2012) locates the
foundation of the causal concept in early haptic experiences rather than the work-
ings of a perceptual module. Such experiences are abstracted and stored in the
form of causal schemata. Causal impressions result from perceptual input by com-
paring that input against stored schemata. The retrieval of a causal schema that
matches what our senses deliver results in the generation of a causal impression.
Similar views have been expressed by Weir (1978) and more recently by Sanborn
et al. (2013). Despite the abundance of studies in the origins and interpretation of
the launching effect, the issue remains largely undecided. For example, in a recent
review, Rips found “no reason to prefer Michotte’s theory over its competitor”
(Rips, 2011, p.77).
The long debate over the nature of causal impressions is tightly linked to our
current discussion regarding the nature of the reordering effect. For example, if
we perceive causal events directly and automatically, it follows that given these
direct impressions we change the order of events so that we retain a consistent
view of the environment while avoiding the impossibility of backwards causation;
in this case we would perceive causality but infer temporal order. If, on the other
hand, causation is computed from lower level perceptual cues, how can we explain
that in some conditions, one of the most critical cues, the order in which events
take place, is disregarded?
Of course, deciding between the perceptual or the inferential route to causal-
ity is beyond the scope of this thesis. Despite that, we think that the causal
reordering effect can illuminate the problem from a novel angle and hopefully ad-
vance the discussion. To that end, in the next set of experiments we will use a
paradigm very similar to Michottean launchings, inspired by the domino example
that was described at the beginning of this thesis. More interestingly, the task
will not require any training session, as was the case in the experiments presented
so far. Any discovered effect will either be purely perceptual, as proponents of
the Michottean approach have argued for, or the result of combining perceptual
input with pre-existing knowledge, but in any case it will not be confined to the
particular experimental context. The simpler task and the lack of training proce-
dure will also address some of the limitations discussed in Experiments Puzzle1
and Puzzle2, such as the potential habituation to a sequence of events and the
potential role of response bias. Finally, by borrowing the Michottean paradigm
we will be able to discuss our findings in the context of the rich literature on
perceptual causation.
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3.1 Experiment 5
In this experiment (thereafter “Michotte1”)1, in order to generate a mismatch
between the causal and the temporal order, we modified the classic Michottean
sequence (Fig. 3.2) by adding a third object, object C, located next to object B
(see Fig. 3.3a-I). Our main stimulus sequence (Fig. 3.3a) consists of object A
moving as usual towards B and stopping directly next to it. Unlike Michottean
launching though, it is object C that starts moving directly after A stops while
object B moves 350 ms later. Thus, the most plausible causal reading of the
sequence that has A launching B and B launching C is incongruent with the
temporal order in which the objects actually move.
t
B CA B C
a b
I
II
III
IV
V
Figure 3.3: The sequences shown to participants in Experiment Michotte1: (a) Object
A approaches B (I-II) and stops next to it at which point object C starts moving (III).
After 350 ms object B starts moving to the right (IV) and stops to the left of object
C’s original position (V), (b) Identical to sequence (a) without object A.
In the first experiment of this section, we presented one group of participants
with the 3-object sequence that can be seen in Figure 3.3a, and asked for a simple
order judgement. The second group saw exactly the same sequence with object A
1All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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removed (Fig. 3.3b). We hypothesised that object A is critical in the formation
of the causal impression. The inclusion of this condition aimed on the one hand
to validate this hypothesis and also, assuming its correctness, to verify that the
relative onset of motion of objects B and C is perceptually distinguishable.
3.1.1 Participants
We recruited 60 participants in total through Amazon Mechanical Turk. A single
participant was excluded from the analysis for providing a nonsensical answer to
the order question (see the next section), i.e. not identifying correctly the first
object that started moving in condition 1. Of the remaining 59 participants, 39
were male and 20 female. The mean age was 32.39 (SD=9.96) and each partici-
pant was paid $0.50. The 59 participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions resulting in 29 subjects in condition 1 and 30 in condition 2.
3.1.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6. After completing the cal-
ibration section that aimed to ensure the consistent presentation of stimuli (see
Appendix A.3), participants were welcomed to the experiment and were asked for
some simple demographic data. They were then informed that they would watch
a short movie clip and answer some questions about it. They were also asked to
be as focused as possible since the clip would be displayed only once.
Then participants saw the clip a single time. In condition 1 (“A present”) that
is shown in Figure 3.3a, three 8 x 8 mm2 squares fade in slowly (2 sec). Object
A is located 35 mm to the left of object B and object C is located 16 mm to the
right of object B. The squares remained static for another 2 seconds. Then object
A starts moving to the right towards B at a speed of 30 mm/sec (i.e. relatively
slowly). Object A stops adjacent to B and, immediately after, object C starts
moving also at 30 mm/sec. After 350 ms object B starts moving to the right
at the same speed and stops to the left of object C’s original position. After C
travels for 35 mm it comes to a halt and the clip ends. The clip was designed to
be as similar as possible to a normal 3-object collision with the exception of the
2Unlike previous experiments, the presentation of the stimuli, in this case was much better
controlled, allowing us to report the exact size of objects at a millimetre level, compared to
pixel-based measurements used earlier - see Appendix A for more details about the calibration
procedure that we employed.
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order of events between B and C.
In condition 2 (“A absent”) the clip was exactly the same but object A was
not present (Fig. 3.3b). Specifically, in this condition, object C starts moving to
the right and 350 ms later B moves also to the right and stops next to C’s original
position. C travels for 35 mm and the clip ends.
For each condition there were two similar versions of the target clip that dif-
fered only in the objects’ colours and the direction of movement. In the “normal”
version, the colours were as shown in Figure 3.3a (red-blue-purple) and the direc-
tion of movement was left-to-right as described above. In the “mirrored” version,
the colours were A=purple, B=red, C=blue and the direction of movement was
right-to-left, meaning that the initial position of the objects and their direction of
movement was mirrored compared to the “normal” clip, i.e. A starts to the right
of B and C to the left of object B. Participants in each condition were randomly
shown one of the two clip versions.
After watching the clip a single time, participants were shown the initial con-
figuration of the objects (i.e. Fig. 3.3a-I or Fig. 3.3b-I) and were asked to place
the events in the order that they saw them. To do this they had to drag-and-drop
the event sentences “The red square started moving” (only in condition 1), “The
blue square started moving” and “The purple square started moving” from their
initial container to another box (similar to what is depicted in Fig. 2.4). The
order of appearance of the sentences was randomised for each participant. A sin-
gle participant from condition 1 who failed to correctly identify the first object
that started moving was not included in the analysis. Finally, we asked subjects
to indicate their confidence to the selected order by dragging a slider on a scale
that was labelled “Not at all confident” to the left and “Very confident” to the
rightmost position.
In the next screen, the initial object configuration was shown again and sub-
jects were asked for their causal impressions for all possible object pairs (six in
condition 1 and two in condition 2). These were expressed by dragging on a
slider labelled “Completely Disagree”, “Neutral” and “Completely Agree” next
to statements of the form “The X square made the Y square move”, were X and
Y were colour pairs (e.g. “The red square made the blue square move”). Finally,
participants were asked for any comment they had regarding the experiment and
they were thanked for taking part.
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3.1.3 Results
Figure 3.4, shows the proportion of participants that reported the objective tem-
poral (A-C-B) vs. those that reported the causal order (A-B-C) of events3. The
overwhelming majority (82.76%) preferred the causal order when A was visible
while a similar majority preferred the objective temporal order when A was ab-
sent, despite the fact that in both conditions the behaviour of objects B and C
was identical, χ2(1, N = 59) = 25.77, p < .01. Furthermore, participants in both
conditions were very confident in the order they reported, with mean confidence
ratings 78.76/100 (SD=24.62) for condition 1 and 73.63/100 (SD=21.05) for con-
dition 2.
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Figure 3.4: Proportion of participants that reported the correct (temporal) and the
causal order of events in each condition in Experiment Michotte1.
The direct causal judgements (see figure 3.5) show that when A was present
participants thought that it caused B to move (88.45%) and also that B caused
C to move (77.28%). Participants were relatively indecisive about the A-C rela-
tionship (51.76%) but given the strong endorsement of the A-B and B-C relation-
ships, one can assume that those endorsing it probably referred to the indirect
A-C relationship, through B. The judgements for the inverse relationships were,
as expected, very low. The C-B relationship is significantly higher than the C-A
relationship (t(28)=2.305, p<0.05) and approaches significance compared to B-A
(t(28)=2.007, p=0.054) but this is driven by those few participants who reported
3There was no difference in the responses given for the normal and the mirrored versions of
the clips, so we collapsed the two versions.
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the correct temporal order of the sequence and any significant difference goes away
if these participants are excluded.
Similarly, when A was not present (condition 2) and, thus, when the majority
of participants reported the objective temporal order of events, the causal judge-
ments were far weaker. The strongest causal belief is in C making B move. In fact
significantly more participants endorsed the C-B causal relationship in condition
2 compared to condition 1 (t(57)=4.837, p<0.01).
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Figure 3.5: Mean causal judgements for each object pair per condition (in Condition 2,
object A was not visible, so there are no ratings involving it). A value of 50 corresponds
to neutrality, lower ratings indicate disagreement and higher rating indicate agreement
with the causal statement (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)
3.1.4 Discussion
In line with previous findings, this experiment indicates that even spontaneous
causal attribution can lead to the modification of the temporal order of events.
The overwhelming majority of participants in the first condition reported the order
that matched their causal impression despite the fact that the actual temporal
order was clearly perceivable, as both the long delay (350 ms) between the events
and the veridical ordering reported in condition 2 indicate. The causal basis
of the reordering effect is further demonstrated by the strong endorsement of the
statement according to which B made C move. Finally, the moderate endorsement
of the C-B relationship in condition 2 provides some weak evidence that when the
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causal impression is not dictating the temporal order, then it is the temporal
order that guides causal attribution, as discussed in section 1.1 and shown in
experiments TwoWay1 and TwoWay2.
The comparison between the two conditions reveals another interesting effect:
despite the fact that objects B and C behave identically in both conditions, the
presence or absence of object A is decisive in the formation of a causal impression
between B and C. This seems to imply a form of holistic processing in which the
way events are perceived depends on the context in which they are embedded. As-
suming that despite the 350 ms delay, the A-B relationship is perceived as causal,
then the presence of a causal relationship creates the context that biases percep-
tion towards a causal interpretation of the B-C relationship and consequently to
the reversal of the order in which events take place. A similar context effect in the
spatial domain was demonstrated by Scholl and Nakayama (2002) where a non-
causal passing was perceived as a launching in the presence of another “proper”
launching sequence.
We will expand on this contextual explanation in the General Discussion sec-
tion but we first need to consider some arguments against the above analysis based
on attentional issues. On the one hand, the sequence becomes visually simpler
in the absence of object A, therefore the erroneous temporal order reported in
condition 1 could be attributed to perceptual load. Similarly, since motion and
especially the onset of motion are known to attract attention (Abrams & Christ,
2003; Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994), perhaps participants’ attention is drawn to ob-
ject C when it starts moving thus completely missing B’s behaviour. According
to either explanation, participants report not the order that they actually see but
rather the most plausible order given the lack of relevant information. In other
words if participants miss part of the action, it makes sense to assume a causal
relationship between events, given the starting/ending configuration and perhaps
object A’s motion. The next experiment is aimed at evaluating these possibilities
as well as applying a stricter test to the reordering effect.
3.2 Experiment 6
In Experiment 6 (thereafter “Michotte2”)4 we presented the 3-object sequence
of Experiment Michotte1 (Fig. 3.6a) but instead of asking participants for an
explicit ordering of the events, we presented the same sequence again side-by-side
4All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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with a proper collision sequence, i.e. a sequence in which the order of events is
congruent with their causal relationships (Fig. 3.6c). After watching each of these
sequences participants were asked to identify which of the two was the clip they
saw earlier.
In the second condition of this between-group experiment, we presented sub-
jects with a very similar sequence that differed only in that object B remains
stationary throughout (Fig 3.6b). We hypothesised that the absence of motion
would diminish the causal link between A and B as well as between B and C. In
the absence of a causal interpretation, participants would be better at identifying
the sequence they saw when asked to choose between that and a proper causal
collision. If that was the case, we would have evidence that the reordering effect
observed in Experiment Michotte1 and in the first condition of this experiment
cannot be explained by lack of attention to B’s behaviour.
t t
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c
Figure 3.6: The sequences used in Experiment Michotte2: (a) Object A approaches
B (I-II) and stops next to it at which point object C starts moving (III). After 350
ms object B starts moving to the right (IV) and stops to the left of object C’s original
position (V), (b) Identical to (a) but object B remains stationary throughout (c) Proper
3-object collision shown during the review question (the arrows show the direction of
movement and were not visible in the experiment).
3.2.1 Participants
We recruited 60 participants through Mechanical Turk but 2 were excluded from
the analysis because in the critical question they did not watch one of the two
sequences that they were asked to choose from (see next section) so their answers
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were in fact random. Of the remaining 58 participants, 31 were male and 27 were
female. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, resulting in 29
participants in each condition. The mean age was 34.57 (SD=12.12) and each
participant was paid $0.50 for participating.
3.2.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6. The introductory screens
were the same as in Experiment Michotte1 and participants were asked to pay
attention to the clip that would be shown a single time.
In condition 1 (“B moving”) the clip was identical to the clip shown in the
first condition of Experiment Michotte1 (Fig. 3.6a). In condition 2 (“B static”)
the clip was similar with the exception that B remained static throughout the
sequence (Fig. 3.6b). So, object A approaches from the left and stops next to B
at which point C starts moving. The clip ends when object C stops after travelling
for 35 mm. As in Experiment Michotte1, there were two versions of each clip,
one with the colours being red, blue and purple and direction left-to-right as in
Figure 3.6 and another version where the colours were shuﬄed (A=purple, B=red,
C=blue) and the direction of movement was right-to-left.
After watching the clip, participants proceeded to the “review” screen in which
two clips were displayed side-by-side. One of the clips was the critical clip that
they had just seen and the other was a clip featuring a proper three-object col-
lision: Object A approaches from the left and stops next to B at which point B
starts moving to the right and stops next to C at which point C starts moving to
the right (Fig. 3.6c). So, in condition 1 the subjects had to choose between two
clips that differed only in the order in which B and C start moving (Fig 3.6a vs
Fig 3.6c), while the difference in condition 2 was mainly whether object B moved
or not (Fig 3.6b vs Fig 3.6c). Below each clip there was a “play” button and
participants were allowed to watch each clip as many times as they wanted before
answering which of the two clips they had seen in the previous screen. Then par-
ticipants were asked to indicate their confidence by dragging a slider on a scale
that was labelled “Not at all confident” to the left and “Very confident” to the
rightmost location. Finally, participants were asked for direct causal judgements
for each pair of objects in the clip, as in Experiment Michotte1.
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3.2.3 Results
The proportion of participants that correctly identified the clip they saw was
37.93% for condition 1 and 72.41% for condition 2, as shown in Figure 3.75.
These two conditions were significantly different: χ2(1, N = 58) = 6.97, p < .01.
In addition, participants were confident in their choice: the mean confidence rating
for condition 1 was 74.10/100 (SD=23.15) and 81.21/100 (SD=22.40) for condition
2.
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of participants that selected the correct clip (the one they saw)
or the “proper” collision clip in each condition, in Experiment Michotte2.
Regarding the causal ratings (Fig. 3.8), for condition 1 they are almost identi-
cal to the respective ratings in Experiment Michotte1: Participants agree strongly
that A caused B to move and that B caused C to move, while being relatively
neutral in the indirect A-C relationship and giving very low ratings to the inverse
relationships. For condition 2, since B did not move at all, these causal questions
are rather ambiguous and the answers participants gave to some extent reflect
this ambiguity by being around the midpoint mark for all forward relationships.
In any case there does not seem to be a prevalent causal impression in condition
2.
5Again, we collapsed the responses to the normal and the mirrored versions of the clips since
no difference was observed
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Figure 3.8: Mean causal judgements for each object pair per condition in Experiment
Michotte2. A value of 50 corresponds to neutrality, lower ratings indicate disagreement
and higher rating indicate agreement with the causal statement (error bars represent
95% confidence intervals).
3.2.4 Discussion
Compared to Experiment Michotte1 the reordering effect this time was less pro-
nounced but perhaps more impressive, given the different measure we employed.
Participants in condition 1 saw a clip featuring rather slow moving objects (30
mm/sec compared to 300 mm/sec in the original experiments conducted by Mi-
chotte (1963)) in which object C moves 350 ms before object B. Nevertheless,
they failed to identify the clip they saw, choosing instead with high confidence a
clip in which B moves before C and, most critically, appears to be launching C.
The fact that when asked to report the order of events (Experiment Michotte1)
rather than identify the clip they saw (Experiment Michotte2), participants show
an even stronger preference for the causal order can be explained, in our view,
by the nature of the measure: it is quite plausible that some subjects do detect
some glitch in the clip when they first experience it, some deviation from an ideal
collision clip but they still don’t identify the deviation to be the order of the events.
Thus, when asked to choose between that clip and the proper collision one, most
of those participants who prefer the deviant one do not necessarily do so because
of the order of events but because it is the one that does not “look right”. This
hypothesis is reinforced by the direct causal judgements that remained roughly
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the same between the two experiments.
Regarding the alternative explanations based on attentional issues, that were
discussed in relation to Experiment Michotte1, the current results seem to discon-
firm such hypotheses. When B remains stationary in condition 2, the majority
of participants detect it and thus are able to correctly identify the clip they saw.
This means that in condition 1, where B does move towards C, albeit late, its
motion is in fact noticed and the subsequent reordering does depend on that de-
tection. All the events that take place in the sequence are actually registered by
the perceptual system and all are necessary for the causal impression to be formed.
It is, thus, not the case that in the causal reordering effect we are simply filling
details that we have not actually perceived based on plausible causal hypotheses.
According to this set of results, events need to be seen in order to be reordered.
Finally, the fact that participants correctly recognize the clip they saw when B
remains stationary, shows that motion detection is a hard perceptual constraint.
This is not surprising given what we know about the processes underlying motion
detection and the existence of specialized motion detectors in the retina (Barlow
& Levick, 1965; Vaney & Taylor, 2002). What is most interesting is the contrast
in this experiment between the perception of motion and that of temporal order;
Irrespective of the exact definition of perception, it seems here that temporal order
is not “perceived” in the same way as motion is. The former appears here to far
more malleable and susceptible to higher level information.
3.3 General Discussion
While comparing the results obtained in Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2 against
those in Experiments TwoWay1 and TwoWay2, we have put forward a causal
and a perceptual explanation. According to the latter, the causal reordering
effect depends on the ambiguity of the perceptual signal. Although, as discussed,
ambiguity must play a role at some level (e.g. a 4 sec delay between the effect
and the cause should diminish the effect), the set of experiments presented in this
chapter show that causality not only guides inferences in the absence of perceptible
stimuli but it even influences the perception of temporal order that is otherwise
detectable. As demonstrated in Experiment Michotte1 the order of events B and
C is correctly reported by almost all participants when A is not present. In the
absence of causal incongruences, the relative onset of the events that are reordered
is clearly perceivable.
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Additionally, from Experiment Michotte2 we can infer that it is not the case
that causation is driving attention away from the critical events, as could be
assumed for Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2. Participants are in fact reporting
their perception rather than an educated guess based on fragmented perceptual
input. It appears that the effect requires all relative events to take place; all the
events are perceived and are subsequently reordered to fit a causal interpretation.
Finally, we have shown that the effect is strong enough to result in the formation
of a mental representation of the reordered sequence: the majority of participants
failed to recognise the sequence they experienced seconds earlier and were very
confident that they had seen the sequence in which the temporal order matches
the causal order.
In trying to explain the causal reordering effect, we must begin by re-evaluating
the arguments about the way temporal order is perceived. As we saw in section
1.2.2 philosophers of time disagree about whether the order of the representings
is the order of the representeds (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992), whether the per-
ceived temporal order mirrors the temporal structure of the environment. We also
saw that those opposing the structural mirroring theory (Dainton, 2010; Grush,
2007; Lee, 2014) rely on the presence of temporal illusions such as postdiction
(Geldard & Sherrick, 1972; Kolers & von Grunau, 1975). The fact that in some
occasions certain stimuli influence the way earlier stimuli are perceived is taken as
evidence that the perception of temporal order is a constructive process, depend-
ing both on perceptual input and also on prediction and post-hoc interpretation
(Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Grush, 2007). In relation to these arguments, we
can interpret the causal reordering effect as an even stronger temporal illusion, in
which a stimulus (B’s motion) not only influences what came earlier (C’s motion)
but in fact switches temporal positions with it.
Although accepting that judgements of temporal order do not result from
direct perception is a prerequisite for our explanation, it is not sufficient. We
need to establish the conditions under which the perceptual input is ignored.
Besides, there are multiple occasions in which temporal order perceptions are
veridical even in the absence of other information. For example, believing that
a spot moves from left to right when we see it flashing first left and then right,
depends only on the correct perception of the temporal order of these events. It
has been shown experimentally (Kanabus et al., 2002) that when the interstimulus
interval between two events is around 40 ms people are correct about 75% of the
time regarding the order in which those events took place.
We have argued earlier that in our experiments the perceptual input is influ-
enced by the presence of strong causal beliefs. Why do causal beliefs arise in the
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first place though? All existing models of causal perception, discussed above, con-
tain a hardwired requirement for causes to precede their effects. That is the case
both for schema-matching views (Sanborn et al., 2013; Weir, 1978; White, 2006b;
White & Milne, 1999) and for approaches based on direct causal perception (Mi-
chotte, 1963; Scholl & Gao, 2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). Especially the latter
approach is so sensitive to slight perturbations of the stimuli that even the 350
ms delay between A and B in our sequences should destroy any causal impression.
Schema-matching models, on the other hand, are more flexible by allowing any
previously experienced sequence to drive causal perception and by being based
on the often vaguely defined similarity between percepts and stored sequences.
Despite that, the main sequence that we have shown to participants is most likely
an example of what White (2006b) described as “stimuli that are unrepresentative
of real interactions between objects in ways other than incompleteness” and thus
should “not give rise to visual impressions of causality because they would not be
matched against any schema” (White, 2006b, p.179).
Thus, in order to argue that participants change the order between B and C,
due to a causal interpretation, we must first establish the fact that B is indeed
seen as causing C to move, despite the claims of current theories of perceptual
causation. Some evidence in that direction is given by the relatively high causal
ratings in the B-C relationship in both experiments. It is also interesting to
note that when object A is not present in the sequence, (Experiment Michotte1,
Condition 2) participants report the veridical order of events. That makes A’s
motion also critical in the way the B-C relationship is interpreted.
Thus one explanation could start from the assumption that, despite the 350 ms
delay, participants perceive the A-B relationship as causal. If we take into account
the view that the cognitive system strives for simplicity (Chater & Vita´nyi, 2003;
Lombrozo, 2007) then an explanation of the reordering effect seems attainable.
If the objective temporal order is preserved, either A launches C from distance
through B and then B is pulled by C (or C moves spontaneously) or A launches B
with a delay and C moves spontaneously. If temporal order is ignored, however,
then A launches B and B launches C. The latter interpretation is clearly simpler
by involving two instances of a single type of causal relationship and furthermore
by matching a causal schema, i.e. an abstract representation of a previously
experienced causal sequence, e.g. a queue of dominos falling6.
6One could argue that the absence of causation and instead the spontaneous movement of all
objects is an even simpler explanation that would furthermore preserve the objective temporal
order. Although valid, this is more of a description of the events that does not explain, for
example, what makes the objects start or stop moving.
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In summary, we argue that temporal order perception is susceptible to higher
order information and that such information is most commonly causal. The
Michottean-like sequences elicit causal impressions despite spatiotemporal devia-
tions and those impressions define the resulting event order. The next two chapters
aim to provide further evidence for these two claims. Specifically, the final chapter
will re-visit the Michottean literature to evaluate the claim that sequences with
spatiotemporal deviations are void of causal interpretations.
Before that, however, we ought to evaluate the limits of the causal reordering
effect. Even if the above discussion turns out to be correct, even if causality
affects the perception of events that are otherwise clearly distinguishable, the
phenomenon must be constrained, otherwise accurate order perception would be
impossible in the presence of causal assumptions. As we discussed already, we
expect the effect to diminish given an adequately long delay between the effect
and the cause. The delay required for accurate order reports in the domino-like
Michottean launching must exceed 500ms, since pilot studies not presented here
did not show a reduction of the reordering effect up to that delay. However,
technical difficulties restrict testing delays close to 1 sec or more, while keeping
other display properties constant7.
An alternative, perhaps more interesting way to study the limits of the reorder-
ing effect would be to present the sequence more than once and test the extent to
which repeated exposure and/or directed attention to the order of events would
diminish the effect. This task is undertaken in the next chapter.
7At such delays, object C would leave the screen before B starts moving, changing the nature
of the stimulus. Nevertheless, one could conduct such experiment in the lab, using a high
resolution display.
CHAPTER 4
Examining the Persistence of Causal
Reordering
In the experiments presented so far, participants saw the critical sequence only
once and were asked to report the order of events a single time. This is in contrast
to most relevant studies we have reviewed, in which participants usually watch the
critical sequence multiple times (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010; Haggard, Clark,
& Kalogeras, 2002). Especially in adaptation studies multiple viewings is actually
a requirement for producing the related effect (King, 2005; Stetson et al., 2006;
Vroomen et al., 2004). Therefore, the obvious question we have not evaluated yet is
related to the persistence of the causal reordering effect. Would multiple viewings
of the critical sequence reduce or even eliminate the effect? Similarly, would
presenting the ordering question after each viewing weaken the effect? These two
questions are related but they address the persistence question in different ways.
It might be argued that when participants see the critical sequence only once
before ordering the events, their perception might be influenced by their lack of
familiarity with the virtual environment. Lack of familiarity might be associated
with increased cognitive load. Thus, the capacity to observe the behaviour of
the objects and the order in which the various events occur might be significantly
reduced by the parallel effort to parse the scene, identify and categorize the various
objects and perhaps generate predictions about objects’ behaviour.
Lack of familiarity might have been an influential factor especially in Experi-
ments Michotte1 and Michotte2, where the presentation of the critical clip is also
the first time participants encounter the virtual environment. We saw, however,
that even in that case participants reported strong causal impressions and high
confidence levels. Thus, if knowledge of the environment plays a role, this re-
quirement is, at the minimum, not consciously accessible since participants do
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not express any confusion or indecisiveness. In Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2,
on the other hand, even if the critical sequence was viewed a single time, partici-
pants have had extensive experience with the environment and that did not seem
to affect the strength of the reordering effect. So the evidence we have gathered
so far does not support the view that adaptation to the particular environment
significantly affects the perception of temporal order at least in the particular se-
quences that we used. Perhaps the simplicity of the scenes and the relatively slow
pace in which events occur, affords participants with enough time to accurately
parse the environment.
Despite that, the role of familiarity not with the environment but with a
particular dynamic sequence might influence the strategies used in perceiving the
scene. Marvin Minsky in his “Frames” theory (Minsky, 1974), has argued that
viewing a static scene proceeds in a piecemeal fashion guided by the prediction or
the expectation of how that scene should look like (i.e. the frame). This prediction
is incrementally updated by the perceptual input. Thus when entering a room we
might initially see a box-like shape similar to most rooms we have encountered
in the past and only perceive the actual oval shape of the particular room as
our initial expectations are incrementally falsified and updated by the incoming
percepts. In a similar fashion, upon the first viewing of a dynamic scene we may
rely more on our expectations, our causal schemata (White, 2006b), and less on
what our senses deliver. If that is the case then multiple viewings of the critical
sequence would increase the amount of available evidence, decrease the reliance
on expectation and finally reduce or eliminate the reordering effect.
Alternatively, the reordering effect might depend on some lower level features
that are processed in a consistent way and result in the same outcome irrespective
of the level of exposure. Instances of the latter are the wide array of perceptual illu-
sions, such as the Muller-Lyer figure, the Ponzo illusion or the Ames room. James
Gibson (1966) argued that the perceptual system transforms certain higher order
relations to particular percepts, without any intermediate inference. Michotte’s
(1963) ampliation that was described earlier is an example of such higher order
relation which, according to the proponents of direct causal perception, leads to
the automatic generation of causal impressions.
Apart from presenting the critical sequence multiple times, setting the ordering
question more than once is probably an even stricter test for the persistence of the
reordering effect. There is an important difference between passively observing a
dynamic scene and viewing the same scene with a particular question in mind. As
Henderson (2003) argued, “vision is an active process in which the viewer seeks
out task-relevant visual information” (Henderson, 2003, p.498). In a well-known
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illustration of this premise, Yarbus (1967) asked participants to view the same
painting under different instructions and reported dramatic differences depending
on the task. Eye fixations were, for example, concentrated on faces when the goal
was to evaluate the age of people. Similar results were reported more recently by
Castelhano and colleagues (Castelhano, Mack, & Henderson, 2009).
Therefore, it makes sense to assume that, after encountering the ordering
question for the first time, participants will observe sequences that follow with that
particular question in mind. In subsequent viewings they will actively evaluate
the scene while trying to distinguish the order in which events take place.
In the following two experiments, we will evaluate the role of guiding attention
through repeated question presentation in an observation-only scenario. It must
be noted, however, that according to our view, the effect is determined by the
presence of strong causal beliefs. If we assume a strong expectation for the coin-
cidence of the causal and the temporal order, then repeatedly querying subjects
about the order of events will most probably also reduce their causal beliefs. Thus,
it will be difficult to determine whether a potential weakening of the reordering
effect will be due to goal-directed attention or to the re-evaluation of one’s beliefs.
4.1 Experiment 7
The first experiment1 in this chapter (thereafter “Repeated1”) aimed to evaluate
the persistence of the causal reordering effect while directing attention specifically
to the order of events. To that end we presented multiple sequences each followed
by the ordering question. However, instead of presenting exactly the same se-
quence multiple times we chose to use clips with slight variations between them,
in order to furthermore evaluate the role of spatial features in the reordering effect.
All the sequences we used were similar to the Michottean-like collisions from
Experiments Michotte1 and Michotte2. However, rather than having object A
moving directly towards B, it first appeared to be bouncing on two elongated
rectangles. Assuming that, as discussed above, posing the same temporal order
question repeatedly would lead participants to doubt the featured causal rela-
tionships, we hoped that the realistic physical events would imply a Newtonian
environment and, thus, counteract the influence of repeated questions in causal
beliefs. For the same reason we reduced the time that elapses between the onset
of motion of objects C and B to 80 ms.
1All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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The 6 sequences we presented differed only in the behaviour of object A. Having
observed in Experiment Michotte1 the criticality of that object in the perceived
order and the perceived causality in the B-C relationship, we varied A’s behaviour
in an exploratory way in order to better evaluate its role. As shown in figure 4.1,
after A bounces on the two platforms it approaches B and stops either directly to
its left as before (“straight”), above B (“above”), below B (“below”) or goes over
B and stops to its right (“through”).
We hypothesized that between the 4 sequences, the “straight” one would evoke
the highest and most persistent reordering effect while the “through” one would be
at the opposite end. This is based on the relative strength of causal impressions
each of these sequences would elicit. The “straight” sequence is the closest to
a stored causal schema (Weir, 1978; White, 2006a), it most closely conforms to
a Newtonian interpretation of the events (Sanborn et al., 2013) and it is most
similar to a Michottean launch (Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), at least in terms of
spatial locations.
We also included a clip in which although B and C behave identically, A is
“invisible” as was the case in the control condition of Experiment Michotte1.
Finally, there was a sequence featuring the “normal” order of events: A stops to
the left of B at which point B moves towards C and stops to its left, following
which C starts moving. The purpose of the “invisible” sequence was to replicate
earlier results and together with the “normal” sequence to establish the limit
against which reordering in other sequences will be evaluated.
4.1.1 Participants
We recruited 72 participants through Mechanical Turk but 7 of them were not
included in the analysis for providing at least one nonsensical answer in the or-
dering questions (i.e. did not report that object A started moving first - see next
section). The mean age of the remaining 65 participants was 30.72 (SD=11.94).
23 participants were male and 42 were female. Each of them was paid $0.50 for
participating.
4.1.2 Design and procedure
The experiment was programmed in Adobe Flex 4.6 and the physics engine
Box2DFlashAS3. Participants were asked for some simple demographic data and
Examining the Persistence of Causal Reordering 89
I
A
BC
II
III
IV-a IV-b IV-c IV-d
V
VI
VII
Figure 4.1: Four of the original sequences shown to participants in Experiment Re-
peated1. (I) The red circle (A) starts moving diagonally to the right towards the first
platform. (II) The red circle bounces on the right platform and changes direction to-
wards the left platform. (III) The red circle bounces on the left platform and changes
direction towards the two smaller circles. (IV) The red circle stops and the purple circle
(C) starts moving diagonally to the right: (IV-a) In the “straight” condition the red
circle stops to the left of the green circle. (IV-b) In the “below” condition the red circle
stops below the green circle. (IV-c) In the “above” condition the red circle stops above
the green circle.(IV-d) In the “through” condition the red circle goes over the green one
(B) and stops between the two smaller circles. (V) 80 ms later, the green circle starts
moving diagonally to the right, in the direction it would have moved if it had actually
been hit by the red circle (the four semi-transparent red circles represent the resting
position of the red circle in the 4 conditions) (VI) The green circle changes direction
as if it bounced with the purple’s initial position. (VII) The green continues moving
diagonally upwards and to the left (the arrows show the direction of movement and
were not visible during the experiment).
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then they were presented with the instructions. They would have to watch a
number of short clips and for each clip they would be asked to report the order
in which events take place. They were asked to “be as focused as possible and
pay close attention to the order of the events”. In the rest of the experiment each
participant saw 12 clips in random order, each followed by the ordering question.
The 12 clips consisted of 6 original clips and their mirrored versions. The
mirrored version of each clip differed in the colours of the various objects (men-
tioned below) and the original configuration and direction of the objects, being
the exact horizontal mirror image of the original clip2. Each clip featured three
circle objects (A,B,C) and two elongated slightly tilted black rectangles as shown
in figure 4.1. Circle A was a red (original) or purple (mirrored) circle of 10 mm
diameter located close to the bottom left corner of the screen. Objects B and C
were circles of 7 mm diameter and were located close to the center of the screen,
with B being to the left of C. In the original clips B was green and C was purple
as in figure 4.1 while in the mirrored versions B was red and C was green.
Every clip was preceded by a 3-second countdown, signified with red digits at
the middle of the screen. At the end of the countdown, in all clips apart from
the “invisible” one, object A starts moving slightly upwards and to the right (Fig.
4.1.I). Upon contact with the right platform it changes direction towards the left
as if it bounced on the platform (Fig. 4.1.II). Similarly, when it reaches the left
platform it bounces again and is directed towards objects B and C (Fig. 4.1.III).
In the “straight” clip object A stops directly to the left of B (Fig. 4.1.IV-a).
In the “below” clip A stops directly below B (Fig. 4.1.IV-b). In the “above” clip
A stops directly above B (Fig. 4.1.IV-c). Finally, in the through clip A goes above
B and stops directly to its right (Fig. 4.1.IV-d).
In all clips except from “normal” the behaviour of objects C and B was identi-
cal: When A stops, C starts moving to the right and slightly upwards, as if it was
knocked by object B. Then 80 ms later, B starts moving in the same direction, as
if it was knocked by object A (Fig. 4.1.V). Finally object B changes direction to
the left and upwards (Fig. 4.1.VI) as if it bounced with C’s original location.
In the “invisible” clip, object A is not visible at all but B and C behave as
described. Finally, the “normal” clip is very similar to straight in that A stops
to the left of B. However, in this case the temporal order of events matches the
causal order: B moves after A stops and C moves when B collides with it.
2In what follows we will describe only the original version of each clip. All references to the
spatial locations or directions of objects are reversed, so whatever is left in the original becomes
right in the mirrored version and vice-versa.
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After each clip participants were shown the original configuration of the clip
(Fig. 4.1.I) and were asked to order the events in time. The events in the tem-
porally correct order for the original versions of the clips were: “The red circle
started moving”, “The purple circle started moving” and “The green circle started
moving”. These statements were initially presented in a random order. Partici-
pants (7) who did not answer that the red circle (or the purple in the mirrored
version) was not the first one to move were excluded from the analysis. In the
“invisible” clip the statement about the red circle was, of course, not included
and, thus, no participant was disqualified in that case.
4.1.3 Results
Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of participants that reported the correct tempo-
ral order in each presentation round. The same is shown in figure 4.3 focusing
specifically on the first, the second and the final rounds.
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Figure 4.2: Proportion of participants that reported the correct (temporal) order in
each round of presentation per clip.
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of participants that provided the correct (temporal) in the first,
second and final round per clip.
Regarding the “normal” clip where temporal and causal order matched, the
majority of participants, as expected, reported the correct order both in the first
round of presentation (81.8%) and all subsequent rounds (mean 94.05%). Similar
results were obtained for the “invisible” clip where object A was not present:
66.67% reported the correct temporal order in round 1 and all subsequent rounds
(75.33%).
Given that the sample size for each of the remaining 4 clips (where 3 objects
are visible and where the temporal order did not match the causal order) is rather
small and that the results for the normal and the mirrored versions are almost
identical, it is more productive to collapse the results across spatial variations and
clip versions. Figure 4.4 shows the progression of correct answers across rounds.
As can be seen the majority selected the causal order in the first clip presentation
(71.43%) and progressively moved to the temporal order of events. After remov-
ing participants who in round 1 or 2 were presented with the “normal” or the
“invisible” clip, a McNemar’s test shows a significant difference between order-
ings reported between rounds 1 and 2 χ2(1, N = 20) = 8.33, p < 0.01. A similar
comparison between the second and the last round turns out non-significant.
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Figure 4.4: Proportion of participants that reported the correct (temporal) order in
each round of presentation, collapsed for all clips in which the temporal and the causal
order diverged.
4.1.4 Discussion
A number of interesting findings resulted from this exploratory study. First of all
we have replicated the main results from Experiment Michotte1. Upon first pre-
sentation, even with the addition of instructions informing participants about the
task, the majority reported the causal rather than the temporal order of events.
Additionally, when object A is not present (“invisible”) the majority reported the
correct temporal order even when this particular clip was presented first and de-
spite the significantly shorted delay compared to Experiment Michotte1, showing
once again that the order of events is perceivable in the absence of inconsistent
causal impressions.
The most noteworthy result from this study is related to the reported order in
the second presentation round, i.e. when a similar clip has already been observed
and when the ordering question has already been shown. As we saw the majority
of responses in the second round reflected the objective temporal order of events.
As discussed, this can plausibly be explained by goal-oriented perception: par-
ticipants, in the latter case, are actively seeking for particular information in a
relatively familiar environment, rather than passively observing the scene. Alter-
natively, it can be explained by a potential weakening of causal beliefs. From the
question itself one might infer that since there can be multiple orderings of the
events, the expected causal relationships should not be taken for granted.
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Irrespective of whether an explanation based on goal-directed attention or on
the weakening of causal beliefs dominates, the increasing accuracy throughout the
experiment seems to rule out an explanation based on encapsulated perception.
If the perceptual system was indeed picking up some higher order relationship
and was directly transforming that to a causal or temporal percept, then that
process would be immune to several viewings and knowledge of the task. This
conclusion is perhaps contradicted by another finding in this experiment: In the
“straight” sequence where the spatial properties are the closest to a normal 3-
object collision, although judgements improved after the first viewing, they never
approached the level of accuracy one would expect if the reordering effect was
wholly due to direction of attention and/or familiarization with the environment
in general and the behaviour of objects in particular.
Thus, when the “straight” clip was shown at the end, after having seen 11
similar clips including the mirrored version of the same clip, 40% of the partici-
pants still reported the causal order of events, i.e. that object B started moving
before object C. Does this mean that there is some low level perceptual factor in
play or is it the case that the number of viewings were not enough to completely
disambiguate the scene? The experiment presented next is a more focused study
of the reordering effect in the presence of repeated presentations. In addition, we
will try to distinguish between increased exposure and goal-oriented attention as
explanations for the reduction of the effect that was observed here.
4.2 Experiment 8
Continuing from Experiment Repeated1, in this experiment (thereafter “Repeated2”)3
we aimed to separate the role of attenuated perceptual signal through repeated
exposure from directed attention through question presentation in reducing the
effect. As before, by attention we mean the act of focusing to the possible ambi-
guities of the stimuli or viewing the sequence with some particular goal in mind
(Henderson, 2003; Yarbus, 1967)4.
This experiment is more directly comparable to Experiments Michotte1 and
Michotte2 than Experiment Repeated1, since we re-used the same sequence as
in the former studies. Specifically, object A moves directly towards objects B
3All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
4The reordering effect cannot be explained by lack of visual attention in general, since, as
we have shown especially in Experiment Michotte2, participants register all the events in the
sequence and still change the order in which those events occurred.
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and C rather than bouncing on platforms prior to the pseudo-collision. Most
importantly, participants were exposed to exactly the same sequence multiple
times, rather than viewing a variety of sequences.
The experiment was divided in 2 blocks, with each block consisting of 5 pre-
sentations of the same clip, followed by a single set of questions. Therefore, in
block 1, participants had adequate exposure to the sequence of events and in block
2, on top of the exposure, they were also aware of the questions that they will be
required to answer. In addition, we administered both the ordering question as
in other experiments and additionally the review question, in which participants
are asked to pick the clip they saw, as in Experiment Michotte2.
Based on the results of Experiment Repeated1, we expected a reduced re-
ordering effect in block 1, that would be further reduced in block 2. The potential
difference between the two blocks would allow us distinguish to what extent the
causal reordering effect is due to insufficient perceptual input or whether it is
related to attention, in the sense specified above.
4.2.1 Participants
We recruited 20 participants through Amazon Mechanical Turk. There were no
irregular answers but 1 participant was removed from the analysis due to extreme
low framerate (1.95 fps with the target being 30 fps) while viewing the critical
sequences5. Another participant was removed for not reviewing both sequences
during the review question, making her answer essentially random (see next sec-
tion). Of the remaining 18 participants, 13 were male and 5 were female. The
mean age was 32.39 (SD=11.27). Each participant was paid $0.50 for participat-
ing.
4.2.2 Design and procedure
After completing the calibration section (see Appendix A.3) and submitting simple
demographics data, participants were simply informed that they will watch a short
clip repeating 5 times.
The clip was almost identical to the clip used in the first condition of Exper-
5Such a low framerate is probably due to the browser losing focus during the experiment, since
the Flash engine almost stops rendering when not in focus. This suggests that the particular
participant was not entirely concentrated during the experiment.
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iment Michotte1, shown in figure 3.3a. However, the objects were circles rather
than squares. In the clip a red circle A approaches from the left a blue circle B at
100 mm/sec. Circle A stops directly next to B, at which point the purple circle C
starts moving to the right. Object B moves to the right, 150 ms later and stops
next to C’s original location. Object C continues for a distance identical to A’s
travel distance (35 mm) and stops.
The clip was repeated for five times, following which, participants were asked,
as before, to order the events in time. The correct temporal order of events was:
“The red circle started moving”, “The purple circle started moving” and “The
blue circle started moving”. This was followed by the review question: Similar
to Experiment Michotte2 the target clip was presented side-by-side with a clip
showing a proper three object collision in which the temporal and causal order
matched, as shown in figure 3.6c (with circles instead of squares). Participants
could watch each clip an indefinite amount of times. However, we removed from
the analysis participants who did not watch each of the two clips at least once.
After answering the review question participants were asked to indicate their
confidence to the selection they made by dragging a slider on a scale that was
labelled “Not at all confident” to the left and “Very confident” to the rightmost
location. At the end of this block, there was an open-ended question asking
participants to describe the difference between the two clips.
In the next block, the exact same procedure was repeated. Participants were
informed that a clip will be shown for 5 times and after watching the clip they
were presented with the ordering and the review questions, together with the
confidence rating and the open-ended question. Finally, participants were given
the option to leave feedback for the experiment as a whole and were thanked for
their participation.
4.2.3 Results
Figure 4.5 shows the proportion of participants that provided the correct answers
in the order and the review question in each block. For the first block, 39% pre-
ferred the temporal order and 61% the causal order of events, while 83% selected
they clip they actually saw rather than the proper three object collision. In the
second block the proportion of participants selecting the objective temporal order
of events rose to 67% while those correctly identifying the clip they saw remained
roughly the same at 89%. However, the between block comparison is not signif-
icant for any of the 2 questions. Note also that the mean reported confidence
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regarding the review questions was high for both blocks: 75.0% (SD=28.9) in
block 1 and 81.2% (SD=26.0) in block 2. Finally, the answers to the open-ended
question did not reveal any systematic pattern, in either block.
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Figure 4.5: Proportion of participants that chose the correct answer in the order and
review questions per clip. In the order question, the correct answer corresponds to the
temporal order of events and in the review question corresponds to selecting the clip they
saw rather than the proper three object collision. Results from previous experiments
are included for comparison.
4.2.4 Discussion
The results of this study are in the same direction as those in Experiment Re-
peated1 but easier to interpret. On the one hand, a comparison with the results
from Experiment Michotte1 shows that increasing the exposure to the reordered
sequence decreases the proportion of participants who misperceive the order of
events. At the same time, increased exposure by itself does not suffice to elimi-
nate the effect, since the majority still preferred the order that is congruent with
a causal interpretation of the sequence. We came close to achieving that in the
second block, when participants were aware of what they are looking for in the
clip. Although the comparison of the responses to the ordering question between
the first and the second block was not significant, the evidence we have accumu-
lated so far lead us to assume that this can be probably explained by the relatively
small sample size.
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Besides, prolonged exposure was adequate to eliminate the effect observed in
Experiment Michotte2 where the majority of participants could not identify the
clip they saw. In this case almost all participants picked the correct clip. However,
as we described earlier the correct identification in this case was guided less by
the order of events and more by the total number of features that differ from a
proper Newtonian collision. In other words, participants know that they clip they
repeatedly saw was non-standard but not all of them locate the problem in the
order of events: Of the 15 participants who picked the correct clip, the majority
(9) got the order wrong. Another indication towards the same conclusion is the
answers to the open-ended question regarding the difference between the two clips:
most participants pointed to the lack of contact between the objects rather than
the order of the events.
4.3 General Discussion
The findings from the two studies in this chapter converge in two conclusions:
Multiple observations, on the one hand, and goal-directed attention, on the other,
have a positive effect in reducing the causal reordering effect. This shows that the
effect we have demonstrated throughout this thesis is not purely the product of
some encapsulated perceptual process. Contrast this with perceptual illusions, like
the Ponzo illusion, in which no amount of exposure and no amount of information
can change the perception of two identical lines as having unequal length.
The fact that repeated observations result in reducing the effect can be ex-
plained by the incremental strategy employed in the perception and the represen-
tation of a dynamic scene. Upon first observation, certain low-level spatiotemporal
cues trigger the activation of a causal representation, which leads to the reorder-
ing effect. This was shown both by the high level of reordering in Experiment
Michotte1 and, especially, the fact that most participants could not identify the
clip they have seen seconds earlier in Experiment Michotte2, preferring instead
the more canonical form of the clip. In subsequent viewings, the initially formed
representation, the initial hypothesis (Gregory, 1970), is compared against the
incoming percepts. We believe that it is due to this comparison that we observe
an impressive improvement in the ability to identify the experienced clip, from
below 40% in Experiment Michotte2 to above 80% in Experiment Repeated2.
However, as we saw, increasing the exposure is not enough to lead to the de-
tection of the correct temporal order. Although, many participants know that
they clip they saw is not typical in some sense, they retain the causal impres-
Examining the Persistence of Causal Reordering 99
sion that guides the perceived order of events. This is further evidence that, in
short timescales, temporal order is constructed or at least strongly dependent on
non-perceptual information such as the apparent presence of causal relationships
(Grush, 2007).
We came close to completely eliminating the effect, when participants watched
the clip with the ordering question in mind, as was the case in the second block
of Experiment Repeated2. This can be thought as further evidence for the non-
encapsulated nature of the effect and the fact that “visual attention to objects
and locations depends both on deliberate behavioral goals that regulate even early
visual representations” (Yantis, 2000, p.77).
It might be argued that this set of results diminish the importance of the causal
reordering effect. If the effect depends on inadequate exposure to the stimuli and
the uninformed, passive observation of the events, then it may just be a fleeting,
uninteresting effect with limited application to everyday life. We believe quite
the contrary. Apart from the fact that even fleeting impressions can be a rich
source of information for the biases that drive cognition, we would argue that
especially in the domain of dynamic events initial impressions are critical in a
large proportion of our everyday encounters. Referring to the example at the
beginning of this thesis, we normally get to see a glass falling to the floor only a
single time. Throughout our lifetime we probably have multiple similar encounters
but we never experience exactly the same sequence of events as was the case in
the last two experiments, unless, of course, we are watching a video recording.
It is very unlikely though that perception operates with the expectation of a
second shot where the sequence will “rewind” and the chance for a more detailed
observation will be given. This is not to say, of course, that first impressions is
all that counts. The ability of the cognitive system to self-correct as evidence
accumulates is also critical and is illustrated in this chapter’s experiments.
Regarding the role of goal-directed attention, it is important to remember
that the effect depends on the presence of strong causal beliefs. Explicitly direct-
ing participants’ attention to the order of events has the side-effect of diminishing
causal beliefs, given, as discussed, the assumption of temporal precedence in causal
events. When one carefully considers whether C happens before B one is simulta-
neously assessing the possibility that B is not causing C, otherwise the temporal
question is already answered. It is very difficult if not impossible, to distinguish
between weakened causal beliefs and goal-directed attention in this task, and, in
any case, we do not think that the above results provide clear support for either
hypothesis.

CHAPTER 5
The Boundaries of Causal Perception
In the experiments we have presented so far, participants appeared to have causal
impressions in Michottean-like sequences in which the cause and the effect were
separated either by a relatively long temporal delay (A-B) or by a large spatial
gap (B-C). According to the perceptual causation literature such deviations should
have destroyed causal impressions.
While Michotte was investigating the launching effect, he conducted a number
of experiments to determine the conditions under which the effect disappears. Re-
garding temporal delay, for example, he found that for delays over 200 ms partici-
pants report two entirely independent movements (Michotte, 1963, p.91, exp.29).
In his own words: “the presence of the interval [200 ms or more] makes the causal
impression disappear completely...two events that are obviously separate, which
arise successively, and which on their own give no impression of causality...Not
only is there no causal impression, but there is no tendency towards a causal ‘in-
terpretation’ in these cases” (Michotte, 1963, p.22). Regarding the spatial gap he
found that it greatly depends on the speed of the objects but at a speed lower
than 250 mm/sec a gap of 20 mm destroys causal impressions (Michotte, 1963,
p.100, exp.31).
Similar results were observed in the experiments that followed (see table 5.1).
Straube and Chatterjee (2010) report that sequences with delays averaging 164.67
ms were judged as non-causal. Similarly, Fugelsang and Thompson (2000) report
that only 4.2% of the subjects had a causal impression with a 170 ms delay. At 167
ms about 30% of participants saw a causal link in Yela (1952) and this proportion
drops to 12% at 250 ms. For a delay of 250 ms the probability of reporting a causal
impression was about 0.1 in Sanborn et al. (2013). For an even more exaggerated
delay of 1300 mm in Schlottmann, Ray, Demetriou, and Mitchell (2006) the mean
rating was -0.42 (1 was causal, 0 was non-causal and -1 was a social impression).
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The causal rating was rather higher, around 150/300 for a delay of 170 ms in
Schlottmann and Anderson (1993).
Regarding spatial gaps, Sanborn et al. (2013) report a probability of perceiving
a causal interaction close to 0 when the gap is 4 mm. Fugelsang and Thompson
(2000) refer to an experiment in which a 12 mm gap resulted in 10.4% of partic-
ipants reporting a causal impression. Yela (1952) reports a negative correlation
between the size of the gap and the resulting causal impression: at 90 mm only
28% of the participants reported a causal link. In Schlottmann and Anderson
(1993) the mean causal rating was relatively higher at about 150/300 for a gap of
2.1 mm. Finally, for a much greater gap of 30 mm the mean rating was 0.083 on
a scale where 1 corresponded to a causal impression, 0 to a non-causal impression
and -1 to an impression of social causation in Schlottmann et al. (2006).
The finding that small deviations from Newtonian principles weaken or destroy
the perceived causal link was taken by Michotte and his followers (Butterfill, 2009;
Michotte, 1963; Scholl & Gao, 2013; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Yela, 1952) as the
strongest evidence of the perceptual nature of causal impressions. Thus, Yela
argued that “every change in the stimulus conditions is followed by systematic
changes in the corresponding impression” and concluded that “such concomitant
variation makes it rather difficult to ascribe the forming of the ‘causal impression’
to the influence of past experience” (Yela, 1952, p.140). More recently Scholl and
Gao (2013) expressed the view that “these measures are unlikely to reflect higher-
level inferences for a reason stressed by Michotte and others in the context of
perceived causality...: these results reveal dramatic effects of very subtle stimulus
manipulations. This is a hallmark of perception...” (Scholl & Gao, 2013, p.175).
Those disagreeing with Michotte attempted either to disprove the universality
of the launching effect (Beasley, 1968) or more commonly to show that the launch-
ing effect does not result from direct perception and is, rather, another example
of causal inference (Sanborn et al., 2013; Weir, 1978; White, 2006a, 2014). For the
schema-matching approaches that we reviewed earlier, sequences featuring devia-
tions from proper collisions1 are seen as non-causal because no matching schema
can be retrieved from memory.
Despite this disagreement regarding the underlying process, the current lit-
erature agrees that people perceive as causal only sequences that fall within the
space defined by Newtons laws, albeit somewhat liberally interpreted (Sanborn
et al., 2013; White, 2006b). Other sequences are thought to be perceived as in-
1By the term “proper” we refer to a collision between a moving object and a static object
that features no delay between the first stopping and the second starting to move, and no spatial
gap at the point of collision.
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Authors Year Condition Results
Sanborn et al. 2013 Gap:4 mm Probability of reporting causality
close to 0
Fugelsang et
al.
2005 Gap: 12 mm 10.4% of participants reported a
causal impression
Michotte 1963
(exp.31)
Gap: 20 mm “the Launching effect was almost
invariably destroyed”
Yela 1952 Gap: 90 mm 28% of participants reported a
causal impression
Schlottmann
and Anderson
1993 Gap: 2.1 mm Mean causal rating about
150/300
Schlottmann
et al.
2006 Gap: 30 mm Mean rating was 0.083 (0 was non
causal and 1 was causal impres-
sion, -1 was an impression of so-
cial causality)
Straube and
Chatterjee
2010 Delay: 164.67
ms (mean)
Sequences judged as non-causal
Fugelsang et
al.
2005 Delay: 170 ms 4.2% of participants reported a
causal impression
Yela 1952 Delay: 167 ms 30% of participants reported a
causal impression
Sanborn et al. 2013 Delay: 250 ms Probability of reporting causality
close to 0
Schlottmann
and Anderson
1993 Delay: 170 ms Mean causal rating about
150/300
Schlottmann
et al.
2006 Delay: 1300
ms
Mean rating was -0.42 (0 was non
causal and 1 was causal impres-
sion, -1 was an impression of so-
cial causality)
Michotte 1963
(exp.29)
Delay: 200 ms
or more
No causal impression
Table 5.1: Past empirical findings for Michottean sequences with gaps and delays
104
dependent motions of objects and the term “non-causal” is frequently used to
characterize sequences that contain delays or gaps (Roser, Fugelsang, Dunbar,
Corballis, & Gazzaniga, 2005; Schlottmann, 1999; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999;
Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000; Wagemans et al., 2006; Weir, 1978). This consensus
in psychology has led philosophers to argue for causality as a categorical concept
(Butterfill, 2009) and neuroscientists (Fugelsang et al., 2005; Straube & Chat-
terjee, 2010) to look for brain patterns that correlate with a sharp behavioural
distinction between causal and non-causal events.
Therefore, the causal basis of the explanation we have put forward for the
reordering effect as observed in Experiments Michotte1 and Michotte2 is not com-
patible with either the experimental findings or the theoretical arguments regard-
ing the determinants of causal perception. The questions, thus, becomes: Is it
indeed the case that in the domain of dynamic events obeying quasi-newtonian
principles defines a strict boundary between causal and non-causal experiences?
More specifically, are collisions with a certain temporal delay or a spatial gap void
of any causal impression, as the current literature holds?
Looking back at the experiments upon which the causal vs. non-causal dis-
tinction is established, the overwhelming majority use the same protocol: Par-
ticipants watch a number of collision-like events, including proper collisions and
numerous variations with delays, gaps, etc. After each viewing participants re-
port a causal judgement, usually in a categorical format (causal vs. non-causal),
other times on a scale ranging from causal to non-causal (or independent) and
sometimes via spontaneous reports (Beasley, 1968; Boyle, 1960; Schlottmann et
al., 2006). The results are then analysed by collapsing judgements for clips of the
same type. They typically show that participants judge proper collisions as causal
and anything else as non-causal - although each type of deviation may contribute
to a different extent to the weakening of the causal impression (Schlottmann &
Anderson, 1993).
It has been argued (Brown & Miles, 1969; Gruber, Fink, & Damm, 1957;
Powesland, 1959; Woods, Lehet, & Chatterjee, 2012) that the repeated exposure
to collision-like events results in relative judgements of causation. For example,
Brown and Miles (1969) split participants into three groups: each group was ini-
tially exposed to 12 collision sequences differing in the range of delays between
the first object stopping and the second object starting to move. The range of
delays was 60-210 ms for the “short” group, 150-300 ms for the “medium” group
and 240-390 ms for the “long” group. Following the adaptation period, all groups
watched sequences with delays covering the full range (60-390 ms) and were asked
to report their causal impression for each sequence. The results indicate that
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causal reports varied as a function of prior exposure: Compared to participants in
the “long” group, those in the “short” condition were less likely to report causal-
ity in sequences with long delays. Brown and Miles (1969) claimed that these
findings can be interpreted either as the result of low-level perceptual adaptation
or the result of semantic adjustment. In other words, for a participant in the
“short” group, either a long delay actually appears longer due to earlier exposure
to sequences with shorter delays or the prior exposure changes the threshold of
what qualifies as causal, of what one decides to call “causal”.
The reordering effect, however, requires not only that participants decide to
call the 3-object pseudo-collision “causal”, but that they actually perceive it as
such. Nevertheless, in the previous chapter, we saw that repeated exposure to the
reordered stimuli and, especially, directing attention to the particular question,
diminishes the effect. Therefore, the observed inaccurate temporal order reports
in our experiments may, to some extent, be due to initial overinclusive causal
impressions. As exposure increases and attention becomes more focused, causal
judgements are more selective and the reordering effect diminishes.
Since in respect to the reordering effect, increased exposure improves the ac-
curacy of causal/order judgements, one would expect the same to be the case
in Michottean sequences with spatiotemporal deviations. There is, however, one
crucial difference between a sequence featuring a delay or a spatial gap between
the cause and the effect and one in which the order is reversed: Although the
exact spatiotemporal relationship between the cause and the effect depends on
the particular mechanism that mediates the relationship, there is no mechanism
in which the effect precedes the cause. There are many examples in everyday ex-
perience where causation appears to work over temporal delays (e.g. medication,
economic processes) or spatial gaps (e.g. remote controls, phone conversations)
but it is very hard to imagine a single example of backwards causation (Black,
1956; Dummett, 1964). In other words, while a reordered sequence is certainly
not causal if one is willing to exclude the possibility of backwards causation, a
sequence with a long temporal delay is not causal only if we impose a Newtonian
interpretation. Thus, while in the case of causes following their effects one can
clearly designate the correct answer regarding the presence and direction of cau-
sation, a temporal delay or a spatial gap does not normatively preclude causal
interactions.
However, as we saw, according to previous research, people appear to impose
Newtonian constraints to the evaluation of Michottean launching sequences, and,
as a consequence, judge sequences with spatiotemporal deviations to be non-
causal. In our view, however, the methodology used in past experiments was
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to some extent biased towards that conclusion.
On could argue that the sequences presented by Brown and Miles (1969) and
other similar experiments are in fact all perceived as causal by participants. What
drives the different types of responses following an interaction with minimal or no
delay and one with a 250 ms delay is predominantly the different type of mech-
anism that is thought to be connecting the cause and the effect. In the no-delay
case, the mediating mechanism is known: it is the impetus or the kinetic energy
of the first object that is transferred to the second object, almost immediately
upon contact. The sequence appears to be governed by Newtonian physics or, at
least, by rules that match our naive Newtonian theories whether Aristotelian (Mc-
Closkey, 1983) or more sophisticated (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013;
Hamrick, Battaglia, & Tenenbaum, 2011; Sanborn et al., 2013). Conversely, in the
case of a collision with some perceivable delay, although we still see a cause and
an effect, the mediating mechanism is unknown or at least less familiar. One may
assume, for example, that the first object is enabling some apparatus that takes
some time to activate and it is the activation of that apparatus that launches
the second object. Or one may remain agnostic as to the intervening mecha-
nism. What is crucial, from our perspective, is that there will be an impression
of causality whether there is a delay or not.
Furthermore, we believe that participants in the above experiments interpret
the task as a categorization task and, as such, they look for features that can be
used to distinguish the various types of sequences. Since, as we argue, causation
is not a distinctive feature as it is shared by all sequences, participants will look
for another dimension that reliably characterizes each sequence and is compatible
with the question that is being asked. If, as is the case with most experiments
in the literature, a proper collision is included among the stimuli and, moreover,
most other sequences are sufficiently similar to a collision with a single spatial
or temporal difference, then collision faithfulness can be that distinctive feature.
From this perspective, participants are shown the category exemplar (Medin &
Schaffer, 1978) and stimuli that are more or less similar to that exemplar. Then,
the question of whether one object makes another move can be interpreted as
whether one object makes another move in a particular way, through a particular
mechanism, i.e. by transferring its kinetic energy. We argue, thus, that the
variable ratings reported in the literature for each observed interaction do not
correspond to varying causal impressions, nor to varying thresholds of what is
deemed causal, but rather to the extent to which each observed interaction is
representative of an ideal collision.
Based on the above argument we would expect a radical shift in participants
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judgements before and after viewing a proper collision. In particular, we would
expect high causal ratings for all sequences prior to viewing the proper collision,
since in all these sequences the first object would be seen as somehow causing the
movement of the second one. Participants at that stage would not differentiate
the various clips in causal terms. Viewing and evaluating a proper collision,
however, changes the way the causal question is interpreted. We believe that
when assessing the causal question in relation to a proper collision, participants
identify this sequence as the main exemplar of the category of Newtonian collisions
and, moreover, identify collision faithfulness as the feature that can be used to
categorize the sequences in terms of good and bad collisions. The proper collision
would, thus, receive a high rating and, more crucially, from that point onwards
participants do not judge the phenomenal causality in a sequence but rather how
similar the sequence is to an ideal collision. In other words, we argue that, prior to
viewing a proper collision, the causal question assesses causal impressions while,
after it, the reported ratings correspond to naive physics judgements.
Unfortunately, the majority of experiments in the literature report only sum-
mary data and there is very little data on causal impressions prior to viewing a
proper collision. Michotte (1963) anecdotally reports that sometimes participants
in his experiments had to be exposed to the launching sequence a number of times
before reporting a causal impression. While this goes against the universality and
automaticity of his claims, it is difficult to imagine how his purpose-made ap-
paratus looked to naive participants. Michotte himself attributes the failure to
elicit causal reports on first exposure to the confusion of participants who were
“all ‘mixed up’ and do not realise what is going on at all, and their impression is
chaotic and unorganised” (Michotte, 1963, p. 20).
The only study to our knowledge that has attempted to get causal judgements
without biasing participants towards a particular type of causal mechanism was
conducted by Schlottmann and her colleagues (2006). Although the overall ex-
perimental design also involves the repeated viewing and evaluation of sequences,
the researchers do report participants’ judgements after viewing the first sequence.
Despite the fact that deviations from Newtonian principles were large (delay=1300
ms, gap 30 mm) participants still reported moderate impressions of causality in
one case (delay) and were indecisive in the other case (gap). Furthermore, causal
impressions were greatly reduced after exposure to the other sequences that in-
cluded proper collisions. However, this was a within subjects experiment and the
order of sequence presentation was counterbalanced between participants. Conse-
quently, when only the first impression of each subject is considered for each clip
type, the sample size becomes too small (N=6) to warrant any safe conclusion.
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Another indication regarding the way participants understand the task in sim-
ilar experiments is given by Sanborn and colleagues (2013). While the experiment
they conducted follows the procedure described earlier, participants in this case
are split into two groups, one answering the question in the familiar format (“Did
it look like the white box moved because the gray box hit it?”) while the other
group is specifically asked about collision quality (“Your task is to decide whether
each movie came from a real collision of the blocks or a random combination of
the variables. A real collision looks like the blocks actually collide. A random
collision looks a little like a real collision, except that the velocities of the blocks,
gap between the blocks, and the time delay before the second block starts mov-
ing are all selected randomly”). The results of this experiment showed the usual
pattern, with sequences involving gaps and delays deemed non-causal by partic-
ipants. What’s most interesting from our perspective, though, is that there was
no significant difference depending on the question format, leading the authors to
conclude that even when asked about causal judgements, participants are actually
assessing the faithfulness of collisions.
The other study where experimenters distinguished between generic impres-
sions of causality and impressions of collision faithfulness was conducted by Schlottmann
and Anderson (1993). Unlike Sanborn et al (2013), the two types of questions were
given to all participants, thus encouraging them to explicitly distinguish between
attributions of causality and impressions of collision naturalness. There were two
relevant findings: first there were qualitatively different responses for each question
type, showing that participants were able to distinguish at some level between the
two. At the same time, though, each participant appeared predisposed towards
either reporting causality or reporting the naturalness of collisions.
The combined results from Sanborn et al (2013) and Schlottmann and Ander-
son (1993) provide some evidence that other experiments might be conflating the
two types of interpretations. When asked something along the lines of how causal
an interaction appears, participants might be reporting either a causal impression
or the impression of a particular type of causal interaction, the presence or absence
of a particular type of causal mechanism. The need to distinguish between the two
is of great importance if we want to accurately assess the findings of experiments
on perceptual causation. If our aim is to understand the rules or the processes
underlying naive physics judgements then we must ensure that participants in
our experiments do not respond to the presence of causation in general. If, on
the other hand, similar to Scholl and Tremoulet (2000) we hope to “characterize
comprehensively the precise stimulus conditions that give rise to these percepts
in order to discover the perceptual ‘grammar’ of causality” then we need to know
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that the cues we discover define the determinants of causal perception in general
and not a specific subset of causal interactions.
5.1 Experiment 9
This experiment (thereafter “Boundaries1”)2 is aimed to re-assess the perceived
causal status of Michottean sequences featuring gaps, delays or angles and to re-
evaluate the extent to which the experimental procedures used in the past are
channelling participants’ judgements to specific types of causal relationships, i.e.
those governed by quasi-Newtonian principles. For that purpose we asked par-
ticipants to report their causal impressions of Michottean-style sequences each
featuring either a 15 mm spatial gap, a 250 ms temporal delay or a 90 degrees
angle between the direction of the incoming object and that of the outgoing ob-
ject. Most crucially each participant watched one of those sequences and reported
her impression once before and once after evaluating a proper collision. As ex-
plained earlier, our hypothesis was that the very act of viewing or deliberating on
the causality of a proper collision will lead participants to stop reporting causal
impressions for non Newtonian sequences.
We already saw (Table 5.1) that when participants watch a series of clips in-
cluding proper collisions and their causal ratings are aggregated by clip type the
results are clear: when the gap is over 4 mm or the delay over 150 ms partici-
pants do report either weak causal impressions or two entirely independent move-
ments. There are less experimental results for sequences with an angle between
the movement of the launching object and that of the launched one; however,
strong predictions are made. Michotte (1963, p. 102, exp. 34-35) argues that
the sharper the angle the fewer the causal reports, completely disappearing at
90o. More recently, White’s (2006a) schema matching theory specifically predicts
that no causal impression would result from a sequence featuring a sharp angle.
Finally, the results of Straube and Chatterjee (2010) confirm these predictions by
reporting that sequences with angles averaging 31.53o were judged as non-causal
by their participants.
In the current experiment, after participants viewed and evaluated the critical
clip, they watched a proper collision and were asked for their causal impression
about it. This aimed to directly assess the influence of a proper collision on the
reported impressions of causality: straight after evaluating the proper collision, we
2All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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presented the critical clip once again and asked the same causal question. We pre-
dicted that the second viewing of the same clip would result in significantly lower
reports of causality, a prediction not shared by any of the theories of perceptual
causation, in their current form.
All Conditions
Gap
Delay
Angle
Colour
A
B C
250ms
Figure 5.1: The sequences shown to participants in Experiments Boundaries1, Bound-
aries2 and Boundaries3. (A) The configuration of the objects for all conditions at the
start of the clip. (B) The configuration of the objects at the time when the effect (blue’s
motion or colour change) takes place. (C) The configuration of the objects at the end
of the clip. (The black arrows represent the imminent or delayed direction of motion
and were not visible in the experiment)
5.1.1 Participants
We recruited 90 participants through Mechanical Turk. Each was randomly as-
signed to one of three experimental groups resulting in 30 participants per group.
The mean age was 35.9 (SD=12.9). 43 subjects were female and 47 were male.
Each participant was paid $0.80 for participating.
5.1.2 Design and procedure
The overall design was mixed factorial with type of clip (“gap”, “delay”, “angle”)
varied between participants and time of causal report (before or after viewing the
proper collision) varied within subjects.
The Boundaries of Causal Perception 111
The clips were created using Adobe Flex 4.6. All clips featured a red and a
blue square of size 10 x 10 mm. The red square was positioned 67.5 mm to the left
of the blue square (Fig. 5.1A). The two objects faded in and 3 seconds later the
red one started moving to the right towards the blue at a speed of 100 mm/sec.
When the right edge of the red square reached the left edge of the blue (or 15 mm
earlier in the “gap” clip) the red halted and immediately after (or 250 ms later
in the “delay” clip) the blue square started moving (Fig. 5.1B). The blue square
moved towards the right (or towards the bottom in the “angle” clip) at the same
speed as the red (100 mm/sec) and came to a halt 67.5 mm later (Fig. 5.1C).
The animation lasted for 1350-1600 ms depending on the clip. The two objects
remained static for 1400 ms and finally faded out3.
After successfully completing the calibration session (see Appendix A.3) and
providing some basic demographics, participants were informed that they will see
a short clip repeated 5 times. When they proceeded to the next screen they saw
one of the three critical clips depending on condition in a loop repeating 5 times.
In the next screen they were shown the initial configuration of the clip (Fig.
5.1A) and they were asked for their causal impression. The exact wording was
copied from Schlottmann et al. (2006) with a couple of changes to reflect the
different colours used and the method to respond (a virtual slider rather than a
scale): “Do you have the impression that red somehow made blue move”? The
causal question was further qualified with the following, also from Schlottmann et
al. (2006): “If you feel strongly that red made blue move, set the slider below at
the left end of the scale. If you feel that red made blue move, but this impression
is not very strong, set the slider towards the left, but not all the way. If you feel
strongly that red did not make blue move, set the slider at right end of the scale,
etc. If you do not know or cannot decide, set the slider at the middle. Use all
of the scale to mark the strength of your impression”. This specific format was
chosen because it does not imply any particular type of relationship between the
cause and the effect and also because it stresses the perceptual rather than the
inferential aspect of the judgement. Participants marked their answer by dragging
a slider on a scale that was marked from left to right with the following statements:
“red made blue move”, “don’t know”, “red did not make blue move”.
In the next screen participants were informed that they will see another clip
and, irrespective of condition, they saw a proper collision repeating five times.
Subsequently, they were asked for a causal impression in the way just described.
Finally, after another information screen they saw the critical clip again repeated
3Apart from the colour of the objects, all other settings were copied from Sanborn et al.
(2013)
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5 times and once more they were asked for their causal impression.
5.1.3 Results
Figure 5.2 below summarises the results for each condition. The first thing to
consider is that for all conditions the causal impressions for the first viewing are
noticeably strong, especially compared to the findings that result from aggregated
ratings (see table 5.1). Across conditions, 83% of the participants reported a
strong or moderate impression of causality (i.e. set the slider beyond the mid-
range point that corresponded to “don’t know” towards the causal statement) after
viewing the critical clip for the first time. The mean judgement was 71.00/100
(SD: 34.49) for the 15 mm gap clip, 78.03/100 (SD: 24.25) for the 250 ms delay
clip and 75.33/100 (SD: 30.21) for the 90 degree angle clip. As expected, the
ratings for the proper collisions were close to ceiling for all conditions with very
low variability.
Of most interest is the significant drop of causal ratings for the critical clip
when viewed for the second time after the proper collision clip. The mean judge-
ment for the second report was 36.80/100 (SD: 33.02) for the gap condition,
41.40/100 (SD: 37.22) for the delay condition and 62.60/100 (SD: 36.14) for the
angle condition. Mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of time of causal
report (before-after viewing the proper collision), F (1, 87) = 61.921, p < 0.01 and
a significant interaction effect, F (2, 87) = 4.602, p < 0.05 due to the reduction
being smaller in the angle condition. Paired sample t-tests were significant for
all conditions: Gap: t(29)= 5.127 p<0.01, d=1.01, Delay: t(29)= 5.482 p<0.01,
d=1.17, Angle: t(29)=2.281 p=0.01, d=0.38.
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Figure 5.2: Mean causal impressions for each question per condition in Experiment
Boundaries1. A rating of 100 corresponds to the impression that red made blue move,
a rating of 0 to an impression that red did not make blue move, while a rating of 50
denotes indecisiveness. (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)
5.1.4 Discussion
The very high causal ratings for the first viewing of the critical clip indicate, in
our view, that the impression of causality from dynamical sense-data is far more
inclusive than previously thought. Despite the fact that the values that we used for
the gap, the delay and the angle are among the most exaggerated in the literature,
the overwhelming majority of participants did report having the impression of a
causal link between the two objects.
The influence of viewing and evaluating the proper collision is apparent. To
some extent, the ratings for the second viewing of the critical clip approach the
results reported in the literature. In that sense, this experiment is a condensed
version of the repeated measures design that is usually being employed. Our
results indicate the game-changing role of including a proper collision among the
clip variations: as discussed, we believe that upon evaluating a proper collision,
participants switch from reporting their causal impressions to reporting the degree
to which a clip “looks like a collision”4.
4An alternative interpretation of these results will be discussed in this chapter’s General
Discussion section
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The sequence whose ratings are the least affected by the interpolation of the
proper collision clip is the angle clip. Although the difference between the first and
the last second viewing remained significant, the ratings for the second viewing
were reduced less in comparison to the other conditions. We believe that this
result is compatible with the categorisation view we have expressed earlier. Since
the angle clip is the most dissimilar to the proper collision, collision faithfulness
is, compared to the other conditions, a less appropriate feature for distinguishing
between the clips. Thus, at least for some participants, both the first and the
second viewing of the clip are judged in terms of the generated causal impressions,
rather than in terms of the presence of a particular type of causal mechanism.
The last experiment in this chapter will further test the role of similarity between
the target and the interpolating clips in producing the sharp decrease in ratings
observed here.
There are, however, other ways to explain the discrepancy between our data
and previous findings. Sensory adaptation is one alternative (Helson, 1948). Per-
haps, in the absence of prior exposure, the delay featured in the first sequence is
in fact perceived as shorter than it actually is. Upon viewing the proper collision
clip, the perceptual system is calibrated to that noticeably shorter delay and, thus,
when the final clip is shown, the time that elapses between the movements of the
two objects appears lengthier than before and that is what drives the weakening of
causal impressions. This shift in what is perceived as “immediate” launching that
depends on prior experience is the explanation favoured by many opponents of
the Michottean approach (Brown & Miles, 1969; Gruber et al., 1957; Powesland,
1959).
Similarly, there might be an explanation based on top-down adaptation. With-
out having experienced any similar clip, participants may initially be more inclu-
sive in what they report as causal, even without actually perceiving causation;
they simply assume, in the absence of a reference point, that the clip they saw
could in some sense be called causal. For example, according to an explanation of
this kind, participants in our experiment may assume that the delay or the gap is
due to “sticky computers” (Schlottmann et al., 2006). As soon as they observe a
clip without delay or gap they rule out that explanation and adjust their ratings
accordingly after the second viewing. The next experiment is designed to eval-
uate the extent to which either sensory or top-down adaptation can explain our
findings.
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5.2 Experiment 10
The main aim of this experiment (thereafter “Boundaries2”)5 was to examine
the role of adaptation as an alternative explanation for the sharp drop in causal
ratings after viewing the proper collision clip. To that end, prior to asking for
any causal judgements, we exposed participants to a wide range of Michottean-
like sequences, including proper collisions and clips with less extreme deviations
compared to the target clips. Thus, if adaptation is the main determinant for
the effect we observed in Experiment Boundaries1, this pre-test exposure would
significantly diminish the causal impressions even in the first judgement of the
target clip that features the most extreme deviations that participants would
have seen by that stage. In addition, since by the time participants watch the
target clip they have already experienced a variety of sequences with and without
deviations, they should be confident that the delay or the gap was not due to
some computer-related glitch but was rather an intended feature of the sequence.
In this experiment, we added a stage at the beginning where subjects passively
observe clips exemplifying the full range of object behaviours, including proper
collisions, without, however, being asked for any judgements. Moreover after the
familiarisation stage, each clip in the critical section is displayed only once (rather
than 5 times as in Experiment Boundaries1) to avoid further adaptation effects
due to the repeated exposure to the particular stimuli.
5.2.1 Participants
The experiment was conducted over the Internet using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
There were 90 participants (30 per group) with mean age 35.78 (SD=11.24) of
which 49 were female and 41 were male. Each participant was paid $0.80 for
participating. Exactly the same clips that were developed for Experiment Bound-
aries1 were reused here.
5.2.2 Design and procedure
The design was mixed factorial, as before, with type of critical clip (“gap”, “de-
lay” or “angle”) varied between participants and time of causal report (before or
5All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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after viewing the proper collision) varied within. We were mainly interested in
comparing the results of each condition with the respective condition in Experi-
ment Boundaries1, as well as investigating the extent to which reporting a causal
impression for the proper collision will influence the impression for the critical
clip, despite the fact that the familiarity with the objects and their behaviour
does not depend any more on viewing the proper collision.
Participants completed the calibration session (see Appendix A.3) and pro-
vided some basic demographics before proceeding to the main part of the experi-
ment. They were then informed that they will watch a number of short clips one
after the other and were asked to pay close attention. The clips were presented
in a random order and consisted of 3 clips with varied delay (100 ms, 150 ms and
250 ms), 3 clips with varied gap (5 mm, 10 mm and 15 mm), 3 clips with varied
angle (30, 60 and 90 degrees) and 3 proper collision clips (no delay, gap or angle).
Following the familiarisation section, the experiment proceeded as before with
the exception that each clip in the testing section was presented only once. Thus,
subjects in the “gap” condition saw a single instance of a clip with a 15 mm gap
and responded to the causal question then a proper clip followed by the causal
question and finally watched another instance of the 15 mm gap clip followed
by the causal question. Similarly participants in the “delay” group watched and
responded to two instances of a clip with a 250 ms delay interrupted by the
presentation of a proper collision and the associated causal question. Finally,
participants in the “angle” condition saw the clip where the second object moves
at a 90 degree angle, then watched the proper collision clip and then once again
the clip with the angle while reporting their causal impressions after each clip.
5.2.3 Results
As can be seen in figure 5.3, the causal ratings for the initial clips in both condi-
tions were high compared to past results but are slightly reduced compared to the
respective conditions in Experiment Boundaries1. This time 70% of participants
across conditions reported a causal impression (i.e. set the slider beyond the mid-
range point that corresponded to “don’t know” towards the causal statement)
in the first viewing of the critical clip (down from 83% in Experiment Bound-
aries1). The mean ratings were 61.10/100 (SD=40.55) for the gap clip, 67.47/100
(SD=38.38) for the delay clip and 78.30/100 (SD=32.28) for the angle clip. How-
ever, a t-test between the respective conditions in Experiments Boundaries1 and
Boundaries2 was not significant: t(58)=1.019, p=0.313, for the gap conditions,
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t(58)=1.275, p=0.207 for the delay conditions and t(58)=0.368, p=0.715 for the
angle conditions.
Similarly, the influence of reporting a causal impression for the proper collision
was somewhat reduced but retained its pivotal role in the impressions reported
for the critical clip. Mixed ANOVA was significant for the time of causal report
(before-after viewing the proper collision), F(1,58)=18.912, p<0.01 but there was
no interaction, F(1,58)=0.320, p=0.727. Paired t-tests were significant for all gap
(t(29)=2.665, p<0.05, d= 0.35), delay (t(29) = 2.577, p<0.05, d=0.50) and angle
(t(29) = 2.391, p<0.05, d=0.40) conditions.
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Figure 5.3: Mean causal impressions for each question per condition in Experiment
Boundaries2. A rating of 100 corresponds to the impression that red made blue move,
a rating of 0 to an impression that red did not make blue move, while a rating of 50
denotes indecisiveness. (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)
5.2.4 Discussion
Although the lack of adaptation may play a role in explaining the far greater
inclusivity in perceived causality reported in our experiments compared to the
literature, it is certainly not the defining factor. Our participants watched 12
clips with deviations smaller or equal to the critical clip and the vast majority
still reported a causal impression for the latter after adaptation. Thinking about
the delay condition, for example, subjects saw 9 clips with no delay between the
cause and the effect, 2 clips with a smaller delay (100 ms and 150 ms) and one
118 5.2. Experiment 10
clip with the same delay. Nevertheless, 73% of them judged that the red square
made the blue square move when the delay was 250 ms. This proportion is far
greater than what is reported in previous experiments despite the shorter delays
that were commonly used.
Our results indicate that, as predicted, it is the process of evaluating the proper
collision that has the most critical effect in reducing causal ratings for other se-
quences. In our view, this corroborates the hypothesis that the low causal ratings
in past experiments have less to do with the determinants of causal impressions in
general and are rather the result of pragmatic considerations. After the evaluation
of a proper collision, participants interpret the task differently: from a task about
determining causation to a task about reporting how representative the sequence
is of a real collision.
It might be argued that the clips we have shown at the beginning were not
adequate for participants to fully adapt to the stimuli. Perhaps if we were to
expose them to even more sequences before the target clip, we would observe a
further decrease in their causal impressions for the initial target clip. However,
the number of pre-test sequences in our experiment is similar to other studies
showing adaptation effects (Brown & Miles, 1969). Furthermore, although the
slightly decreased causal impressions in this experiment compared to Experiment
Boundaries1 can be attributed to adaptation, this result might also be accounted
for by the same hypothesis we have put forward for our main effect. Even if
during the familiarization session participants are not informed about the task,
some of them might be identifying the underlying mechanism as the most salient
difference between the various clips. If that is the case then those participants
might be interpreting our causal question as a collision faithfulness question, even
at first viewing.
While it is very difficult to set apart these two hypotheses about the role of
the familiarization clips, it is important to remember that the purpose of this
experiment was not to investigate the effect of adaptation in general but rather
to assess the extent to which the results from Experiment Boundaries1 can be
explained through perceptual adaptation. From that perspective, it is fair to
say that if 12 clips with less extreme deviations were not enough for perceptual
adaptation, we can see no way that the single proper collision shown after the
evaluation of the target clip can alter the adaptation level and subsequently the
perceived causality in the final clip.
The difference between the first and the last judgement in the first two ex-
periments could also be interpreted as a practice effect. Perhaps, irrespective
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of the particular features of the middle clip, participants simply change the way
they evaluate causality over time and over trials. In addition, while explaining
the weaker influence of the proper collision in the angle condition of Experiment
Boundaries1, we argued that the angle clip was the least similar to the proper
collision; collision faithfulness was, in that case, seen as a less appropriate way
to distinguish the sequences. To test these two hypotheses, we replaced the in-
terpolating clip in the third experiment, with a clip very dissimilar to a proper
collision. We expected that reporting a causal impression for a dissimilar clip
would not influence the way the task in interpreted and, thus, would not result in
reduced ratings after the second viewing.
5.3 Experiment 11
As discussed in the previous sections, our hypothesis for the weak causal impres-
sions reported in past studies is related to the way participants interpret the task
and the causal question they are presented with. By approaching the whole exper-
iment as a categorization task, they are searching for those features that reliably
discriminate the various sequences. If, as is our conviction, causality is not the
differentiating feature since it is phenomenally present in all sequences, the next
candidate, when proper collisions are included, is collision faithfulness.
The above hypothesis explains, in our view, why in Experiments Boundaries1
and Boundaries2 participants report significantly lower causal impressions after
watching and evaluating a proper collision. A concrete prediction deriving from
this hypothesis is that if, contrary to the proper collision, the middle clip features
a causal interaction but one that does not abide by Newtonian principles, then
there will not be a significant difference in the ratings between the first and the
last clip. So, if in all three clips one object appears to be responsible for the
behaviour of the other object and, furthermore, if in all clips the way this is
achieved is different to a Newtonian collision then the causal mechanism will not
be the decisive feature and all clips will receive equally high ratings.
In order to test this prediction, we reused the design from Experiment Bound-
aries1, this time with a very different middle clip in place of the proper collision6.
In the middle clip this experiment (thereafter “Boundaries3”), the red square ap-
proaches, as before, the blue square from the left but this time instead of the
blue moving away upon contact, its colour changes (see bottom row in Fig. 5.1).
6All the experiments presented in this thesis can be found at: http://goo.gl/qKMnL1
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According to Michotte such a qualitative change is not perceived as causal (Saxe
& Carey, 2006). Similarly, in Schlottmann & Shanks (1992) participants did not
perceive a colour change as causally efficacious, although in that case the colour
change would be the cause rather than the effect.
5.3.1 Participants
The experiment was conducted over the Internet using Amazon Mechanical Turk.
There were 90 participants (30 per condition) with mean age 32.78 (SD=11.64).
57 participants were male and 33 were female and each was paid $0.80.
5.3.2 Design and procedure
As previously, the design was mixed factorial with the type of the first and third
clips (“delay”, “gap” or “angle”) varied between participants and the time of
report (before or after viewing the colour changing sequence) varied within par-
ticipants.
The experiment was developed using Adobe Flex 4.6. The size and colour of
the objects as well as the speed and direction of their movement were all identical
to Experiment Boundaries1. The only difference is the middle clip, where instead
of featuring a proper collision, the red square approaches the blue square but
upon contact the blue square remains static and changes colour to red (Fig. 5.1,
bottom row). The two objects remain on the screen for another 1400ms and then
fade out.
The procedure was identical to Experiment Boundaries1: Participants who
successfully completed the calibration section (see Appendix A.3) saw the critical
clip 5 times in a loop and were then asked for a causal impression. Depending on
condition, the critical clip was the 15 mm gap, the 250 ms delay clip or the 90 de-
grees angle clip, identical to the respective clips used in Experiments Boundaries1
and Boundaries2. Then the “colour” clip was shown for 5 times followed by the
causal question. However, the format of the question, in this case, was slightly
modified in order to reflect the different object behaviour. In this case the question
read: “Do you have the impression that red somehow made blue change colour?”
The clarifying text was also changed to reflect the different events that take place
in the clip. Finally, the critical clip was shown again for 5 times followed by the
causal question.
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5.3.3 Results
The results are summarised in figure 5.4. For both conditions the ratings for the
first causal impression are comparable to the respective ratings in Experiment
Boundaries1. In the “gap” condition the mean rating is 66.50 (SD= 35.11), in
the “delay” condition it is 67.23/100 (SD=33.66) and in the “angle” condition it
is 79.93/100 (SD=23.41)
Interestingly the middle “colour” clip received high causal ratings across con-
ditions (mean=87.37, SD=22.63). What is even more pertinent, though, is that
the colour clip had no effect on the final causal report in either condition. In the
“gap” and the “angle” groups the causal rating was slightly increased to 71.90/100
(SD=33.30) and 82.37/100 (SD=22.37) respectively, while in the “delay” condi-
tion it was slightly decreased to 60.40 (SD=37.44). A mixed ANOVA was not sig-
nificant for either the time of causal report (before-after viewing the colour clip),
F(1,58)=0.01, p=0.901 or the interaction term, F(1,58)=1.89, p=0.157. The same
was true for paired t-tests: t(29)=0.91, p=0.37 for the “gap”, t(29)=1.34, p=0.19
for the “delay” and t(29)=1.41, p=0.17 for the “angle” condition.
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Figure 5.4: Mean causal impressions for each question in Experiment Boundaries3 per
condition. A rating of 100 corresponds to the impression that red made blue move for
the first and third bars and change colour for the second bar. A rating of 0 corresponds
to an impression that red did not make blue move (or change colour), while a rating of
50 denotes indecisiveness. (Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals)
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5.3.4 Discussion
While perceiving the colour change as the effect of a causal relationship is in-
teresting in itself, since it contrasts with previous assumptions (Saxe & Carey,
2006), the key finding is that unlike Experiments Boundaries1 and Boundaries2,
the middle clip did not reduce the ratings for the target clip. This provides evi-
dence, first of all, that the reduction observed in the other two experiments cannot
be explained away as a practice effect. For the causal ratings to be reduced it is
not sufficient that the clip is shown for a second time. In line with our hypothesis,
the particular type of clip that intervenes between the two evaluations is of critical
importance.
More specifically, participants judged the relationship featured in the middle
clip in which the second object changes colour upon contact as strongly causal,
as was the case with the “proper” collision clip in Experiments Boundaries1 and
Boundaries2. This time, however, this did not reduce the impressions reported
for the target clip. As discussed, we believe that the difference between Experi-
ments Boundaries1 and Boundaries3, the difference between the “proper” and the
“colour” intervening clip is the type of mechanism assumed. The proper clip is the
exemplar of a particular type of interaction and as such it prompts participants
to use collision faithfulness as the way to categorize the clips. In the “colour”
clip though, the type of causal relationship is equally novel so it can’t be used to
categorize the clips. Thus, in this case, the interpretation of the causal question
remains the same and so does the reported causal impression.
5.4 General Discussion
The set of studies that we presented in this chapter paint a far more inclusive
picture of causal perception. Sequences that are traditionally thought as non-
causal, such as those featuring spatial gaps, temporal delays or even sharp angles
between the cause and the effect received high causal ratings in our experiments,
even if the values used for those delays, gaps and angles were relatively extreme.
This persisted even if participants were familiar with the stimuli. The reported
causal impressions were significantly reduced only after subjects were asked to
judge how causal a proper collision, i.e. a collision with no gaps or delays, looked
like. Furthermore, we showed that this reduction was not a practice effect and
that the features of the intervening clip played a critical role: the reduction in
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causal ratings took place only if the causal mechanism in the intervening clip could
be used to differentiate between clips, as was the case in the “proper” collision
clip. In contrast, the ratings were not similarly reduced if the intervening clip was
not a known exemplar of a particular category of causal interactions.
This indicates, in our view, that the long line of studies of perceptual causa-
tion is to some degree misleading, in terms of the way in which the results have
been interpreted. While it is widely believed that sequences that deviate from
the ideal collision are non-causal, our results provide evidence that as a matter
of fact, people do have a causal impression even if the sequence does not abide
by Newtonian principles. When the task is interpreted as asking for causal im-
pressions in general, the majority reports such an impression, irrespective of wide
gaps, long delays or sharp angles. When, conversely, it is thought that the task
is a categorization one, and, moreover, when collision faithfulness can be used
to meaningfully distinguish between the clips, then participants assign the label
“causal” preferentially to sequences with Newtonian characteristics. This shows
that a Michottean sequence with a delay between the cause and the effect, for
example, might be assigned to a different category compared to one without the
delay, but that these categories are not defined by the presence or absence of
causality but by the mechanism that connects the cause and the effect.
Furthermore, our results are not the due to perceptual adaptation as has been
argued in the past (Brown & Miles, 1969; Gruber et al., 1957; Powesland, 1959;
Woods et al., 2012), although adaptation may play a role. In other words, it
is not the case that through bottom-up or top-down mechanisms participants
change what they perceive or what they report as causal depending on the stimuli
that came earlier. Our second experiment shows that exposure to sequences with
deviations, even milder ones, does not have a significant effect on reported causal
impressions.
It may appear strange that in all studies presented in this chapter, the major-
ity of participants reported an impression of causality. Perhaps it is the case that
participants are over-inclusive in their causal reports, because they lack any other
information. The degree to which people’s default assumption is the presence
rather than the absence of causality is interesting in itself but one can imagine se-
quences that do not elicit causal impressions even without additional information
(e.g. a clip in which the red object moves away from the blue object, suddenly
stops and 2 sec later the blue object starts moving in the opposite direction). In
any case, the purpose of the work presented here was not to define the boundaries
of causal perception but rather to show that whatever those boundaries are, they
are far more inclusive that current theories assume. Towards that objective, we
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presented the sequences that are traditionally thought as non-causal and showed
that people report strong causal impressions as long as they don’t misinterpret
what is being asked of them.
5.4.1 Evaluation of current theories
How is the long-standing debate about the purely perceptual vs. the inferential
nature of causation in dynamic sequences affected by our findings? First of all,
the set of studies reported here did not aim specifically at breaking the stalemate
but rather at re-evaluating the hitherto undisputed evidence upon which this
discussion is based. Nevertheless, some conjectures can be made in light of our
results.
It will probably be harder for the Michottean view that posits a modular input
analyser that transforms dynamic sequences into causal impressions to explain
our results. It may be argued that the proposed module detects causality in all
the sequences that we have presented, those including gaps or long delays, those
that feature sharp angles and colour changes. In that case, however, the module
will have to become so generic and so “non-Michottean” that a radically new
specification will be required.
The alternative was reviewed by Rips (2011) and proposes the side-by-side
operation of both the input analyser and a top-down non-perceptual process, both
contributing to the detection of causality. Our experiments show at a minimum
that causal impressions depend on more than merely the perceptual features of
a sequence. Participants actively evaluate what is being asked of them and their
causal reports reflect this evaluation.
Proponents of the Michottean approach may insist that unlike our interpre-
tation of categorization over mechanism information, the various sequences are
distinguished based on the route that delivers the causal verdict. A sequence with
a delay may be reported as causal through a top-down inferential route while a
sequence without a delay leads to the same verdict through a distinct, purely
perceptual route. Thus, after viewing the proper collision clip, participants in our
first two experiments assume that they are asked to call “causal” only what is
perceptually causal and not any other sequence.
This alternative explanation is certainly viable and we can think of no way
to experimentally distinguish between it and our mechanism-based explanation.
We note, however, that in light of our results, the Michottean explanation must
The Boundaries of Causal Perception 125
assume that very similar input data lead to identical responses through two very
distinct cognitive routes. Moreover, if participants in our experiments categorize
sequences based on the processing route taken, the Michottean approach must
posit that people have access to the route that was used to deliver the causal
impression. Of course, the most critical evidence against this explanation comes
from the causal reordering effect presented especially in Experiments Michotte1
and Michotte2. In that case, we have verified that sequences with gaps and
delays result not only in reporting strong causal impressions but, furthermore, in
changing the objective order of events based on those impressions.
It might be hard for the Michottean approach to encompass our results exactly
because it makes such precise predictions that are universal and independent of
individuals’ prior experience. The competing schema-matching approach is far
more flexible, thus, considerably harder to falsify. On the one hand, the Bayesian
approach of Sanborn and colleagues (2013) is specifically aimed at describing the
extraction of causality from quasi-Newtonian events. As such it fits both with
previous findings and our results after participants evaluate the proper collision
and, thus, start judging the fidelity of collisions rather than causation in general.
Weir’s (1978) model also requires an initial exposure to a proper collision in order
to activate the launching schema that is employed in following sequences. That
does not explain, however, why in Experiment Boundaries2, participants who
experienced proper collisions still judged those with gaps and delays to be causal
and why this was not the case in Experiment Boundaries3.
Presumably, our participants employ a different schema in order to judge
causality in the sequences with gaps, delays or colour changes for which the New-
tonian schema does not match. This fits with White’s (2006a) approach who
argues that people abstract from sequences they have experienced in the past
in order to construct generic schemata to guide their future causal judgements.
However, as we saw, White predicts that unrealistic sequences would not result
in causal impressions. He specifically describes a sequence in which the initially
static object moves at a sharp angle compared to the moving object’s pre-contact
direction, as an example that should not be judged as causal according to his
theory. This, however, is the angle sequence for which 82% of participants across
the 3 experiments (N=90) reported a strong or moderate causal impression (a
rating higher than the midway point). Generally, it is difficult to imagine how
such a sequence or the one from Experiment Boundaries3 that involved a colour
change would match any schema based on people’s previous experience, yet both
generated strong causal impressions.
A very recent approach also by White (2014) that somewhat relaxes the re-
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quirement for a stored schema and depends instead on a set of 14 cues or heuristics
to determine causality is in our view the most promising approach. All the se-
quences that we used in the studies reported here feature many of White’s cues.
For example, in the colour sequence that is probably the hardest to be matched
by a specific schema, at least 8 of those cues are present and as White’s (2014)
theory predicts it elicited a very strong causal impression. Certainly, further work
is required to validate the cues set forward by White and it would be even more
interesting if that work involved evaluating observed sequences rather than event
descriptions.
Do the current findings suggest that there is no space for a perceptual input
analyser that detects causality? Not necessarily, in our opinion. However, the
input to this module must be far more abstract than many proponents of this
view have argued for. Rather than a module for detecting causality specifically
in mechanical events, we may imagine a module that responds to the temporal
and perhaps the spatial co-occurrence of events. Rather than producing causal
verdicts, this module may flag events as potentially causally related, in the same
way that the perceptual system flags spatially neighbouring stimuli as potentially
belonging to the same object. The output of that module would then be fed into
higher level processes that would deliver the causal verdict by taking into account
non-perceptual cues, such as heuristics, schemata or full-blown causal models.
What we describe, in other words, is something like Rips’ (2011) Michottean
model but in which the various components are arranged serially rather than in
parallel. Of course this is no more than a conjecture, so a lot more work is required
if we hope to someday describe the “perceptual grammar of causality” (Scholl &
Tremoulet, 2000).
5.4.2 Perceptions of causality and the causal reordering
effect
In relation to the causal reordering effect that we observed in previous experi-
ments and especially Experiments Michotte1 and Michotte2, the results reported
here corroborate the arguments presented in chapter 3. We can, thus, be more
confident that in the three object collision shown in Experiments Michotte1 and
Michotte2, the relationship between A and B is actually seen as causal despite
the 250 ms delay and that is potentially also the case for the 16 mm gap between
B and C. Perceiving A as launching B makes the causal interpretation of the B-C
relationship a more simple and coherent explanation and that is what determines
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the perceived temporal order of the events.

CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusions
6.1 Summary of findings
The experiments presented in this thesis investigated the causal reordering effect,
the influence of causal beliefs on the perceived temporal order. We have studied
the effect in a variety of settings, in cases where causal relationships are recently
learned within the experiment or directly perceived, in single-shot and in repeated
stimuli presentations. In addition, our findings led us to re-examine the conditions
in which causal impressions are spontaneously generated in Michottean launching
events.
In Chapter 2, we presented 4 experiments where participants were required to
learn a number of novel causal relationship by interacting with a software-based
world powered by a physics engine. In experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, partic-
ipants went through an extensive training session, presented as successive stages
of a computerized puzzle game. According to the mechanics of the game, in the
experimental condition of Experiment Puzzle1 and in condition 1 of Experiment
Puzzle2, the collision of a small square with another object caused the transforma-
tion of a rectangle into a star. In the test section participants observed a sequence
where the order of these events was reversed, i.e. where the transformation pre-
ceded the collision. Nevertheless, when asked to order the events in time, the
majority reported the order that matched the causal beliefs that were acquired in
the training session, thus reversing the objective temporal order of events. On the
other hand, in the control condition of Experiment Puzzle1, i.e. where no training
was provided, most participants reported the veridical order of events.
Conflicting results where obtained in the other two experiments of that chap-
ter, where the aim was to provide further evidence for a bidirectional relationship
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between causal and temporal order. In a much simplified task featuring static
objects, although participants inferred the causal direction relying solely on tem-
poral order relationships, no consistent causal reordering effect was observed. This
inconsistency stimulated many of the experiments that were presented in the re-
mainder of the thesis.
In chapter 3, the primary aim was to investigate whether stimuli are per-
ceived and then reordered or whether the order of events is not perceived at all,
due to perceptual noise or attentional interference. We presented michottean-like
launching events featuring three objects, in which the third object starts moving
long before the second one collides with it. Despite the simplicity of the scene,
the relatively low velocities of the objects and the long delay between the target
events, the majority of participants reported the causal rather than the objec-
tive temporal order of events. In contrast, when the first object was removed
from the sequence, participants reported the correct order of events, despite the
fact that the behaviour of two critical objects remained the same. In the second
experiment of chapter 3, we introduced a behavioural measure of the reordering
effect: the observed temporally inconsistent sequence was presented side-by-side
with a normal collision, i.e. a sequence in which the temporal and the causal
order matched. When asked to identify the sequence they saw seconds earlier the
majority of participants erroneously selected the normal collision and, moreover,
reported high confidence in that choice.
Chapter 4 tested the effect against multiple presentations of the critical stim-
uli. In Experiment Repeated1, participants saw 12 3-object pseudo-collisions and
reported the order of events after each presentation. We observed a gradual im-
provement in participants’ performance. Nevertheless, a significant number of
participants insisted on the causal order for sequence types in which the spatial
configuration resembled a normal 3-object collision. In Experiment Repeated2, we
attempted to distinguish extended exposure from directed attention: in the first
part of the experiment participants made a single order judgement after watching
a 3-object reordered pseudo-collision for 5 times. In the second part, the same
task was repeated with participants being aware of the experimental question.
Our results indicate that repeated exposure reduces the causal reordering effect
but that the veridical temporal order is reported by the majority only when at-
tention is directed to the order of events. In contrast, when asked to identify
the presented clip against a normal 3-object collision, most participants made the
correct choice even in block 1, i.e. before becoming aware of the experimental
question.
Finally, in the last empirical chapter, we revisited a common assumption in
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perceptual causality literature since Michotte (1963), the idea that causal percep-
tions arise only when the spatiotemporal properties of the observed sequence abide
loosely by Newtonian principles. We have conducted 3 experiments examining a
potential confound of the above assumption, i.e. the possibility that participants
misinterpret the causal question for a collision faithfulness question. In Experi-
ment Boundaries1, participants viewed 2-object Michotean launching events that
strongly violated Newtonian rules (e.g. long delays, wide gaps) but reported strong
causal impressions. Judgements of causality were reduced only after participants
were asked to evaluate a proper collision sequence (i.e. one without deviations).
In Experiment Boundaries2, the same procedure was used but participants were
exposed to a variety of animations before their first judgement, in an effort to
evaluate the role of perceptual or high-level adaptation. Nevertheless, the results
were statistically identical to Experiment Boundaries1, despite the prolonged pre-
test exposure. In the last experiment, we evaluated the role of the intervening
clip in reducing causal judgements as observed in Experiment Boundaries1. Thus,
we replaced the middle clip (normal collision) with a clip featuring a novel causal
relationship, in which the cause is a collision but the effect is a colour change.
Despite the fact that participants reported causal impressions even in the colour
changing sequence, the colour clip did not affect causal judgements of deviant
collisions as was the case in Experiment Boundaries1.
6.2 Conclusions
So, what would you see if the glass that slipped through your friend’s fingers
shatters to pieces half a second before it touches the floor? According to the
research presented here, the answer is clear, if rather unintuitive: you would in
fact perceive the glass shattering after colliding with the floor; in the presence
of strong causal beliefs, the perception of temporal order is determined by the
assumed causal order.
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Figure 6.1: In the unlikely event that the glass shatters half a second before reaching
the ground, people will change the order in which events happened, according to our
results.
To be precise, we are not arguing that people perceive temporal order through
causal relationships. In human perception the time arrow is not reducible to the
causal arrow, as suggested by some philosophers (Grunbaum, 1968; Reichenbach,
1956; Van Fraassen, 1970). The two concepts are independent but strongly in-
terrelated. If the events whose order we are trying to discern are not causally
related, we can be very accurate when ordering them in time. In Experiments
TwoWay1 and TwoWay2, the majority of participants reported the correct order
of two events that were separated by a temporal gap as small as 50 ms. Further-
more, order judgements inform causal inferences: In the same experiments and in
the absence of any other cue, the cause was assumed to be the temporally prior
event. In the more complicated environment of Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2,
participants also relied on temporal cues, among others, to define the causal prop-
erties of abstract objects. Their success in the complex puzzle games shows that
people are very effective in a bottom-up strategy, in taking advantage of Humean
cues to infer causal links and using interventions to remove any ambiguities.
Nevertheless, we make sense of the world around us through causality. We
do not find ourselves confronted with a sequence of disjoint unrelated events but
instead by a complex web of causes and effects. As has been demonstrated else-
where, causal interpretations influence judgements of spatial relations (Scholl &
Nakayama, 2004), size (Buehner & Humphreys, 2010) trajectory (Kim et al., 2013)
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and temporal duration (Buehner, 2012). We believe that our work takes this line
of research a step further by showing that causality influences perceptions not
only quantitatively, by altering relative size and duration but most interestingly
by resulting in strong qualitative changes.
We have demonstrated the causal reordering effect in a variety of settings. In
Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, the causal links were novel and very recently
learned. However, they imposed structure in the otherwise random object be-
haviour and participants used causality to make sense of the various events and,
thus, achieve their goals. When the objects behaved outside of this learned frame-
work, when that which, up to that point, was seen as the cause occurred after its
associated effect, participants did not abandon their causal beliefs and certainly
did not assume that the effect can precede its cause. Rather, they disregarded the
objective temporal order of events and reported the causal order, the order that
was congruent with the causal interpretation of the sequence. This was best illus-
trated in Experiment Puzzle2: two groups saw the same sequence of events but
reported the opposite temporal order, the order that matched the causal beliefs
they have acquired through the different types of training that preceded.
Referring to the discussion at the beginning of this thesis regarding the na-
ture of time perception, our results agree with those philosophers arguing for an
interpreted view of temporal order (Dainton, 2010; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992;
Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Grush, 2005, 2007, 2008; Lee, 2014). It appears that
the mental representation of the order of events is not a direct reflection of the
order in which those events arrive at the retina. Rather, the cognitive system inte-
grates the order of arrival with other evidence. If, as hypothesized, there exists a
distinct mechanism for order discrimination (Mitrani et al., 1986), our results in-
dicate that inputs to that mechanism include richer sources of information besides
direct sensory input. Alternatively, rather than causal representations influencing
the generation of temporal order judgements, there might be no spontaneous rep-
resentation of temporal order at all. Since the temporal priority principle (causes
precede their effects) allows for order judgements to be inferred retrospectively,
then perhaps it is only causality that is represented.
However, causal reordering was not present in all our experiments, prompting
a more thorough investigation of the effect’s determinants. When comparing
experiments TwoWay1 and TwoWay2 against experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2
the most apparent difference was the lack of motion in the former case. This can
be interpreted as a requirement for ambiguous input signals. To some extent, this
is uncontroversial: if, for example, the effect were to take place several minutes
before the cause, then, undoubtedly, people would revise their causal beliefs and
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report the correct order of events. Even with shorter temporal gaps (Experiment
Repeated1), we saw that the prolonged exposure that presumably strengthens the
perceptual signal improves, to some extent, participants’ accuracy.
On the other hand, in Experiment Repeated2, presenting the stimulus multi-
ple times was not adequate to eradicate the reordering effect for the majority of
participants. Although that was achieved through directing participants attention
to the order of events, it is hard to determine whether that was due to attention
attenuating the input signal (Shore et al., 2001; Spence & Parise, 2010) or rather
to the weakening of causal beliefs provoked by asking an otherwise bizarre ques-
tion. As an example of the latter possibility, if one is asked whether the lamp
turned on before the switch was pushed, one almost immediately begins consider-
ing alternative causes for the lamp’s illumination. The temporal order question,
in a sense, implies the causal question.
Even if signal ambiguity is, at some level, self-evidently a factor, the more
interesting question is whether participants in experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2
were perceiving all the events in the sequence or whether they were basing their
decision on incomplete evidence. In the latter case, causal knowledge supplements
rather than replaces perceptual input. However, the results from experiments
Michotte1 and Michotte2 pointed to the former direction. Despite the relatively
slow speed in which events took place and despite the fact that the third object
started moving long before the second one approached it, participants preferred
a causal interpretation and, based on that, they were confident in reporting the
causal rather than the temporal order of events. The resulting causal impression
was so strong and the objective temporal order was ignored to such an extent,
that the majority of participants formed a mental representation of a normal
Newtonian three object collision: when asked to indicate which clip they had seen
a few seconds earlier they confidently but erroneously chose the causal clip.
More relevant to the ambiguity question, when the first object was absent par-
ticipants reported the correct temporal order and when the second object remained
static the majority correctly identified the clip they saw. Thus, we can safely ar-
gue that all the events that take place are registered; if some of the events are
omitted, a different causal impression and a different order of events is reported.
Thus, it does not seem to be the case that causality influences temporal order
perception only when the perceptual input is incomplete. Rather, the temporal
order of events and their causal relationships are in some way integrated when
forming a mental representation. How is this integration achieved though and
what determines which piece of evidence is weighted more heavily, thus governing
the resulting behaviour?
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As discussed, one critical factor is the strength of causal beliefs. Although
this is relatively difficult to quantify, we can expect that for relationships learned
during the course of the experiment (experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2) causal im-
pressions become stronger as the amount of training and the corresponding level
of exposure increases. In the case of pre-existing causal knowledge (experiments
Michotte1 and Michotte2), the spatiotemporal characteristics of the scene and
perhaps their resemblance to real world interactions will affect the resulting confi-
dence in causal interpretations, as schema-based approaches to causal perception
have suggested (Sanborn et al., 2013; Weir, 1978; White, 2012)1.
Based on the above, it appears that if we could quantify the quality of the
input signal and the strength of causal beliefs then we could model the reordering
effect as the weighted combination of the two factors. However, apart from the
independent contribution of each piece of information to the resulting impression,
we must also take into account the goals of the perceptual system. In that respect,
Gregory (1970) and more recently Clark (2013) have argued that the perceptual
system is attempting to generate the best hypothesis for the state of the external
world. Perception, in this case, is regarded as “making remarkably efficient use of
strictly inadequate, and so ambiguous, information for selecting internally stored
hypotheses of the current state of the external world” (Gregory, 1970, p.86).
What determines the best hypothesis, though, is a complicated question.
Based on one interpretation of our findings, especially those in which no reordering
effect was observed (experiments TwoWay1 and TwoWay2), we have argued that
the best hypothesis is related to the cost associated with adopting alternative hy-
potheses. While comparing experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2 against experiments
TwoWay1 and TwoWay2, we argued that the cost of adopting the non-causal
hypothesis is mainly associated with losing the ability to make sense of the envi-
ronment. Concretely, in experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2, the featured objects
have stable properties that persist throughout the experiment. Participants used
these causal properties to understand the various events and especially to predict
future outcomes and, thus, achieve their objectives. In experiments TwoWay1
and TwoWay2, however, the properties of the objects are more transient and the
objects were seen to change causal roles in the course of the experiment. There-
fore, abandoning the causal hypothesis in the first two experiments meant losing
the ability to understand and predict. In contrast, in the latter two experiments,
the world was already unpredictable and fuzzy, thus a veridical impression of the
1In Experiment Boundaries3, we saw that causal impressions are generated even from quite
unrealistic interactions, such as the case of an object changing colour when contacted by another
object. It remains a question, though, whether such an interaction appropriately modified would
still result in changing the objective temporal order of events.
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temporal order and the associated rejection of the causal relationship did not rep-
resent a significant departure compared to the way events were understood up to
that point.
In regards to experiments Michotte1 and Michotte2, the cost of rejecting the
straightforward causal hypothesis is associated with the relative simplicity of the
competing hypotheses. According to Chater and Vita´nyi (2003) “the cognitive
system should, and does, prefer patterns that provide simple descriptions of the
data” (Chater & Vita´nyi, 2003, p.19). A domino-like collision is a far simpler
description compared to the spontaneous onset of motion of the objects or the
combination of a delayed pushing and a pulling required if the veridical order of
events were retained. As such, the causal hypothesis is preferred over the alter-
natives and for the majority of participants it persists, despite repeated exposure
to the sequence, as shown in Experiment Repeated2.
Thus, although the quality of the sensory input and strength of causal beliefs
are undeniably two of the determinants of the reordering effect, the context in
which causal and temporal order judgements are made is also quite critical. In
the sections that follow we will discuss some options for future investigations of
this hypothesis and an attempt to formally describe the effect.
In all the experiments that studied the causal reordering effect we have noted
some rather unexpected results. Leaving aside the order of events, participants
in our experiments reported causal impressions in sequences that featured long
temporal delays and large spatial gaps. Since this was not predicted by exist-
ing theoretical models or previous experimental evidence, we have conducted a
number of experiments to re-assess the alleged non-causal status of Michottean
sequences that feature gaps or delays. We have found that, prior to reporting
their causal impressions in a “proper” collision, i.e. a collision abiding by New-
ton’s laws, people report causal impressions even in sequences with spatiotemporal
deviations. This was true even in the case where participants have sampled the
full range of object behaviours before their initial judgement. We concluded that
previous studies conflate general causal judgements with judgements regarding
collision faithfulness. Causal impressions are far more ubiquitous than previously
thought and it is clearly the case that in our reordered sequences gaps and delays
do not reduce the strength of those impressions.
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6.3 Implications
The relationship between temporal order perception and causal beliefs can be seen
as an example of the relationship between perception and cognition. The latter is
the subject of the long-standing debate regarding the modularity and penetrability
of perception. For Fodor (1983) and Pylyshyn (1999) certain aspects of visual
perception are completely encapsulated, impenetrable by higher order cognition.
Others have more recently (Clark, 2013; Dennett, 1993; Hurley, 1998, 2008; Vetter
& Newen, 2014) argued for a more dynamic interdependent relationship between
the two processes and even questioned whether we can indeed view perception
and cognition as two separate processes.
The significance of our findings for the above debate depends on whether we
categorize the perception of temporal order as a low level phenomenon or not2. If
temporal order is a product of early vision (Pylyshyn, 1999) then we have demon-
strated a concrete example where low level perception is indeed influenced by the
product of higher level processes. Alternatively, one could consider temporal order
a second order judgement that takes place after the early perceptual input has
been processed and, thus, our findings provide no useful evidence in that direction.
Irrespective of whether temporal order judgements are influenced at earlier
or later stages of the pipeline, our findings show that the temporal content of
experience is not mirroring the temporal structure of the environment but is the
result of an active interpretation (Dainton, 2010; Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000;
Grush, 2007). Furthermore, causality whether directly perceived or inferred is
shown to guide the way we interpret our environment. Causal impressions or
causal expectations play a very critical role in the way sensory input is interpreted.
They have been shown to affect judgements of space, size, trajectory, temporal
duration and, as we have illustrated, the order in which events appear to happen.
Apart from the theoretical implications discussed here and elsewhere in this
thesis, the fact that the perception of temporal order is malleable and, moreover,
that it can be determined by causal beliefs has also practical consequences. This
is particularly obvious in determining the validity of eyewitness testimonies. Con-
sider the case of Raoul Moat who in July 2010 died after a 6-hour stand-off with
the police, in Northumbria, UK. Although it was clear that his death was inflicted
2The same can be said about the formation of causal impressions, regarded by some as a
purely perceptual process, as we saw earlier (Michotte, 1963; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000). In
Experiments Puzzle1 and Puzzle2 , however, we saw that temporal order can be influenced even
by causal impressions that are clearly inferred based on recently learned information rather than
directly perceived.
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by a gunshot wound to the head from his own gun, policemen used taser guns
very close to the time when Moat’s gun fired. Following the incident there was
an inquest to determine, among others, whether policemen fired their taser guns
before Moat shot himself, thus potentially causing Moat’s muscles to contract and
fire the shot or whether the taser guns were fired afterwards and thus Moat com-
mitted suicide. According to the findings that we have presented here, the validity
of the statement of an eyewitness about the time when the taser guns were fired
should be considered in relation to the prior attitude of the witness regarding the
victim’s and the policemen’s intentions. If, for example, the eyewitness perceived
the policemen to be aggressive or impatient and thus likely to end the long stand-
off, then it is possible that even if the witness was truthful, she could be actually
changing the order of events to fit her causal assumptions.
Our findings could also prove useful in the training of professionals operating
in fast-paced environments. Think about a soccer referee that has to decide
whether the striker was tackled by the defender or whether he “dived” to trick
the referee into believing that a foul was committed. On many occasions, this
decision depends on a temporal order judgement: did the striker lose his balance
before or after the defender attempted the sliding tackle? A referee who considers
a striker particularly deceitful or a defender especially aggressive might actually
perceive the order of events differently compared to a referee who is not thus
biased. Making causal beliefs explicit and considering their influence on perception
might help improving the quality of the decisions in fast paced environments or
the dependability of witnesses’ testimonies.
6.4 Future directions
Throughout this thesis, we have set forth a number of hypotheses, some of which
were backed by our findings, others remained as conjectures. Therefore, one can
think of a variety of possible experiments to corroborate or refute the suggestions
we have made. For example, it would be fruitful to study the reordering effect
in the presence of motionless stimuli, in order to determine whether motion is
a necessary component. More interestingly, in a study similar to experiments
TwoWay1 and TwoWay2, one could vary the stability of the causal properties
of the objects in order to examine our proposal that the causal reordering effect
depends on the hitherto perceived predictability of the environment. Similarly, it
would be interesting to verify whether the presence or absence of readily available
alternative hypotheses would, as predicted, reduce the level of reordering. Finally,
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if we could devise a study in which participants are actively trying to determine
the order of events when presented with the stimuli without, however, doubting
the causal relationships, we could better assess the role of directed attention in
the reordering effect.
However, rather than expanding on ideas that we have discussed elsewhere
in the text, in the remaining of this section, we will propose directions that are
significantly different to what we have already seen.
6.4.1 Modelling the reordering effect
If we were attempting to model the causal reordering effect in order to more
accurately describe its determinants, one would assume, based on our findings,
that it depends on the causal impression generated given the spatial and temporal
properties of the observed animated sequence. Moreover, the causal impression
seems to depend on prior causal beliefs, provided that we ignore the possibility
of a modular input analyser (Michotte, 1963) or in situations where the latter
does not apply. Figure 6.2 shows a simple causal model that captures the above
description.
Spatial Cues
Causal 
Beliefs
Causal 
impression
Temporal order
judgement
Temporal cues
Figure 6.2: Potential way to model the causal reordering effect. The final temporal order
judgement depends on the timing of the events and the perceived causality. The latter is
influenced by both the spatial (e.g. A’s final location) and the temporal properties of the
animation as well as prior causal beliefs. The dashed arrow from “judgements” to “be-
liefs” signifies the fact that the current judgement will influence held beliefs (posteriors)
which will affect the next causal impression and so on.
One could then test this model by varying, for example, the spatial and tem-
140 6.4. Future directions
poral characteristics of the scene and calculating the probability of a causal im-
pression and from that the probability of reporting the temporal or the causal
order of the events. In fact, Experiment Repeated1 was originally part of a set of
experiments with exactly that purpose. However, as we saw, the spatial features
of the clip, i.e. the resting location of object A, did not have the predicted effects
on the reported temporal order. For example, we observed a strong reordering
effect, even if object A stopped above object B (see Fig. 4.1a). This was also the
case for the temporal features of the sequence: in experiments not reported here,
we found that the reordering effect persists irrespective of the time that elapses
between the onset of motion of objects C and B, at least within the range of delays
that we have tried (80 - 400 ms)3. As discussed earlier, we believe that this can
be explained by the fact that the persistence of a belief is not defined solely by
the input that caused it but also by the potential cost of abandoning it.
Another option in modelling the strength of causal impressions and quantifying
their influence on temporal order judgements would be to use the concept of causal
strength as proxy. Despite the apparent similarity of the two terms, the concepts
they describe are quite different. Strength of causal beliefs refers to the confidence
one has in that a causal relationship obtains. Causal strength, on the other hand,
describes the perceived strength of a causal link, the perceived frequency with
which it obtains. One, for example, can have a strong belief in a weak causal
relationship, such as being certain that sometimes smoking causes lung cancer.
However, in certain circumstances the two concepts can be related. The more
often one encounters smokers with lung cancer, the higher the assumed strength
in the relationship and the more confident one will be in that the relationship
holds.
The advantage, from our perspective, is that there have been many attempts
to quantify causal strength over the past years (Cheng, 1997; Jenkins & Ward,
1965; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Thus, we can imagine that, especially regarding
a novel causal relationship, as the cause-effect coincidence increases (∆P ), not
only the perceived causal strength but also the confidence in the stability of that
relationship will increase. Thus by varying ∆P and observing its result on the
probability of reordering, we can better characterize relationship between causal
beliefs and reordering.
This approach, however, does not take into consideration the cost associated
with abandoning causal beliefs which, in our view, has a critical role. Although,
3This observation prompted us to conduct experiments Boundaries1, Boundaries2 and
Boundaries3 where we observed the ubiquity of causal impressions, despite gaps, delays, an-
gles etc.
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as discussed, there can be several parameters associated with the latter consider-
ation, one can make the simplifying assumption that the probability of abandon-
ing a causal hypothesis depends also on the availability of alternatives. Cheng’s
(1997) Power PC theory greatly advanced previous covariation-based approaches
by including in the calculation of causal strength not only the co-occurrence of
causes and effects but also the probability that the effect was caused by alterna-
tive events. Thus, we can modify our three object paradigm used in Experiments
Michotte1, Michotte2 and Repeated2, to include an alternative cause, for example
a fourth square D colliding with square C. Then, by varying the probability of A
launching B and of C launching D and measuring the probability of reordering
and assuming that in this scenario the causal power (Cheng, 1997) is a reliable
proxy for the strength of causal beliefs, we can better assess the role of the latter
in the causal reordering effect.
6.4.2 Using the causal reordering effect as a measure of
causal beliefs
In the opposite direction of what we considered above, one can think of the reorder-
ing effect as a way to evaluate the generation of causal impressions from visual
stimuli. As we saw, most of the studies on phenomenal causation, including the
experiments presented in chapter 5 relied on participants’ explicit reports to deter-
mine perceived causality. It has been noted (Choi & Scholl, 2006; Schlottmann et
al., 2006) that such direct reports may reflect not only causal impressions but also
higher level considerations. We have argued, for example in chapter 5, that it is
unclear whether participants in studies employing repeated measures are report-
ing impressions of causality or alternatively impressions of collision faithfulness,
depending on how the task and the causal question are interpreted.
Another option is to evaluate causal impressions using spontaneous verbal re-
ports (Beasley, 1968; Boyle, 1960; Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann et al., 2006) but
these are often difficult to analyze, open to interpretation and not immune from
some of the confounds mentioned above. Yet another method was proposed by
Choi and Scholl (2006). In their experiments, rather than using explicit judge-
ments, they assessed causal impressions indirectly through what is known as “rep-
resentational momentum” (Choi & Scholl, 2006; Hubbard, Blessum, & Ruppel,
2001; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2002). It has been argued that in a classical Michot-
tean launching display there is the expectation that the launched object will stop
at a distance proportional to the force that was exerted to it by the launchee.
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Hubbard and colleagues (Hubbard et al., 2001; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2002) varied
the speed of the launchee and through that the perceived transferred momentum
and asked participants to report the resting location of the launched object. Ac-
cording to the results, participants misremembered the resting position in a way
proportional to the speed of the launcher. It was proposed (Choi & Scholl, 2006)
that “representational momentum” can thus be used to indirectly but more reli-
ably measure causal impressions, at least in relation to the perceived force that
was exerted (although see (Choi & Scholl, 2006) for some concerns regarding this
approach).
Here we propose that in order to assess the presence of causal impressions, in
general, without relying on explicit reports, one could use the causal reordering
effect. In other words, instead of asking participants directly for a causal rating
we could be presenting the events in an order incongruent to the causal order and
ask for temporal order judgements. This procedure was illustrated in Experiment
Repeated1, although the experiment was not designed for that purpose. We saw
that the spatial position of object A determined the reported order of the motion
of objects B and C. Since the latter was identical in all conditions, we observed,
for example, that a resting position of A above object B generates a stronger
impression than when A stops below B. Of course this procedure requires further
validation of the relationship between causal impressions and temporal order per-
ception. Additionally, it requires events that can be temporally reordered which
potentially restricts the range of its applications.
6.4.3 The susceptibility of children in the causal reorder-
ing effect
An especially prominent avenue for further exploring causal reordering is investi-
gating the extent to which children are also susceptible to the effect. Whether that
is the case or not depends on two factors. First, do children have causal impres-
sions in sequences deviating from Newtonian principles, e.g. sequences with gaps
and delays? Previous research indicates that children are as sensitive as adults to
spatiotemporal deviations (Cohen & Amsel, 1998; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes,
1994; Schlottmann, Allen, Linderoth, & Hesketh, 2002) although there is evidence
that preschool children are more tolerant to delays (Schlottmann et al., 2002).
The second factor that would determine the presence of the reordering effect in
children is whether causality at an early age is seen as unidirectional, as is the case
with adults. We have reviewed studies showing that children do indeed expect
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causes to precede their effects (Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Rankin & McCormack,
2013) but there has also been evidence to the contrary (Shultz & Mendelson,
1975).
An experiment similar to experiments Michotte1 and Michotte2, suitably adapted
for children, would be very illuminating irrespective of the outcome. If children,
like adults, change the order of events to match a causal interpretation, there
would be solid evidence for the fact that children respect and even impose tem-
poral precedence, the belief that causes always precede their effects. At the same
time, as was the case with adults, there would be some evidence that children
perceive causality despite the presence of gaps and delays. Alternatively, if chil-
dren report the correct order of events, it would perhaps mean that temporal
order perception is less flexible, less interpreted in early life. One could further
argue, in that case, that the role of causality in interpreting the environment fol-
lows some developmental trajectory and depends on learning and adapting to the
environment. Perhaps as we grow up, the causal lens through which we perceive
the environment becomes progressively more and more inescapable.
6.5 Conclusion
We have presented evidence showing that people misperceive the order in which
events take place in the presence of strong causal expectations. Does this con-
stitute an error of the cognitive system? Although the glass will probably never
break before colliding with the ground, one can imagine situations where erroneous
causal beliefs will persist despite available evidence for the contrary. However, this
is a small price to pay for the advantages gained by relying on causality when in-
terpreting our environment. Immunity to the causal reordering effect essentially
means spending valuable resources in re-examining the temporal and, perhaps,
the spatial properties of each and every interaction that takes place around us to
determine case-by-case whether what we just saw was indeed a causal interaction.
Some level of accuracy is, thus, sacrificed to preserve resources and immensely
increase the speed in which we parse our surroundings. So, in essence, what we
have done in this thesis is fabricate an unlikely situation purposefully designed to
trick an otherwise highly efficient system. In the process, we have, hopefully, shed
a ray of light into how this mysterious system works.
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APPENDIX A
Conducting perceptual experiments online
All the experiments reported in this thesis were conducted online and the majority
used Amazon Mechanical Turk for subject recruitment. Given that psychological
experiments and especially those investigating perceptual processes are tradition-
ally performed in the lab, can we trust the results reported here? In particular,
does running an experiment over the Internet result in more noisy, less depend-
able data? More specifically, does the population of “workers” in Mechanical Turk
constitute a representative sample of the overall population? And, finally, is the
variability in hardware and software configurations inherent in an online exper-
iment running over multiple computers prohibitive for perceptual experiments,
especially those with graphical animations and time-sensitive features?
A.1 Psychological experiments over the web
Despite web-based experiments becoming more and more common, there remains
a suspicion regarding the quality of the collected data. The source of that sus-
picion is primarily related with the unsupervised nature of online experiments.
Unavoidably, there is minimal control over the selection of participants and, more
importantly, over the conditions under which the experimental task is performed.
The experimenter cannot verify the validity of the provided data (e.g. demograph-
ics), the environment in which the task is performed or whether participants are
showing the required diligence while performing the task (Germine et al., 2012;
Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2000; Kraut et al., 2004).
To address these suspicions, there have been numerous studies over the past
decade comparing web-based and lab-based data, providing strong evidence against
the above suspicions. Gosling et al. (2000), for example, compared a huge set of
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questionnaire data collected online (N=361.703) against lab-based data and found
that online participants are equally motivated and that the resulting data is con-
sistent with data collected in the lab. Similarly, McGraw, Tew, and Williams
(2000) obtained “textbook” results for both within and between-subjects effects
in a number of diverse tasks such as reaction times, perception of visual stimuli
and attention. The convergence of web-based and lab-based data was also con-
firmed in a similar study by Germine et al. (2012) who concluded that “collecting
data from uncompensated, anonymous, unsupervised, self-selected participants
need not reduce data quality, even for demanding cognitive and perceptual exper-
iments” (Germine et al., 2012, p.847).
A.2 Participants in Mechanical Turk
Another common suspicion is related to the diversity and representativeness of
online subject pools, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, which affect the potential
generalizability of the findings. This suspicion is driven by both the anonymity of
online participants and the, nowadays aged assumption that Internet users belong
to a specific demographic, specifically of “young, White, upper middle-class men”
(Gosling et al., 2000, p.94).
Of course, the assessment of the quality and diversity of any subject pool
has to take into consideration the respective characteristics of the pools that
are traditionally used. A truly random and diverse sample is very difficult, in
not impossible, to achieve in most psychological studies (Azar, 2000). Concerns
regarding the diversity of participants in lab-based experiments have been raised,
irrespective of the online alternative (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). The
majority of participants in lab based experiments are undergraduate students
(Azar, 2000; Sears, 1986), therefore relatively young and educated. It is often the
case that they are recruited within the department conducting the study, so the
sample is additionally skewed towards, for example, psychology students, with the
added risk of having participants relatively familiar with the aims of the research.
In contrast, participants recruited through Mechanical Turk are relatively more
variable in terms of age, income, education level and nationality(Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Gosling et al., 2000; Ipeirotis, 2010; Ross, Irani, S.,
Zaldivar, & Tomlinson, 2010). For example, the mean age of participants in the
experiments reported here was about 30 with a standard deviation around 10,
which is far more diverse than what would be the case if we were following the
traditional route. Therefore, although participants in Mechanical Turk are not
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precisely representative of the population as a whole (Ross et al., 2010), online
recruitment signifies, in fact, an advancement in respect to the diversity of par-
ticipants.
Furthermore, the convenience, speed and cost effectiveness of running online
studies allows for larger samples and multiple studies replicating the main study
or investigating closely-related issues. For example, the total number of people
that participated in the experiments described in this thesis, as well as other non-
reported confirmatory or exploratory studies exceeds 3000, with an approximate
cost of about £1000. This is especially important in the face of recently raised con-
cerns regarding the replicability of psychological experiments (Kahneman, 2012;
Shanks et al., 2013).
A.3 Enforcing the uniform presentation of stim-
uli over the Internet
Although the diversity and diligence of online participants is evidently on par
with or better than that of lab participants, the diversity of the hardware and the
software on which the experiment is run might be a source for concern. In other
words, even if participants are completely honest and focused, their behaviour
depends on the consistency of the presented stimuli which might be at risk when
the experimental software is executed in variable and largely uncontrolled config-
urations.
The majority of the experiments reported here featured animated sequences,
required a relatively close control of the timing of the various events and investi-
gated the way the stimuli were perceived. Such experiments are usually conducted
in controlled conditions in order to ensure the uniformity of the presented stimuli
(although see (Hecht, Oesker, Kaiser, Civelek, & Stecker, 1999)). So, how can
we achieve a similar level of uniformity given that we have no control over the
hardware or the software (i.e. browser) used to display our stimuli?
Our approach was twofold: first, we took special measures to limit the potential
stimulus variability prospectively and then, we recorded a number of variables
while the experiment was running. More specifically, the main source of variability
for online applications is both hardware and software related and may result in
deviations both in the size of the presented objects and in the temporal duration
of events. In terms of software, we chose the Flex SDK that allows for a minimum
level of control over the timing of the stimuli while it compiles into the SWF
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file format and targets Flash Player making it browser-independent and relatively
encapsulated (Reimers & Stewart, 2007). In the rest of this appendix we describe
the steps we took to reduce temporal and spatial variability.
A.3.1 Temporal Variability
Regarding the timing of the stimuli, although for most of our experiments small
deviations would be acceptable, we recorded the minimum number of frames per
second (fps) displayed at any time during the experiments. It should be noted
that a low frame rate might be due to aged hardware or alternatively to the Flash
player losing focus, i.e. the user switching to another program or another tab in
the browser. Furthermore we also recorded the actual onset time for the critical
events.
For all the reported experiments we conducted additional analyses after re-
moving participants that significantly deviated either in their frame rates and/or
the recorded duration of critical events. However, there was no case where the
results differed in any interesting way depending on whether those participants
were removed or not. This can probably be explained by the fact that the reported
findings depend mainly on the relative rather the absolute onset of events and,
furthermore, by the fact that the temporal parameters we used were in the range
of 200-300 ms, making a 30-50 ms deviation unimportant.
A.3.2 Size Variability: Calibration Section
Turning now to the issue of enforcing a consistent size of objects, the main problem
is the variable monitor sizes and especially the variable ppi (pixels per inch).
Although the area where the critical clips are displayed was standard (around
1000x500 pixels), a pixel has varying dimensions depending on the exact ppi and
this can result in variable object sizes. Without any way to access the actual ppi
value, especially from within a web browser, we had to resort to more practical
solutions.
In experiments Michotte1, Michotte2, Repeated2, Boundaries1, Boundaries2
and Boundaries3, before proceeding to the actual experiment every participant
had to go through a calibration session (programmed in DHTML+Ajax). This
involved using an optical disc (CD, DVD etc), a credit card or a dollar note (all
participants were from the US) in order to match the size of the respective virtual
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object that appeared on screen. The participant would place, for example, her
credit card on her screen where a virtual credit card was displayed and would use
the provided controls to increase or decrease the size of the virtual card so that
the virtual and the actual cards matched in size (the same would occur if using a
dollar note or an optical disc).
Given the standard size of those particular objects, we then compared the size
of the actual object against that of the virtual object as set by the participant,
in order to derive the effective ppi. This value was then used to define the size
of the objects and the distances in our experiments, thus ensuring consistency of
stimuli among participants.
After the calibration section and before proceeding to the actual experiment,
participants had to answer two further questions. The first displayed a horizontal
line on the screen and required from the participants to use a ruler in order to
measure it and then input their measurement. The size of the line was dependent
on the ppi value derived during the calibration section. Participants had a single
chance to enter the correct value. An incorrect value resulted in the premature
termination of the experiment and no data was recorded.
The second question asked participants to report their approximate physical
distance from their monitor. The two options were: “I can more or less touch
the screen if I extend my arm” and “I am further away from the screen”. Re-
peated analyses excluded participants that selected the second option but again
no significant differences were observed.
A.3.3 Restricting participation to 1 per participant
With online studies there is always the risk that some participants will attempt to
do the experiment more than once. To prevent that from happening we advised
participants against attempting to redo the same experiment twice and we used
a combination of their IP address and their Mechanical Turk Worker ID. The IP
was recorded on our server after the initial instructions and before presenting any
stimuli. In some cases, participants were warned against using the back button
on their browser or refreshing the page as this would result in the termination of
the experiment. Participants with an IP address that was already on our server
were not allowed to participate.
Of course, most Internet Service Providers assign dynamic IP addresses there-
fore it is possible that the IP of a participant would change (possible but im-
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probable especially within a short period of time). However, all the experiments
reported here constituted a single “Batch” in Mechanical Turk, meaning that no
subject with the same Worker ID could participate twice.
Thus in order for someone to participate twice in any of our experiments he
or she would have to ignore our request, maintain two Mechanical Turk accounts
and use computers in different networks or find a way to renew their IP address.
